[Page 564]

158. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Meeting at Junta Geral, Angra do Heroismo, Terceira, Azores

PRESENT

  • The President
  • President Pompidou
  • Mr. Andronikof
  • Major General Walters

The President opened the conversation by saying he appreciated this opportunity of having this first of his meetings with Heads of Major Governments with the President of France. Their meeting, quite apart from the usual matters they would discuss, had attracted world attention. Obviously what France and the U.S. could agree upon was of great importance to Europe and to the world. Some of these matters were highly technical in which President Pompidou was more learned than he himself was in such fields as the monetary and trade questions. These were matters they might well discuss at the afternoon meeting after a chance to see what their positions were in other areas. He was prepared to handle it any way President Pompidou preferred and as far as he was concerned the agenda was open. He would like to discuss Europe with its problems, the South Asian situation (India-Pakistan) and, of course, bilateral problems and finally the tough problem of the monetary situation which, if President Pompidou agreed, they could discuss that afternoon.

President Pompidou said he was agreeable to this.

President Nixon then said he was prepared to discuss any other matters that might be of interest to President Pompidou. Did he have any suggestions.

President Pompidou said that if they spoke of Europe, America, the Soviet Union, China, Asia and even Australia, the most interesting [Page 565]in his view, outside of the monetary problem, but part of it was the relations between Western Europe on one hand and East-West relations on the other, that is relations between Western Europe and the U.S. and the Soviet Union and its allies.

President Nixon then said it seemed to him that in looking at his problem, it was not just a monetary problem but an area involving political relations as well. In this, cooperation between France and the U.S. was the keystone. For that reason if he and President Pompidou arrived at some understanding, it would aid progress in the political field as well and have a great effect on the rest of Europe and the eventual outcome.

There was a curious situation in regard to the monetary situation. Some writers said that France was the key, others the U.K., Germany, Italy or the Japanese. In any event all have different problems in that area. But the relationship between France and the U.S. is central to a solution. This is also true in the political area. One of the major contributions that has been made in the past three years has been the closer relationship that has developed between France and the U.S. Fortunately, we also had good relations with General De Gaulle as President Pompidou knew. President Pompidou and he had carried on in the same spirit that De Gaulle and President Nixon had established in 1969.

One thing that might be useful would be for him to get President Pompidou’s appraisal of the Soviets. He himself had not met either Brezhnev or Kosygin. President Pompidou had been to Moscow and had seen them in France.3 The President would like this only for guidance and was not seeking confidential disclosures but he would be interested to get President Pompidou’s views of the Soviets, their intentions and his analysis of them.

President Pompidou said that first of all, in reply to what President Nixon had so kindly said about French and U.S. relations, he would sum up in three or four sentences his political philosophy. France is a Western country. This was true historically and in sentiment. She was determined to remain a friend and ally of the U.S. France had close to her the Soviet Armies and the mass of the Soviet Union. In such circumstances only two policies were possible. Either she hid behind a wall or tried to understand one another. In a third area he believed that it was necessary to give Western Europe as much economic unity as possible and later political unity and, if all went well, equally so in the Defense area because this is the only possible counterweight to the USSR. All the more so because he was sure that the U.S. progressively would not want to bear all of the burden of their presence in Europe. As he had [Page 566]told the President, he hoped it would not happen soon but it (a U.S. withdrawal) would take place and they needed a United Europe to face the East. This was in part necessary because Germany is at present very strongly anchored to the West but one could never know for sure what form their evolution could take as only the Soviets could give them what they wanted: unification. Perhaps someday the Germans might decide to give priority to this. One could wonder. He also believed that the development of this policy of European Unity and détente with the East is favored by the existence of China and the fact that the Soviets are not looking for crises in Europe and are very concerned with Asia. This results as he told Chancellor Brandt in the greatest difficulty in the construction of Europe, that is, the definition of its relationship with the U.S. Fundamentally vis-à-vis the Soviets the Europeans have a common position of détente and vigilance. On Asian problems the Europeans can get together because they are not directly concerned. With regard to Africa they would like to tie Africa as close to Europe as possible. France and the U.K., despite difficulties, did have some influence in this area.

