Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

84. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

Rome, May 27, 1970, 1028Z.

Secto 20/2803. Subject: May 25th Quadripartite Dinner—Scheel Presentations on Kassel and Talks With Soviets.²

1. Summary: Scheel presented an account of the results of the Brandt–Stoph talks at Kassel on lines already known: he said the results were negative, but that the FRG would persist with its policy of trying to achieve a political settlement with East Germany. In presenting details of Bahr’s agreement with the Soviets, Scheel said that the FRG had told the Soviets that this agreement and others in which the FRG was negotiating with East Germany and the Poles formed a single package with the Allied talks on Berlin and that the FRG would not ratify the other agreements until both Allies and FRG were satisfied that agreement had been reached to assure the future of Berlin, including FRG ties to Berlin. In his presentation, Scheel again stressed FRG views that there were important differences between the USSR and East Germany with regard to the desirability of a settlement with the FRG. End summary.

2. Kassel results. Scheel began by saying that the Kassel meeting had a negative effect on German public opinion. (In a side private remark he said he expected that the negative results of Kassel would cost the FDP as a member of the Brandt coalition 1/2 of one percent of the vote in the North Rhine Westphalian elections, but that what was lost there could be picked up with the results of the Bahr talks, so that there would be no net loss for the FDP.) The negative effect on German public opinion was caused by the fact that many leading journalists and the population as a whole had excessive expectations for Kassel. The fact that 25 years after the war, the two heads of government of the two German states had now come together for the second time, was in itself an achievement. Moreover talks were not at an end. It was agreed that the two heads of government should meet again even though no date was set.

3. The East Germans focused solely on the demand that relations with the FRG be formalized without showing any willingness to discuss the content of these relations. Chancellor Brandt on the other hand had defined the possible content of future FRG/GDR relations in his twenty points. Brandt had said that relations with East Germany would be formalized only when it was agreed what kind of relations they would be.

4. Kassel meeting had no results worthy of mention, except for the fact German public opinion is now more sober in its expectations for the future. Stoph’s inflexibility at Kassel was the reason Brandt had not proposed a new meeting with him, but rather the establishment of a committee of working groups to deal with the substantive questions involved. The East Germans had demanded full diplomatic recognition as a precondition for acceptance of this proposal. The FRG had refused, because it believed that the relations between the two Germanies differed in their quality from relations between other countries.

5. Scheel said the FRG had the impression that at Kassel the East Germans did not stick to the line agreed upon between them and the Soviets prior to the negotiations, instead they went to the utmost extent of their negotiating leeway as earlier agreed with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact to present an extreme position. East German feelings of triumph after having secured recognition by Algeria on the day before the meeting may also have tempted them to impose maximal demands. Scheel said the FRG would draw only one conclusion from Kassel: it would stick to the line of trying to come to political terms with East Germany. The FRG would give East Germany time to study its proposals and would in due course propose a future meeting with the East Germans, including proposals for the level of such a meeting.

6. Bahr talks in Moscow.³ Scheel said that the FRG had succeeded in Moscow in concluding one intermediate phase of the negotiations which had been in process since December 1969 on a renunciation of force treaty. The objective was to put FRG/USSR relations on a different and improved level. The talks with the Soviets had dealt not only with questions of bilateral interests but also comprised a tour d’horizon of unsolved European questions including those involving Polish and Czech issues. After long exploratory talks, a stage had now been reached which made it appropriate for governments to study the outcome of the negotiations thus far and to decide whether formal negotiations on a treaty should take place.

7. The FRG and the USSR negotiators had worked out a common agreed version of the four main points of such a treaty (text provided by FRG on May 26 in septel).⁴ These are: (A) The treaty should serve the cause of peace based on the present conditions in Europe. (B) Relations will be on basis of Article II of UN Charter. (C) Present borders are inviolable. (D) Previous treaties of both sides are not affected.

8. In reply to question from Schumann, Scheel said that the agreement did not deal directly with Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter. The London and Paris Agreements also contained no specific references to them. Moreover, in connection with the NPT, the FRG’s NATO allies had issued special statement on Articles 53 and 107. This question could now be considered as solved.

9. Scheel said the decisive portion of the agreement with the Soviets was the section on the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of the countries of Europe. However, the FRG had taken steps to assure that this formulation would not hinder the German Government in pursuing its political goal of reunification of Germany by peaceful means. The FRG had reached agreement with the Soviets that the FRG would put its views on this subject in a letter to the Soviet Government. The letter would be published and distributed in the German Parliament. The Soviets would not reply but would accept the German letter. The letter was an essential corollary of the treaty. The FRG could agree to European borders only if its peaceful efforts aimed at uniting the German people within a European peace order were not taken to be a violation of the proposed treaty.

10. Scheel said that the FRG had also agreed in the talks with the Soviets that it should be the objective of FRG policy to achieve a satisfactory resolution of problems with Czechoslovakia arising from the Munich agreements. Scheel said no details would be specified on this subject in the treaty with Moscow. It had also been agreed with the Soviets that a treaty similar to that being concluded with them would provide the basis for the Federal German relationship with East Germany, including equality without discrimination.

11. Scheel stated that at wish of Soviets, FRG agreements with USSR, Poland and GDR and Czechoslovakia were to be considered a political entity which would be ratified only when all parts were completed. Scheel said Soviets had refused to discuss Berlin and FRG had concluded this must be left to Allies. But in doing so, it started from the view that the remaining agreements he had just mentioned would be ratified only if a satisfactory Berlin settlement was reached. The FRG had explained to the Soviets that it considered a solution to the Berlin problems which would assure Allied rights and take into account the existing ties between the FRG and the Western sectors to be a political precondition for German ratification of the other treaties.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, USNATO, and Berlin. Rogers was in Rome May 24–28 for the NATO Ministerial meeting.
2. For a German record of the quadripartite meeting in Rome, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 868–873.
3. In a May 25 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger summarized the talks as follows: “Egon Bahr, Chancellor Brandt’s negotiator in Moscow, appears to have successfully completed the exploratory phase of his talks with Gromyko. Although details are not yet available, the Bonn foreign ministry told us that Bahr had reported he had ‘made it,’ which they interpret to mean a satisfactory resolution of the Soviet demand for full ‘recognition’ of all European borders. Though the two sides are far from a final agreement, the Germans now believe they can proceed with serious negotiations on a renunciation of force agreement. The Germans, however, [believe?] that they failed to achieve their tactical objectives in the talks with East German Premier Stoph. No date was set for a third meeting, and no negotiators appointed to carry on the talks in the interim—both objectives Brandt had sought. Bonn speculates that there may have been a direct connection between the talks in Moscow and those in Kassel with Stoph. Since the East-West German talks yielded nothing new, the Soviets decided to go ahead and tie up their preliminary package. Bonn further speculates that the East Germans have stretched their hard line position as far as possible without breaking off all future contacts, since the Soviets probably wanted them to keep open another Brandt–Stoph meeting.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 22, President’s Daily Briefs, May 25, 1970–June 5, 1970)
4. Telegram 2791 (Secto 16) from Rome, May 26. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR) Reference is to the so-called “Bahr paper,” which was leaked to and published by the German press on June 12 and July 1. For the German text, see Meissner, Moskau-Bonn, Vol. 2, pp. 1220–1223 or Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 822–824; for an English translation, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1101–1103. See also Document 85.