Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

46. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 5, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Conversation with German Minister on Newspaper Article About Alleged White House Views

After the German Minister had finished discussing another matter during his call on me today, he raised the article by David Binder in today’s New York Times (Tab A).² I said I had wanted to raise the same matter. I said that the reported American démarche to Bonn concerning lack of German consultation was, of course, a complete fabrication, as the Germans themselves know. However, I wanted to make clear, and was doing so specifically in Dr. Kissinger’s behalf as well, that it was extremely difficult for us to talk with German visitors if shortly thereafter we saw newspaper articles attributing certain views to the White House. This was particularly serious when these views were patently fabricated and attempted to set the White House against the Department of State.

I continued that the Binder story was evidently based on back-grounding by German officials and seemed to have its origin in a discussion in the Bonn Group on November 18 in which the matter of inadequate German consultation on the German note to the Soviet Union of November 15 had come up.³ In conclusion, I repeated that it would be extremely difficult to talk confidentially with Germans in the future if stories of this sort continued appearing.

Mr. Oncken said that he assumed that the Binder story was an outgrowth of the recent article in Die Welt, in which Bundestag member Erik Blumenfeld was quoted about alleged White House views.⁴ Mr. Oncken went on to say that there were many people in Bonn, especially in the CDU, who wanted to embarrass the new Government and create dissension between it and Washington. He speculated that a story such as Binder’s could have originated in the Federal Press Office, whose officials were not as sensitive as the professionals in the Foreign Ministry to the trouble such a story might make.

I said that I realized that one could not control what newsmen wrote, but that it ought to be possible for governments to exercise control over what its officials said. Oncken said that any such control would be difficult to establish over members of the Bundestag. I concluded by reiterating that if confidential exchanges with the White House staff were to be continued in the future, it was essential to prevent leaks or distorted reports of them. Mr. Oncken said he would report our conversation to Bonn.⁵

HS

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. A note on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it on December 15.
2. Attached but not printed. Binder wrote that Fessenden had filed a formal complaint on the German failure to consult on Ostpolitik. According to Binder, the “démarche” originated not with the State Department, as reported in the German press, but with “people in the White House” close to Kissinger. Although no démarche has been found, Fessenden did express concern about the lack of consultation during talks with Ruete on November 26 and Bahr on November 28; see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 1338–1341, 1347–1348. In a December 11 letter to Dean, Sutterlin reported that Ahlers, possibly basing his account on a memorandum of conversation between Fessenden and a German official, was the “direct source” of the Binder story. “Whether Ahlers willfully confused an internal German memorandum with a non-existing American memorandum or whether he did this in ignorance is unclear.” (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, Chron (1969)—Letters (Incoming))
3. In a November 25 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt noted that the Germans had apologized for failing to consult but “made some rather lame excuse.” “This may be an embarrassment for the Germans,” he explained, “since Brandt’s letter of November 19 to the President [Document 44] was probably regarded as part of the coordination process. In that letter Brandt gave the President some long excerpts from his letter to Kosygin. State is not aware of this letter, and there is no indication from the reporting telegrams whether the Bonn Foreign Office is aware of it. (Bahr’s message said that only Brandt, Ehmke and he knew about it.) But judging from their rather vague excuses some in the West German Foreign Ministry may in fact know of the letter’s existence, and may, if pressed by State, mention it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III)
4. On December 2 Blumenfeld told an Embassy officer he had sensed some “apprehension” within the Nixon administration on Ostpolitik during a recent trip to Washington. Blumenfeld based his claim on conversations he had not only at the State Department but also at the White House, including Kissinger “with whom he spent at least an hour.” (Memorandum from Wolfson to Dean, December 2; Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, Chron (1969)—Letters (Outgoing)) In a December 9 letter to Dean, Sutterlin disputed this account: “I am told by Hal Sonnenfeldt that far from having an hour with Henry Kissinger he actually had five minutes after waiting for an hour.” As for the State Department’s role, Sutterlin was clear: “certainly no apprehension was expressed here concerning the FRG’s Eastern policy.” (Ibid., Letters (Incoming))
5. On January 14, 1970, Rush told Brandt that “the President had no worries whatsoever about lack of consultation, certain newspaper stories notwithstanding. The Chancellor replied that he understood this completely and had no concern that we were dissatisfied.” (Telegram 385 from Bonn, January 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GER W–US)