The difficulty lay in the equitable distribution of the financial and economic burden and establishing the political relationship as one of alliance but not simple subordination. Herein lay the difficulty. By that he meant, not that it was impossible but delicate to define. Here lay the reason for the fact that France had a role to play that was greater than her intrinsic power. Fundamentally, Chancellor Brandt and Germany needed a France not too concerned by their Ostpolitik. They needed her blessing. Everyone in Europe was counting on France to defend certain commercial and financial interests with the United States. It is a comfortable situation for them. In case of any difficulty they can say, “Well, it’s the French.” In reality there remain in the USSR great apprehensions regarding Germany. These memories mean that the present Soviet leaders prefer France to have an important role in Europe rather than see the leadership go to Germany by default. This is not awkward for the United States. There is in France a Government determined not to let the Communists come to power. He would now return to what the President had said about the Soviet leaders.

He had seen Kosygin three times and Brezhnev three times. He had been to the USSR as Prime Minister and had seen both Brezhnev and Kosygin. He had seen Kosygin as Prime Minister.4 He had returned to the USSR as President and, as President Nixon knew, Brezhnev had recently been in France. They were very different men. [Page 567] Kosygin’s temperament is not very gay. He was very studious on economic and technical problems. He was fascinated by industrial progress. He was from Leningrad and in this respect he was perhaps more reserved towards Germany than others. He was afraid of the Germans and if pushed might react violently. Brezhnev was a Ukrainian and a Southerner. He was jovial and cordial and liked to eat and drink. He was folksy, liked good cars. He owned a Rolls Royce, a Mercedes, a Citroën and a Maserati. He did not yet have a Mustang. President Nixon commented that Brezhnev had all kinds of cars but not an American one. President Pompidou said that a 21L looked like an American car. Brezhnev liked good living. He was easy in conversation but in depth he was very tough. He was permanently conscious of the importance of military power but was also aware that he had to raise the living standards of his fellow citizens. We were close to a period of anniversaries. The U.S. would soon celebrate its 200th Anniversary, the French were celebrating the 100th Anniversary of the Republic. Brezhnev wanted to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Constitution and to them commemorate means to distribute more consumer goods to the people. Brezhnev counted on France and Germany and the West in general to furnish the means of rapidly producing more consumer goods. He is determined to import consumer goods if necessary. Despite all of this he never forgets the importance of power and at the bottom of things Soviet Policy presents two characteristics:

1. It is like a river—if it finds a hollow, it flows in until stopped by rock.

2. It is obsessed by China constantly.

For now the Soviets are desirous of accentuating détente in Europe and would like to conclude their agreements with the Germans and obtain the ratification of the treaties. They are in a hurry. They watch without pleasure the formation of the Common Market. Above all they are concerned with everything that happens in Asia and try to cut the ground from under Chinese ambitions. They are presently more concerned with Chinese potential than ambitions.

President Pompidou said that he had mentioned that the Soviet leaders were obsessed with China. The dream of Yalta may not be over for Soviets who may still dream of sharing the world with the U.S. This is a deeply rooted idea. China disturbs this idea and they don’t like it. President Pompidou said that leaving aside current events (Indo-Pakistan War)5 he believed the Soviets would seek to reach agreement with the U.S. But one must understand, and this President [Page 568] Nixon knew as well as he did, that to them an arrangement means retreat nowhere and advance whenever possible. This is true of all powerful people!

President Nixon said that this analysis by President Pompidou was very perceptive and very candid. It was extremely helpful and he could assure the French President that his candor would be respected and his confidence would not be betrayed. He would like to ask a question: Which did the Soviets fear most—China or the U.S.? President Pompidou replied that they feared China most, not immediately but they felt they could do nothing against China which was indestructible by its mass and in 20 to 50 years it will be so enormous that they will not be able to cope with it. Next they fear Germany. They feel Germany is capable of fomenting something. With the U.S. they feel complicity.

