Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

92. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 29, 1970, 1000Z.

7412. Policy Message. Subject: Brandt Government Difficulties Over Eastern Policy Coming to a Head.

1. Summary. Domestic political controversy in Federal Germany over the Brandt government’s Eastern policy appears to be reaching a point of culmination where Brandt will have to make a very hard decision between broadening his base of support and jeopardizing the entire structure of his negotiations with the East. We believe the more likely outcome will lead to some very hard choices for the Soviet leadership as well. The US interest in the outcome is great since the outer limits of the range of possibilities involved here may be between the collapse of the government of a major ally and the collapse, at least for some time to come, of the German effort to seek a contractual modus vivendi with the East. [End summary.]

2. Chancellor Willy Brandt is now paying for his mistaken belief that broad public opinion support for his Eastern policy would make itself felt in the Land elections of June 14. Brandt and his closest advisers thought this public support so broad that Brandt could put through his negotiations with the East despite his very narrow parliamentary majority. Hence Brandt deliberately refrained from the conciliatory posture and willingness to compromise on substance which would have been requirements for broad base of bipartisan support with the Christian Democrat (CDU) opposition. He even neglected to inform adequately the leadership of his Free Democrat (FDP) coalition other than Foreign Minister Scheel. The failure of the expected public support to manifest itself in the June 14 elections has not only emboldened the CDU opposition, but has produced new signs of fissure within the government coalition, especially in the FDP, which may be even more serious than those of recent months, which had already brought a considerable degree of political immobility.

3. The evidence of intensified difficulty has come out in various conversations which the Ambassador, DCM and Embassy officers have had this week with key people. On the one hand, Bahr himself, Ehmke and Leo Bauer, all members of the innermost circle of Brandt’s advisers, have been telling us that it is full steam ahead on the Moscow negotiations, although Ehmke had indicated some slowdown in the schedule. But this confident optimism by the inner circle of the SPD is in sharp contrast to some other things we have been told:

A. According to CDU leader Franz Josef Strauss,² on June 20 Foreign Minister Scheel in a “panicky” move sought out CDU floor leader Barzel and proposed to him that he and other CDU leaders join Scheel in a nonpartisan negotiating delegation to Moscow.³ Barzel replied he was willing to consider something like this, but only if the negotiations were not based on the results of the Bahr–Gromyko talks and a wholly new start were made. Strauss considered this condition unacceptable for the Brandt government.

B. Even more significant, Interior Minister Genscher, now the key man of the FDP, told us on June 26 he would resign from Brandt’s Cabinet if the Bahr–Gromyko paper were signed in its present form.⁴ Genscher listed a number of basic improvements he would insist on, and was very critical of Brandt’s failure to seek a wider political base for his Eastern policy.

C. In a highly emotional outburst to us on June 25 Ahlers, the government’s information chief, who up to now has been one of the inner circle of advisers on Eastern policy, said Bahr was an “all-out appeaser” and stated that he, Ahlers, was determined to stop the dangerous drift in the Brandt government’s Eastern policy.

4. Even when Ahlers’ erratic nature, including his own previous all-out support for Brandt’s Eastern policy are taken into account, his remark is significant because it portrays in a clash of personalities the basic choice Brandt must make soon between broadening his domestic base or even retaining power, and endangering the negotiations with the Soviets. What is infuriating Ahlers, who is primarily interested in the political survival of the Brandt government, is Bahr’s adamant insistence thus far that the text he negotiated in Moscow cannot be changed or the entire negotiating complex of Eastern policy will collapse.

5. In this overheated, high-pressure situation, Brandt, who reportedly has been in a state of depression since the Landtag elections, will have to decide between building out his political base within the FRG and heeding Bahr’s repeated injunctions that the treaty complex could be destroyed by further demands. This is an enormously difficult choice for a man of Brandt’s background and interests to make. We believe that in the final analysis, he will have to yield to the unmistakable evidence that his government, and indeed the prospects of a decade of an SPD government, are threated if he fails to broaden his political base.

6. If Brandt follows this logic, this means a broadening of German negotiating demands as posed to the Soviets. The choice for the Soviet leadership will be difficult and could create strains within it. Apart from this risk, we feel the situation is favorable because it may culminate in an agreement which is somewhat more positive for Western interests. If Brandt takes the other course, and attempts to bring about signature of the four points in their present form without any amendment, we would predict that his government will founder.

7. Fuller details of the evidence summarized above are reported in a separate telegram.⁵

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 EUR E–GER W. Secret; Priority; Noforn; Limdis. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Warsaw, EC Brussels, Berlin, and USNATO. According to another copy, the telegram was drafted by Dean, cleared by Fessenden, and approved by Rush. (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, JDean—Telegrams, May–Jul ’70 (Drafted or Co-Drafted))
2. Strauss met Dean at the Bundeshaus in Bonn on June 26. A memorandum of conversation is in ibid., JDean—Memos of Conversation, 1970.
3. For the exchange of letters between Scheel and the CDU, see Meissner, ed., Moskau-Bonn, vol. 2, pp. 1247–1249.
4. According to another report, Genscher had secretly agreed to form a coalition government with the CDU if the FDP suffered another setback in the November state elections. (Telegram WH00382 from McManis to Haig for Kissinger in San Clemente, June 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 24, President’s Daily Briefs, June 26, 1970–July 10, 1970)
5. Telegram 7413 from Bonn, June 29. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 EUR E–GER W)