Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

47. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 16, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Allied Probe on Berlin: A Status Report

On December 16 the Three Allied Ambassadors in Moscow will deliver an aide-mémoire to the Soviets beginning a new round in the exchanges on Berlin.² The aide-mémoire (text at Tab A) makes the following points:

• —both the Allied-Soviet exchanges on Berlin and the FRG talks with the Soviets on non-use of force are relevant to improving European security;
• —the Allies welcome the FRG–GDR talks on transportation and postal matters, and hope the Soviets will encourage them;
• —the Allies propose that the Four Powers should attempt to agree on practical measures to eliminate difficulties involving: (a) free movement between Berlin and the FRG, (b) normalization of internal Berlin life, including movement between sectors, and (c) discriminatory treatment of West Berlin’s economy;
• —representatives of the four Berlin missions should meet at an early date to agree (at the first session) on an agenda and arrangements for further meetings.

In his memo to the President of October 31,³ outlining the above points, the Secretary doubted that the Soviets would be favorably disposed to making even small improvements in the Berlin scene, but thought we had “nothing to lose” in making an effort. You expressed your concern to the President, and informed the Secretary by memorandum of November 19 (Tab B)⁴ that the President wanted to determine, after the Soviet response, whether to proceed further. In the intervening six weeks, the Bonn Group machinery produced the final text of the aide-mémoire and agreed on prior NATO consultation. The process was not without struggle, however, particularly with the French. State applied some pressure in Washington for the French to agree to Berlin as the site for the proposed talks (the French preferred Moscow), and in exchange, State backed down on its insistence that the talks be held at the Ambassadorial level. (I had told State not to press these issues with the French to a deadlock without checking at the White House.)⁵

Throughout this period, the FRG offered encouragement, but the spark was gone—for them it seemed to be a useful albeit futile exercise. However, on December 12, following the negative developments in bilateral talks in Moscow, the Germans pressed forcefully the urgency of moving ahead with the probe—so that they would not be alone in the arena with the Soviets. The UK was interested, in large part motivated by a desire to be active in Berlin matters with an eye toward the potential problems they might face preserving their rights in Berlin as the FRG moves closer to recognizing the GDR. The French had to be pulled much of the time; it was mainly because of the late introduction of a new French draft that the démarche did not take place at the time of the NATO meeting (perhaps the French timed their draft to ensure distance between the Allied probe and the NATO meeting). The US was a sparkplug throughout. (See chronology at Tab C)⁶

There is little likelihood that the Soviets will directly accept the Western topics. In response, they will probably again note their readiness to discuss the improvements they would like to see, such as the elimination of Federal presence in Berlin. If the Soviets should partially accept the Western points for discussion, much further work will be required to prepare the negotiations, both within the USG and with the Allies.

I believe that it will be essential to take stock of this entire exercise once the Soviet reply is in hand. Your memo of November 19 provides the basis for this; you may wish to remind Elliot Richardson that next steps require Presidential approval.

Tab A

Bonn, December 15, 1969, 0945Z.

Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁷

15895. For Dept: Deliver to Sutterlin EUR/GER opening of business. Subj: Tripartite Approach to the Soviets on Berlin. Ref: A) State 207037;⁸ B) State 207175;⁹ C) Bonn 15884;¹⁰ D) Bonn 15768.¹¹

1. Below for convenience of Emb Moscow is confirmatory final text of Tripartite aide-mémoire to Soviets: Begin text.

(1) The United States Government, together with the British and the French Governments, has studied the reply of the Soviet Government of September 12¹² to its August 7 statement¹³ concerning an improvement of inner-German relations and of the situation as regards Berlin and access to the city. It has also noted with interest the discussions between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Government concerning an exchange of declarations on renunciation of the use of force or the threat of the use of force and considers that both these topics have relevance to efforts to improve the situation as regards European security.

(2) The United States welcomes the willingness of the Soviet Union to exchange views on avoiding present and future complications as regards Berlin and access to the city. Improvement in the internal situation of the city and in its links with the outside world would exercise a favorable influence on the general atmosphere in Europe. The United States considers that the Four Powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as a whole should attempt to agree on practical measures aimed at eliminating difficulties and tensions in these fields. To this end, the United States proposes that the Four Powers arrange to have their representatives meet to discuss details of such measures.

(3) In the view of the United States, an important aim of such discussions would be to prevent difficulties in movement between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany. To this aim, one could envisage agreement on procedures and practical measures aimed at assuring free movement of persons and goods between Berlin and the Federal Republic, which continues to fall within the responsibility of the Four Powers.

(4) A second aim of such discussions would be the normalization of the internal life of Berlin, which is also a quadripartite responsibility. The United States would welcome consideration of how movement of persons, postal and telephonic communications and commerce between the western and eastern sectors of the city could be restored.

(5) A further aim of quadripartite discussions would be the elimination of problems arising from discriminatory treatment of the economy of the western sectors of Berlin.

(6) The United States welcomes the initiation of talks between the two German sides on transport and postal matters. It hopes that such talks will soon lead to positive results, that they can be expanded to include additional subjects, and that the USSR will be prepared to encourage them.

(7) The United States proposes that the Four Powers responsible for Berlin and Germany as a whole authorize representatives of their Missions in Berlin to meet in that city at an early date, to be agreed on among them, to discuss these topics and other topics which the Soviet Union might wish to raise. It proposes that agreement on an agenda and arrangements for further meetings be reached at the first session of the talks. End text.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 337, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969. Secret. Sent for information. Haig forwarded this memorandum to Kissinger on December 18 as an item to discuss in his meeting with Richardson the same day. Kissinger, however, failed to indicate on the memorandum whether he raised the issue with Richardson. (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, December 18; ibid.)
2. In telegram 6848 from Moscow, December 16, Beam reported that he had delivered the aide-mémoire to Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Kozyrev that morning. Although told that the document was “for the serious consideration of the Soviet Government,” Kozyrev did not ask Beam, or the British or French Ambassador, about its substance. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 28 GER B)
3. See Document 42.
4. See footnote 3, Document 42.
5. In a December 11 letter to Dean, Sutterlin noted “a very marked White House sensitivity on anything that could be construed as confrontation with the French. There is a very strong inclination to get along with Paris at the present time. For this reason the White House urged that we compromise with the French both on the location and level of the proposed talks with the Soviets. I balked at this and we came out with the solution with which you are familiar, namely a concession on the level but not on the place. This concern for the French is something we have to keep in mind.” Sutterlin also reported: “If we must go through the bureaucratic procedure of referring outgoing telegrams to the White House for clearance under a memorandum from the Secretary or Under Secretary we can usually count on a week’s delay. Having gotten White House clearance earlier on the substance of our reply, we have been resorting this past week to informal clearance with Sonnenfeldt and this has worked pretty well.” (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, Chron (1969)—Letters (Incoming))
6. Attached but not printed.
7. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and USNATO. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 28 GER B.
8. Dated December 12. (Ibid.)
9. Dated December 13. (Ibid.)
10. Dated December 12. (Ibid.)
11. Dated December 10. (Ibid.)
12. See Document 24.
13. See Document 21.