President Nixon said that there was one difference. They feared China certainly and Germany possibly because they are neighbors and might be a threat from a territorial standpoint. While they fear American power, they do not fear any U.S. territorial ambitions against them. He believed that in the broad landscape President Pompidou had painted we should now look at the pieces and see how those pieces could be moved to our advantage rather than theirs. To begin with, in respect to the relationship between Western Europe and the U.S., it was no secret that the Germans felt that the U.S. could not be depended on. The reasons were they felt that it was inevitable that the U.S. would withdraw from Europe except perhaps for a small force but the U.S. could not be counted upon to risk its survival to defend Europe in a nuclear war. The actions of the U.S. Senate, the Mansfield Amendment6 reinforces that point of view. It was all well and good for us to make the usual protests that the U.S. would stand by the European countries and that we could be counted on. In the final analysis what determines U.S. and French policy is self interest. This was the basis for his contention that the U.S. and Western Europe, despite some differences of which they were aware, were inextricably tied together. In the long term it would be disastrous for the U.S. to leave Europe as a hostage to the USSR. That is why it was necessary for the U.S. and Europe to have close economic relations. Militarily it was vital to the U.S. to preserve Europe and to remain and not to reduce its forces unless on a very clear multilateral basis such as a reduction vis-à-vis the Communist bloc would be disastrous. MBFR had begun in 1968 before he was elected. U.S. policy was that it must be pursued on a multilateral basis. We had yet to find any formula by which such a reduction would not downgrade our interests in relation to the Soviet bloc. We could continue the [Page 569] Brosio discussions7 and consult to the extent that President Pompidou desired. Personally the President was very skeptical. His concern was that MBFR be used simply to obtain a U.S. withdrawal. Only with a visible U.S. presence could we maintain our interest. The Soviets know this and that is why they want us out as soon as possible.

In the matter of our talks with the Soviets either at SALT or in May when the President would meet with Brezhnev and Kosygin 8 he wished to assure President Pompidou that there would be absolutely no U.S. Soviet talks apart from or at the expense of the European Alliance. President Pompidou had spoken of the Soviet interest in a Yalta type agreement with the U.S. Many in the U.S. felt that Yalta was very detrimental for Europe politically and economically and basically beneficial to the USSR and detrimental to the U.S. Therefore the President looked on the forthcoming talks as very tough and hard. The Soviets want progress on trade. This is possible but will not be nearly as great as many think. Some progress on arms limitation may be possible if there is an equal deal on other subjects. However, there must be a clear understanding that during this period when the Soviets have nuclear parity with the U.S. this does not mean that the Soviets can get away with a policy to humiliate the U.S. or weaken the U.S. in defense of the position of its allies in Europe.

It seemed to the President that in this framework the maintenance of strength and cohesion was more important then ever. The U.S. in the long run cannot have a viable world without Europe. Europe cannot survive without the U.S. contribution to nuclear strength at this time. The Soviets know this and would like to divide the U.S. and Europe. The Soviets also know that at the heart of the European problem are the Germans. President Pompidou could not be more correct when he pointed out that Germany, which is the heart of Europe, is always potentially, despite its cultural and economic ties to the West, drawn towards the East. The East holds millions of Germans as hostages. This is why we must keep Germany economically, politically and militarily tightly within the European Community. Ostpolitik is a nice concept and can win a Nobel Prize. President Pompidou or himself in Brandt’s place might do the same. But politically it was dangerous to risk old friends for those who would never be friends. We should be very tough with the Soviets on the matter of European security. The agreements with Brandt should be signed sealed and delivered. Into this picture now come France, Britain and Germany. If President Pompidou and he, in the course of their meetings, could, without being belligerent (which [Page 570]neither he nor President Pompidou wanted), reach a strong understanding on principles, it would be helpful and not just for both countries. It would help his meetings with the Germans and with the U.K. to make progress on Europe. We must realize that many cynics and some honest people felt that when France left NATO that this meant the end of the European Alliance. The President was aware that France remains in the Alliance but is outside the Integrated Military Structure. He felt we would play into the hands of our potential opponents if it appeared that France, except for some economic ties, was determined to go her own way in a race to Moscow. The President was not suggesting that France and others should not have independent policies towards the East. This was why he was having meetings with our Western European Allies so as to make crystal clear in our initiatives with the Soviets and the Chinese that our primary allegiance is to the West, not in any sense of belligerence but that is where our interests lie. This will help in making a better deal with the Soviets.

One of the reasons, as he had mentioned earlier, why he sought improved relations with the French by meeting with General De Gaulle. Some people who were whistling in the dark believed we could build a European relationship without France. The President said that it was his belief that there could be no viable Europe without France. Just as France is not viable without Europe and to square the circle he did not believe that even the U.S. could in the long run pursue a policy of isolation. Our fate was tied up with that of Europe.

