Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

65. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Four Power Talks on Berlin

The U.S., UK and French Ambassadors in Moscow on February 27 formally advised the Soviets that the Three Powers agreed to hold Four Power talks in Berlin at the Ambassadorial level.² We now have to develop among the Three Powers and the FRG an agreed Western position, and the second in Berlin with the Soviets. Secretary Rogers has sent for your approval a position paper for the guidance of the U.S. representatives in Bonn in the development of the Western position (Tab A).³

In exploring the Soviet views we would seek their agreement to a more regularized and freer German access to Berlin, greater movement and communication between East and West Berlin, and a recognition that the FRG properly represents West Berlin abroad. We would propose to the Soviets that the FRG and GDR authorities seek to reach agreement on the access question under a general Four Power authorization, and that representatives from both East and West Berlin serve as a working party of the Four with respect to intra-city problems.

The FRG has recently introduced a new and somewhat novel factor. It has proposed that the Three Powers seek Soviet agreement to respect the ties which have developed between the FRG and West Berlin. Obversely, the Three Powers would agree to respect the situation in East Berlin. If an understanding could be reached, the FRG would be willing to reduce to a limited degree some of the formal indicia of Federal presence in West Berlin.⁴

As I mentioned in my memo of February 24,⁵ it is unlikely that any basic agreement can be reached with the Soviets (you will recall that President Pompidou is also quite skeptical).⁶ They will be seeking to exploit any differences on the Western side, to dramatically reduce Federal presence in West Berlin and at the same time to enhance their own role there. The Soviets will also wish to obtain Western recognition that the GDR controls German access to Berlin. Notwithstanding this dim prospect, there is a possibility that some limited improvements might be agreed. Moreover, the very fact of the Four Power talks will demonstrate that the Soviets continue to share with us responsibilities for Berlin and Germany. Brandt considers this very important at a time when he has set in motion negotiations with the Soviets, Poles and the East Germans. Even if it is possible to achieve some limited improvements in the Berlin situation, this success might not be long-lasting. There is an inherent asymmetry in the Berlin power structure: the Soviets have the capacity to mount immediate harassment on the slightest pretext, while the West has to consult and react. Thus, the Soviets can with relative ease take back its “concessions,” while it is difficult for the West to restore its previous position.

The most important point now is that we get on with the development of an agreed Western position. The U.S. position paper provided by Secretary Rogers seems to offer sufficient guidance for our representatives in Bonn. The new FRG proposals will require clarification and may be difficult to deal with, and there are apt to be differences of priorities and tactics. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to work on an urgent basis toward developing an agreed position. Since the final Western position may be considerably different from our own current view, I think it important that you have the opportunity to review it prior to the actual commencement of talks with the Soviets.

Recommendation:

That you approve the U.S. position paper.⁷

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 690, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft to Kissinger on March 5 and Kissinger revised the memorandum on March 9, eliminating a recommendation that the President approve his memorandum to Rogers. “I’ll worry about memo,” Kissinger wrote. “Pres. doesn’t have to approve my memos to Rogers.” (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, March 5; ibid., and Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 4, Chronological File, 1969–75, 23 Jan.–30 Mar. 1970)
2. See Document 54.
3. Memorandum from Rogers to the President, March 3; attached but not printed. Also in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6. The position paper concluded: “The most likely outcome of the Quadripartite talks is (a) minor improvements in the situation in Berlin accompanied by a decrease in the FRG’s political presence in the Western Sectors or (b) suspension of the talks without either the achievement of improvements or a dramatic break with the USSR. In either eventuality, the talks will have served to reemphasize Quadripartite responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole and will have provided a framework in which Brandt can deal with the GDR with less fear of appearing to compromise this responsibility. The worst outcome would be a complete break because of unacceptable Soviet demands or inability to agree on subjects to be discussed (e.g. a Soviet proposal for separate peace treaties with the GDR and FRG). This might increase tension locally but at the same time would clarify for the Europeans the limited prospects for a reasonable agreement on European security.”
4. See Document 59.
5. Document 58.
6. Regarding the French attitude on Berlin, see Document 57.
7. The President initialed his approval of this recommendation. On March 13 Kissinger informed Rogers of the decision by memorandum. “The President has approved the position paper which you enclosed with your memo of March 3 for the guidance of the American representative in the Bonn Group in the development of the Western position. Appreciative of your assessment that the final Western position may represent a substantial modification, the President will wish the opportunity to review it prior to the commencement of the Four Power talks.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 690, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. II) Haig signed the memorandum since Kissinger was “occupied and Richardson called personally about it.” (Note from Haig to Kissinger, March 13; ibid.)