Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

85. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 27, 1970.

SUBJECT

• West German-Soviet Talks—Bahr’s Latest Message To You

Egon Bahr has completed the talks that began last December in Moscow. He reached an agreement on four principles which will be the basis of negotiations for a treaty on the nonuse of force. He sent you a backchannel message (Tab B), claiming that the agreement was based on the Oder-Neisse formula given to the Poles last month. He asserts that in view of differences between the Soviets, Ulbricht and Gomulka, no time should be lost in pressing forward with the Soviet talks, lest they influence the Soviet attitude negatively.

The actual text (Tab C)² of the Soviet-German agreement, however, seems to go beyond the position that the Germans have been taking:

“The FRG and the USSR undertake without reservations to respect the territorial integrity of all states in Europe in their present boundaries. They declare that they have no territorial claims against anyone and will not raise such claims in the future. They regard today and in the future the borders of all states in Europe as inviolable as they exist on the day of the signature of this agreement, including the Oder-Neisse line which forms the Western boundary of the Peoples Republic of Poland and the border between the GDR and the FRG.

“The agreement between the FRG and the USSR does not affect bilateral and multilateral treaties and the agreements concluded earlier by both sides.”

In the Polish negotiations, the German formula included “respect” for borders, and a statement that an agreement reached regarding Poland’s Western border “will have to be confirmed in a peace treaty for Germany as a whole.”

It would seem that the Germans conceded more than they received in this exchange. As for the alleged differences among the Communists, this remains to be seen. The Poles have been pressing for Bonn to state that the border is final, without qualification. The Soviet-FRG formula comes quite close to this. Moreover, in view of the known contacts between Gromyko and the Poles in the last three weeks, plus Ulbricht’s presence in Moscow, it would seem a reasonable assumption that they have coordinated their positions.

This is evident in Scheel’s remarks to the three Western Allied Ministers in Rome.³ He said that the Soviets insisted that Bonn’s negotiations with Moscow, the Poles, Czechs and the GDR were one political entity, to be ratified at the same time. This means that whatever concession already made to the Soviets will be pocketed by the others, who will still be free to drive new bargains on the specifics of their treaties with Bonn—with Ulbricht presumably driving the toughest bargain of all, judging by the Kassel meeting. Moreover, as the Germans move closer to closing the ring on all of these negotiations, the pressure for final success will be enormous. It must be acknowledged, however, that “success” in Moscow puts pressure on the Poles and Ulbricht.

In any case, the Germans intend to proceed forthwith on the Soviet front, with a visit by Scheel to Moscow in June. Meanwhile, the Polish talks resume in Bonn on June 9. Our role may become exceedingly difficult. The current German contention is that none of the agreement with the East will be ratified until the Berlin talks reach agreement. This could mean that the pressures on us, both on timing and substance, in the four power talks will become greater and greater. Given the French skepticism over the Berlin talks, and the opaque Soviet position, these talks could lead us into a sharp dispute with our Allies.

In addition, we will face the problem of whether to negotiate a four power statement on the Oder-Neisse as the Poles, with French support, want.

The Western foreign ministers have finally awakened to the implications of Ostpolitik, and in Rome agreed to have a study produced by July 31, reviewing possible consequences for our rights, how to handle the GDR in international organizations, etc. (Tab D).⁴

As for the Bahr message, I have done a brief acknowledgement to it as well as one he sent you on May 8.

Recommendation:

That you sign the message at Tab A.⁵

Tab A

Washington, June 1, 1970.

Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the German State Secretary for Foreign, Defense, and German Policy (Bahr) ⁶

Thank you for your messages of May 8 and 25. As regards the former, in which you referred to the Cambodian situation, you will probably have seen the President’s recent letter to the Chancellor. We have appreciated the Chancellor’s understanding and the way in which he dealt with the pressures that developed in Germany on this subject. The military operations continue to go well and we will proceed with our plans as indicated in the President’s statements.

I was glad to have your observations on the Moscow talks, supplementing the account given by Foreign Minister Scheel in Rome. I understand that it was agreed in Rome to have the Bonn group examine more closely the implications for the Western position in Berlin and for four-power responsibilities in Germany. This is important so that we can be sure that all of us are fully aware of any problems that might arise.

I greatly appreciate your messages. Best regards.

Henry Kissinger ⁷

Tab B

Bonn, May 25, 1970.

Message From the German State Secretary for Foreign, Defense, and German Policy (Bahr) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)⁸

Foreign Minister Scheel this evening will be informing the three Western Foreign Ministers about the details of the results of the Moscow talks. I would like to transmit a few personal impressions through this channel:

1. The Soviet Union evidently did not completely inform the GDR about the status of the Moscow talks prior to the meeting in Kassel.

The surprising visit of the GDR delegation in the week before Kassel did not make the Soviet position vis-à-vis the FRG more rigid.

2. After long hesitation and consultations with Warsaw the Soviet Union accepted the formula about the Oder-Neisse line which Duckwitz had presented in Warsaw.

3. We remained without modification within the framework about which we talked in Washington; i.e. the rights of the four powers will not be affected, the treaties of the FRG with the three powers remain overriding, the interconnection with Berlin has been made clear.

4. Gromyko indicated that his government accepts the basis that has been achieved and that it is ready to move from the exchange of views to negotiations without a break.

5. At the present stage, in which the positions of East Berlin, Warsaw, and Moscow are not identical, it would certainly not advance our interests were we to give Ulbricht and Gomulka the opportunity, through delay, to influence the Soviet position in a negative direction.

Regards,

Egon Bahr ⁹

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V. Top Secret. Sent for action. According to another copy, Hyland drafted the memorandum. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Top Secret Chronological File 1969–1975, Box TS 2)
2. Tab C is telegram 2791 (Secto 16) from Rome, May 26; not printed. See footnote 4, Document 84.
3. See Document 84.
4. Tab D is telegram 2763 (Secto 7) from Rome, May 26; not printed. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6.
5. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: “OK for backchannel.”
6. The date of the message is taken from another copy. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1970, Europe, Mideast, Latin America)
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
8. The German text of the message from Bahr is also attached to the memorandum; see also Akten zur Auswärtigen Pollitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 2, p. 861.
9. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.