President Pompidou then said that the President had brought up a number of attitudes by Democrats, Mansfield and others, in the Senate which was really more significant than Pearl Harbor. In other words, in the hypothesis of a major conflict it is not just part of the U.S. Fleet that might be destroyed but Western Europe which would be lost to the Soviets. The U.S. would, of course, revenge them, but this would be small consolation to the Europeans in the cemetery. The President agreed.

President Pompidou then said that he had three remarks to make about what the President had said. Brezhnev had spoken a great deal about MBFR. He drew an idyllic picture of almost no soldiers in Europe in 10 years. In any case, France will not diminish her military effort. She will pursue it whatever happens. The President commented that this was “good”.

President Pompidou said that he had told Chancellor Brandt about what the President had said of the danger that negotiations might be a pretext for U.S. opinion to demand the departure from Europe of the U.S. Forces. The Chancellor had replied that the U.S. Forces should not leave unless the Russians went too. President Pompidou said he must admit that he did not understand the German attitude on this point. They should be the most hostile to the reductions envisaged in MBFR. [Page 571]After all, they would be the first to be endangered. He must say that Brandt had told him that he was hostile to the neutralization or “Finlandization” of Germany. But the day the U.S. leaves Germany, the U.K. and France will not be far behind and then Germany would not be far from neutralization.

President Nixon said that the problem in the U.S. as in Europe was largely psychological. Many Americans were naive and softhearted. Many intellectuals, the media and professors don’t believe there is any threat from the Russians. Some of the young also. President Pompidou interrupted to say, “Bishops too.” President Nixon said that some of the Protestant and Catholic clergy feel this way too and the inherent difficulties are increased when political leaders who know the Soviets add fuel to the fire. What used to be called the cold war rhetoric is no longer saleable. What was needed was the type of spirit with which President Pompidou had met the Soviets and in which he himself planned to meet them. A totally pragmatic meeting of Eastern and Western leaders. He had no illusions regarding the difficulties of his forthcoming meetings. There would be no “spirit of Moscow or Peking” arising out of his trips. He remembered Khrushchev. He had a sense of humor. He was tough and impressive. He would not allow the almost passionate desire of so many of our people to believe the best about the Soviet leaders’ desire to seek peace to blind them to reality. Not because the Russians were Communists but because they were a powerful country who saw their goals as antagonistic to ours. The French had lived too long to be so naive. His attitude towards both the Communist Superpowers was that we cannot live with them but then we cannot live without them. Live and let live based on fantasies of our own. Our society and civilization need to recognize that their attitudes, desires and foreign polices are different from our own basically because they are Communists. From time to time they may recede from their policies of expansion but Communist theology requires a dedication to expansion taking advantage of every temporary circumstance. By that he did not mean that non-Communist nations did not try and take advantages but not in areas of fundamental policy of conquest. The nations of Europe and the U.S. do not have this as part of their national policies.

The President did not know why the Soviet leaders and the Chinese leaders had arrived at the decision to meet with U.S. leaders. Not primarily because they wanted better relations or liked us. If there was not a strong Europe and if the Soviets did not have a threat in the East they would not be interested in talking to the U.S. By the same token he would like to have Dr. Kissinger tell President Pompidou what the Chinese think. He did not believe that Mao would be talking to the leader of the capitalists and courting the U.S. unless he was concerned by the Soviets and to a lesser extent by the Japanese. If one said this publicly [Page 572]they would deny it. Some in our country said when the President announced his trip to Peking that the Soviets would refuse to talk with us.

Actually the Soviets were more willing to talk SALT, Europe and Berlin after Peking announced the visit than they had been before. After the announcement of his visit to Moscow the Chinese had showed a greater interest in talking to us than before.

President Nixon recalled that he had told President Pompidou before that when he had seen General De Gaulle while he (President Nixon) was out of office and has asked him whether he had any advice for the U.S., President De Gaulle had replied that rather than put all of its eggs in the Soviet basket the U.S. should have a more open policy towards the Chinese like France.9 His responsibility was like President Pompidou’s. They must go into these things with their eyes open and try to defend our point of view.

