26. Editorial Note
According to Department of State Objectives Paper, NATO/G–2, November 28, 1969, the overriding U.S. objectives at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting in Brussels, December 4–5, included maintaining “momentum and cohesion in Allied initiatives in the area of East-West relations, denying to the extent possible a Soviet propaganda march, assuring public understanding of the Allied approach, and, above all, making serious progress, where possible, on the hard issues that are the basic causes of East-West tension.” More specifically, the United States should seek to advance the cause of balanced force reductions (BFR), mediate a compromise position on NATO’s formal attitude toward a European security conference, and mitigate Allied fears of imminent reductions of U.S. troops in Europe. (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 420) Reports on the meet-ing are in telegrams 5570, December 4, and 5571, December 5, from USNATO. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, NATO 3 BEL (BR)) The text of the final communiqué and declaration are in NATO Final Communiqués, 1949–1974, pp. 226–232.