66. Editorial Note
On March 19, 1970, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and East German Premier Willi Stoph met in Erfurt (East Germany) to discuss the status of inner-German relations. The discussion was inconclusive, leading only to agreement on holding a second meeting in Kassel (West Germany) on May 21. The significance of the meeting, the first between leaders of the two countries, was reflected rather in the tumultuous response Brandt received from the East German citizenry, who first chanted “Willy” and then “Willy Brandt” to differentiate him from “Willi,” his East German counterpart. The next morning, President Nixon read a staff report on U.S. television coverage the previous evening and underlined the passage: “All networks had footage from E. Germany where Brandt was greeted by shouting and cheering E. Germans. Brandt appeared in a window and the E. Germans boomed their welcome.” Nixon commented in a handwritten note to Kissinger: “K— Good. This will scare hell out of the Soviets. They have their problems & may come to us to pull them out.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 31, Annotated News Summaries, News Summaries–March 1970) Nixon reiterated this point in a telephone conversation with Kissinger at 3:06 p.m. According to a transcript, Nixon noted: “If I were they [the Soviets], I would have worried about the Brandt reception in E. Germany. Anytime anybody from the West goes to the East—it’s like Romania.” Kissinger replied: “They fear two Germanies may get together on nationalism. It should worry them a hell of a lot.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 362, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
[Page 179]The two men again discussed the Erfurt visit by telephone at 7:09 p.m. Nixon: “The Brandt thing has sent shivers up their back. Can’t you imagine the kind of reception I would get if I went there[?] I just may go. If Brandt wanted it, I would go.” Kissinger: “The outcome would be unpredictable—you know the East German [Ulbricht] is tough.” Nixon: “They are much tougher than the Hungarians. Even the American press reported the Brandt visit that way even though they hated to do it.” Kissinger: “German situation is dangerous.” Nixon: “If it is dangerous to us, it is dangerous to the Soviets.” (Ibid.)
In a March 24 memorandum to the President, Kissinger summarized several reports on a recent West German Cabinet meeting, providing both more detail on the Erfurt visit and “more insight into Brandt’s general philosophy”:
“Brandt explained that while his policy was firmly grounded on the Western Alliance, Bonn could not be in a position in which she was totally dependent on her allies to represent her interests (he mentioned SALT in this regard). Brandt said a reduction in the ‘American commitment’ in Europe was to be anticipated, and that it was important to convince American opinion that an East-West settlement should be sought. It was vital to West Germany that East Germany’s influence in the Warsaw Pact be constrained through special relations between the two Germany’s.
“As for the Stoph talks, Stoph was subjected to rigid instructions; he had to retreat from agreements he had originally reached with Brandt, when notes were delivered to him from outside the meeting. As expected, the theme of recognition ran throughout the talks; at one point in the private talks Stoph agreed that he did not understand legal niceties but that the two should agree to exchange Ambassadors at once. Though Stoph protested West German activity in Berlin, he also said in private that a ‘great deal about Berlin could be regulated without fanfare.’” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Daily Briefs, March 21–March 31, 1970)