President Pompidou said that the U.S. view of things was more world wide than that of France because of our means. This was why he considered the time favorable to commit Europe in a procedure of détente which could backfire but that Soviets could reverse only by a theatrical or forceful move. They are very concerned by Asia, China and their discussions with the U.S. on nuclear matters. They want peace in Europe. He believed that the Soviets harbored the illusion that the French, Germans, Italians and other countries could give them considerable economic aid. These are illusions and he had said so publicly. One could only sell to the Russians in exchange for what one buys and this was not much. No one could give unlimited credit. The European picture was very favorable except on MBFR on which he had already given the President his views. The French were not disposed to reduce their arms effort. One word about the problem of a European Security Conference. This point is evident. A security conference is beginning to be discussed seriously. He believed that all European countries were agreed on holding such a conference but felt that if the U.S. preferred a later date they would be agreeable to keeping the U.S. happy. Until, however, the U.S. agreed, there could be no real serious preparation of such a conference. Why did the French believe that such a conference could be of interest? They felt that Communism as such represented by Communist regimes was false from the economic and social point of view in many so called Socialist nations. Poles, Romanians and especially the Czechs and Hungarians wanted to shake off the tutelage. They believe that with the Western bloc divided and the Eastern bloc united that they lost. He felt that on one side there were the free coun[Page 573]tries who were independent and France felt that she was. On the other side there were countries who wanted to take steps towards freedom and independence. If the superpowers or the West (that is, the U.S.) feel that this liberty and independence is bad, then harm is done. The Russians feel it is bad but cannot stop it.

President Pompidou had been struck in his last talks with the Romanian President and Foreign Minister by their anguish at the idea that multilateral preparations and meetings on this conference might be delayed. They believe that when all are seated around a table they will be protected and not until then. The U.S. and France did not have exactly the same view. The problem is one of interpretation of the situation rather than that of a disagreement on goals.

President Nixon replied that, first of all, as to the matter of whether there would be a European Security Conference the question as President Pompidou had implied was one of timing and tactics. As President Pompidou had indicated, we believed that until the German treaties are finished plans for a European Security Conference cannot be implemented. We also believed that it was vitally important that extensive discussions among ourselves be held with regard to the agenda. He agreed with the French President that there was some possibility that this conference might not be an unmixed blessing for the Soviets although they very much wanted it. The extent to which it opens up to the West the Eastern countries to whom President Pompidou referred can be a leavening factor in the attitude of those countries. We have in each case to distinguish between the leadership and the countries. The people of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had demonstrated on several occasions that there was nothing that they would like better than to get rid of Soviet influence and leadership. Certainly a country like Romania where Ceaucescu is a devoted Stalinist is also devotedly a Romanian and to the extent that he can safely do so he takes an independent line from time to time. The President’s views long term were the same as President Pompidou’s. There are risks for the Soviets in such a conference just as they think it contains risks for us. They feel it will have the effect all over Western Europe of creating a false atmosphere of security and will lead to the letting down of our guard and the belief that real peace is just around the corner and that the cold war is finished. His own view in summary was that in a deliberate way we should move towards such a conference but have in mind the fact that we should harbor no illusions as to the Soviet aims in holding it. Our planning should be such as to serve our purposes while they will attempt to serve theirs.

Overhanging the whole area of Soviet-U.S. relations is the sober, sombre fact that if the Soviet leader decided to risk nuclear war and the U.S. was involved, he knew that he had the power to kill 70 million [Page 574]Americans and we had the power to kill 70 million Russians. The U.S. President knows this too. There are limitations on power and a restraining influence not because of love but because of fear. It was essential that the two nations pursue the negotiating track rather than the confrontation track. We have impressed this on the Soviets with regard to Southern Asia in the last 24 hours. The President wished to add in regard to the desire for détente that he totally agreed with President Pompidou. The people of the U.S. and Europe wanted it, at least a majority of them did. In Europe perhaps for different reasons. The Germans want it because the Soviets can give them East Germany; U.K., France and Italy because they are convinced that we live in a dangerous world. The danger presently represented by nuclear war, not the loss of 3,000 men as at Pearl Harbor. The whole place would be turned into a graveyard. No one wanted that. It was very important to look at the two attitudes on détente. Some sought a European Conference on the naive assumption that the Soviet aims have changed and that their designs in Europe and in the rest of the world are basically peaceful. On the other hand, some who seek détente on our side have no illusions and recognize that a different relationship and good relations between Europe and the USSR and the U.S. and the USSR are a practical necessity, that there are dangers in a policy of confrontation. But we must have no illusions about the basic aims of the Communist States. They are quite different from one another. Even if they wanted it would be impossible for European or U.S. leaders to take an intransigent stand and refuse to talk. Ten years ago this was possible in the U.S. It is no longer. On the other hand, it is important that the leaders recognize that naive public opinion often demands talks that will make the whole world peaceful. We should seek such negotiations but for the right reason. By the facts of Soviet power, the risks of confrontation in the Middle East or elsewhere are unacceptable. Therefore, we should seek to lessen the risk of war and seek, as President Pompidou had indicated, to make Europe a more viable area and to open Eastern Europe whose peoples’ hearts are with the West.

