93. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- The Germans Increase Pressure on the Berlin Talks
During the earlier stages of the Bahr/Gromyko talks, the Soviets rejected a Bahr proposal for an FRG letter which would record the German view that there was a definite linkage between the USSR–FRG agreement and a successful conclusion of the Four Power talks in Berlin. Finally, Bahr obtained Soviet agreement that the FRG could make a unilateral statement of this linkage at the time of signature. In light of the domestic pressures which have been building, the FRG has been searching for additional methods of establishing this linkage for the record.
Last week the FRG suggested that there be an exchange of notes between the FRG and the Three Allies on linkage.2 The texts would be discussed in advance with the Soviets, exchanged on the date the USSR– FRG agreement was signed, and would be published. A preliminary draft of the German note records that a satisfactory result in Berlin is a necessary element of détente, and that results would be “satisfactory” if the existing ties between Bonn and Berlin are maintained. There is also an inseparable internal connection, so the note provides, between the USSR–FRG agreement and the German agreements with the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In preparing this exchange of notes, the Brandt Government is apparently pulling out all the stops to protect itself from CDU attack at the time the Soviet agreement is signed. The Allies are asked, in effect, to serve as highly visible and consenting witnesses to the FRG statements on linkage. Bahr told Ambassador Rush that in domestic political terms it was “essential” to the Brandt Government that a Berlin agreement be reached prior to the ratification (but subsequent to signing) of the FRG agreements, and he felt this procedure need not put undue pressure on the Three Powers to accept an unsatisfactory Berlin agreement.3
Fortunately, State has taken action to throw cold water on the proposed exchange of notes.4 Such an exchange would make the Berlin negotiations extremely difficult. If the whole outcome of the FRG’s Eastern policy is publicly tied to success (as defined by the Germans) in the Berlin talks, we will be placed under great pressure (from our other NATO Allies as well) to reach an understanding with the Soviets. Moreover, in view of the FRG definition of success (Soviet acknowledgement of Bonn–Berlin ties), we would be placing ourselves [Page 259] in the position of either blocking Eastern policy or capitulating to the Soviets by accepting less than our heretofore defined minimum. This pressure could cause serious stress in inter-Allied relations, particularly Franco-German.
The FRG will probably withdraw its proposal for a public exchange of notes with the Allies on the linkage question, but then the Brandt Government will be forced to sort out its own internal problem squarely on its own. Genscher, Interior Minister and FDP deputy chairman, told Russ Fessenden recently that he felt strongly that a Berlin settlement should be achieved before an agreement with the Soviets is initialed (not even signed).5 (Genscher told our Embassy that he would like to visit the US, and call on the President, in the second half of July or immediately following Labor Day.) This issue, among others, will undoubtedly be thrashed out during the July 7 all-day cabinet meeting on Eastern policy.
In tandem with these developments, the Germans in the Bonn Group discussions in preparation for the June 30 Four Power meeting in Berlin have taken an increasingly forceful position with respect to the question of Bonn-Berlin ties. Pressuring the Three Powers to push the negotiations forward, the FRG representative has stressed that, for the FRG, the central issue in the Berlin talks is the Bonn-Berlin ties and Federal presence in Berlin. The German logic is that the ultimate Berlin bargain would be the Soviets giving something on the issue of ties and the FRG giving something on its political presence. Once that is accomplished, improvements in access and inner-Berlin movement would flow logically and without difficulty. Most disturbingly, the FRG has told us that if the Soviets were not willing to make concessions on Bonn-Berlin ties, the German side would make no counter-concessions.
If the FRG continues to insist on this position, not only will the Allied bargaining position with the Soviets suffer, but the risk of inter-Allied friction will increase dramatically. The next session of the Four Power talks in Berlin is scheduled for July 21, and it will probably be the last until September. There is obvious need for study on the Western side, well in advance of that session, of overall negotiating aims at this stage of the talks. However, the best guess is that the FRG and the Three Powers will not have reached any genuine agreement, and differences will be papered over for the July meeting in the hope that the Western side will be able to achieve more unity come September.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 690, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. II. No classification marking. Sent for information. According to another copy, Downey drafted the memorandum. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 6, Chronological File, 1969–75, 1 June–8 July 1970) On July 9 Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: “Hal—See me re this.” For the outcome of this instruction, see Document 101.↩
- The suggestion was raised by the German representative at the June 19 meeting of the Bonn Group. A record of the discussion, as well as the text of the proposed notes, is in telegram 7070 from Bonn, June 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR)↩
- See Document 91.↩
- In telegram 100454 to Bonn, June 25, the Department expressed “serious reservations” on the German proposal to exchange notes. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR)↩
- See Document 92 and footnote 4 thereto.↩