61. Editorial Note
On March 2, 1970, as talks between West German State Secretary Bahr and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko resumed in Moscow, the Embassy in Bonn submitted an assessment of “Soviet views on political agreements with [West] Germany.” Within the next few months, the Embassy suggested, the Soviet Union would decide whether to proceed with negotiations not only in Moscow but also in Warsaw and East Berlin: “it appears likely that a decision to move or not to move will govern all three. Moscow, not Poland or the GDR, will make the final decision.” The Soviets were probing to determine what the West Germans would concede at the bargaining table, a process that, while advanced in Moscow, was just beginning in East Berlin. Although the available evidence was insufficient to determine the course of Soviet policy, the Embassy concluded that, since “losses from breaking off the negotiations outright appear to outweigh gains,” the Kremlin would allow the talks to continue. The outlook for a settlement on Berlin, [Page 165] which would be affected by success but not necessarily failure in Moscow, was less certain. The Embassy judged the “chances for agreement on limited practical improvements on Berlin whether in written form or not to be about fifty-fifty.” (Telegram 2295 from Bonn, March 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR)
The Embassy in Moscow contributed to the analysis, maintaining that the Kremlin would play a “waiting game” before making any decisions. According to the Embassy, the Soviets sought accommodation for several reasons—the domestic economy, the Chinese threat, a possible European security conference—but would probably insist on nothing less than “full acceptance by Bonn of Moscow’s view of the ‘realities’” of the Second World War. (Telegram 1212 from Moscow, March 11; ibid.)
The Mission in Berlin emphasized East Germany and the quadripartite talks as complicating factors and noted that: “we see little likelihood of the Soviets pressing the East Germans to modify substantially existing practices affecting Berlin to suit Western requirements.” The Mission concluded:
“This does not mean that we should not negotiate or not exploit the forthcoming discussions to see what benefits might be achieved. It means, however, that as we go into talks, we ought to have few illusions about what can be accomplished. While Soviets must carefully consider implications of Berlin talks for wider relationships, fact is that on Berlin Soviets will not be negotiating from weakness. And, indeed some of our Allies will find themselves under far greater pressures to achieve agreement than the Soviets are likely to be.” (Telegram 395 from Berlin, March 13; ibid.)
In a letter to Ambassador Rush on March 30, Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand expressed admiration for the “fine perceptive analyses coming from Bonn, Berlin and Moscow,” especially the “sober and realistic views” set forth in the telegrams cited above. According to Hillenbrand, the German experts within the Department generally shared the “somber forecast” of the three posts: “Like you, we are inclined to doubt that the Soviets, the East Germans or the Poles are likely to make any major concessions.” Hillenbrand continued:
“At the same time, however, we are hopeful that there may be pressures operating on their side to a greater extent than we presently know so that the various negotiating fora will not be weighted solely in their favor. If such pressures do indeed exist they may well impel the Soviets (and perhaps the other communist interlocutors) to make at least some counter-concessions, not affecting their basic system, in order to obtain some of their very much sought after objectives. “In the final analysis, of course, the outcome of the Berlin and other talks depends not only on how stubbornly the Soviets and their allies pursue their drive for concessions. It depends also on the skill, tenacity and perspicacity with which the four Western powers exploit their assets in the course of the several talks.” (National Archives, RG 59, EUR Files: Lot 74 D 430, Department of State—Hillenbrand)