The President wished to add in a different sense. He would like to discuss the motives for his trip to Peking in the afternoon. China today was a major power with the largest population in the world. She was a mini economic power with a production less than half of Japan’s although she had 800 million people to Japan’s 100 million. China was a mini nuclear power in relation to the USSR but we take the long view as do the Soviets and President Pompidou. Twenty years from now China will be a major nuclear power if they so wish. Do we allow that to come about with China isolated. We should make an effort for a new start. The President had made this choice himself with his eyes open to seek by necessity a peaceful relationship with them.

[Page 575]

President Pompidou said he believed that the two Presidents were being told to go.

President Nixon said that he understood they would break now. What subjects should be discussed in the afternoon—economic subjects?

President Pompidou said that he had seen Dr. Kissinger earlier that morning concerning monetary and economic problems. He would also like to talk about China since the President had also expressed this desire. He could tell the President what he thought and then Dr. Kissinger could tell them about his impressions in China.

President Nixon said he felt that this would be important. If President Pompidou had no objection he would like to have Dr. Kissinger sit in on the afternoon session. We had had some very interesting contacts in the last few days and he would like to have President Pompidou brought up to date.

President Pompidou then expressed the belief that the Chinese were much more complicated than the Soviets. The President said that they were perhaps more sophisticated and more subtle.

President Pompidou said that Soviet policy was realistic. Their problem was to follow their calendar but one could understand the substance of what they were trying to do. The Chinese were more complicated. The situation in Pakistan interested him very much. He understood their clash with the Soviets but he was not sure that the Soviet policy towards Pakistan was simple.

The two Presidents then agreed that the press and others would want to know what they had talked about and discussed what should be said.

The President said that they could have their Press Secretaries say that they had had a far ranging discussion of bilateral problems, European problems and global problems but that this would still not be much.

President Pompidou said he felt that they should be told that the two Presidents had not discussed monetary problems, otherwise they would be agitated. President Nixon suggested that they might be told that these problems would be discussed that afternoon. “And tomorrow,” suggested President Pompidou. The President said that if President Pompidou agreed, they could say that they had discussed the President’s forthcoming trips to Peking and Moscow to which the President was going only to represent the U.S. and not on behalf of Europe.

President Pompidou said that he understood that the Press had already picked up the fact that Dr. Kissinger had been to see him earlier [Page 576]that morning10 and the two Presidents agreed that they would say he had called on President Pompidou to set up the agenda for the meetings.11

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Beginning December 12, 1971. Top Secret. Nixon and Pompidou met in the Azores December 13–14. The focus of the meetings was monetary reform issues. Memoranda of conversation dealing with the economic portions of their discussions and those of their senior advisers are ibid. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 219 and 220. Kissinger discussed the talks in White House Years, pp. 963–964.
  2. The time “1600” is crossed out and “0900 AM” was inserted by hand. According to the President’s Daily Diary, however, the meeting took place from 10:05 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)
  3. Pompidou visited the Soviet Union October 6–13, 1970. Brezhnev visited France October 25–30, 1971.
  4. Prime Minister Pompidou visited the Soviet Union July 3–8, 1967, and held meetings with senior members of the Soviet leadership. He met separately with Kosygin during the Soviet Premier’s July 1, 1969, visit to Paris.
  5. The war broke out on November 22 when Indian troops attacked in support of the independence movement in East Pakistan. The Pakistani Government accepted a cease-fire on December 17. The war resulted in the dismemberment of the Pakistani state.
  6. See Documents 62 and 63.
  7. See Document 72.
  8. Reference to the scheduled U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow, which took place May 22–30, 1972.
  9. During a 1963 visit to Paris. Nixon mentioned it in describing a similar 1967 discussion with Adenauer in RN , p. 281. The issue also came up during the March 1969 meeting between the President and de Gaulle; see Document 118 and RN , p. 373.
  10. A memorandum of this conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Beginning December 12, 1971.
  11. For text of press statements, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 1184–1191.