Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

60. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, March 2, 1970, 1905Z.

2292. Subj: Ehmke on Dispute Within GDR Politburo.

1. FRG Minister Ehmke requested the Ambassador to come to the Chancellery March 2 urgently. Ehmke said he wished to pass on in strictest confidence information which he did not intend to tell others in the government except the Chancellor and Wehner. He did not intend to inform the FRG FonOff or his own closest colleagues. Nonetheless he considered it important that the US should know about this matter now.

2. Ehmke said he had received authoritative information from East Berlin that violent controversy had taken place within the Politburo of the East German Communist Party over the way the Brandt–Stoph talks should be handled. According to Ehmke’s information, Ulbricht and Stoph had announced in the Politburo session that they were willing to have relatively businesslike talks with Brandt. Politburo members Honecker and Norden were reported to have immediately declared their outright opposition. They were supported by a large majority of the remaining members of the Politburo. Honecker and Norden had urged one single very rough session with Brandt, in which Stoph should pose categorical GDR demands and the talks should be broken off in an atmosphere of complete failure. Among the factors which motivated the Honecker–Norden opposition was that the Politburo had privately taken a poll of East German population whose results showed that over 70 percent of the East German population expected the Brandt–Stoph talks to result in far reaching agreements leading to German reunification and supported this outcome. The Politburo opposition element had cited these results, arguing that there was a serious risk that the regime would lose control over the East German population unless their proposal for handling of the talks was followed.

3. According to Ehmke’s report, the controversy was only resolved when Gromyko came to East Germany and obliged the opposition group to accept the concept that negotiations with Brandt should take place in a reasonable businesslike atmosphere.

4. Ehmke said GDR political emissary Von Berg had contacted him with the request to see him for background discussions on the pending negotiations. After consulting with the Chancellor and Wehner, Ehmke has agreed to see Von Berg in Bonn on the evening of March 3rd. No other Federal German official will be informed of this visit at this time. Ehmke said he would keep the Ambassador informed about further developments on this.

5. Ehmke said the first report from Sahm in East Berlin on his talks with the East Germans to prepare the Brandt–Stoph meeting was that the East Germans were insisting that Brandt arrive in East Germany by plane to Schoenefeld or by train directly to East Berlin and not traverse West Berlin first. Ehmke told Sahm that if the going gets too rough he should suspend his talks with the East Germans and come back.

6. Ehmke reiterated to the Ambassador Chancellor Brandt’s view that if at all possible the first session of Allied talks with the Soviets should precede the Brandt–Stoph talks and provide all-important Four Power symbolism. He said the FRG considered the Berlin talks to be the focus of the whole current negotiation complex and that advances on Berlin were a prerequisite for progress in the talks with the East Germans and possibly other negotiations with the East as well.

7. This information should be very closely held.²

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GER E. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. On March 4 Ehmke told Rush that Berg had failed to appear as scheduled. When Rush asked for an explanation, Ehmke replied that “he [Ehmke] could only guess, but it was apparently a sign of dissent, confusion and conflict on the other side. Ehmke said he would let the Ambassador know of further developments in this matter.” (Telegram 2415 from Bonn, March 4; ibid.)