Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

384. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, November 10, 1972, 1715Z.

15432. Subj: Conversation With CDU Party Leader Rainer Barzel.

Summary: When I called this afternoon on CDU Party Leader and Chancellor-candidate Rainer Barzel as the first of the four Ambassadors (US, French, British, Soviet) whom he had asked to see, he was visibly disturbed and unhappy. He sharply criticized the basic treaty initialed on November 8 by the FRG and the GDR, and characterized the 4-power declaration as an unfortunate interference in the German electoral campaign. I explained to him some of the background of the 4-power negotiations and denied that there was any Allied intention to interfere in the German political process.

1. In a polite but heated manner, Barzel said he had been shocked by the developments of the last few days. Having studied the text of the basic treaty, he could only describe it as being a bad thing for Germany. He felt betrayed by the Allied haste in arriving at a 4-power declaration in a way that he thought constituted intervention in a West German electoral campaign. He did not see why the three Western powers could not have waited until after the elections to conclude their negotiations in Berlin.

2. I commented that interference in the German political process was certainly not our intention, and that a deliberate slowing up on our part could also have been regarded as such interference. I explained the background of the 4-power negotiations, pointing out that initial contacts were made by the three Allied Foreign Ministers with Gromyko in Berlin on June 3, and that these contacts were continued in September in connection with UNGA. Thus, the basic groundwork for the negotiations had been laid months ago. Moreover, it had always been understood that we should maintain a parallelism with the FRG–GDR negotiations on a basic treaty which would, inter alia, open the way to eventual application by the two German states for UN entry. It was the exchange of letters between Bahr and Kohl on UN entry² which required that we react quickly by concluding an agreement which would protect quadripartite rights and responsibilities.

3. Although some of my arguments made an impression, Barzel was basically not persuaded. He observed that, if elections had been held last Sunday, the CDU/CSU would have won a victory, but now he could not be sure of the outcome. Returning to the basic treaty, he noted that while there were many things wrong with the Moscow and the Warsaw treaties, he had been willing to make compromises in order to blunt an all-out CDU attack on them. But the basic treaty was unacceptable as it stood. In order to remove it from the present political campaign, he had offered a truce (Burgfriede) for the next ten days on discussion of the treaty, but the Chancellor had rejected this and was insisting on a clear-cut definition of the CDU position. Barzel would accordingly have to make a comprehensive statement on the subject before November 19. He did not, however, intend to criticize the three Allies in that statement. It was obviously impossible to mount an effective counterattack on such a complicated document during the next 9 days. Brandt was massively manipulating the Ostpolitik in order to divert attention away from domestic issues.

4. Barzel then asked what the position of the three powers would be in the event that the CDU/CSU did win the election, chose to insist on changes in the basic treaty, and then the GDR, supported by the Soviet Union, submitted its application for UN membership. I pointed out that the wording of the 4-power declaration was very precise on this point. We had agreed to support the applications of the FRG and the GDR to membership in the UN only when they were submitted by the two countries, and not in isolation. He also asked why we had been unable to get a reference to Germany in the declaration. I went over the history of this point, starting with the negotiation of the Berlin agreement, but stressed that the all-German connotation of the declaration was apparent from the very way in which it had been negotiated by the four Ambassadors in Berlin, and that the Western powers clearly understood that their rights and responsibilities included those for Germany as a whole.

5. Barzel said he had one request to make. If it were intended to make a response to the Chancellor’s message of congratulations on the reelection of the President,³ then he hoped he too would receive some reply to his similar message.⁴ If this type of equal treatment were not observed, the Chancellor would undoubtedly make use of any message to him as campaign material.

Comment: Barzel had cooled down somewhat by the end of our conversation, but his general appearance was more agitated than I have ever seen before. He is clearly chagrined at being outmaneuvered by the Chancellor, and the constant unfavorable comparisons between him and Brandt have clearly been taking their toll on his nerves. He now feels that Brandt has pulled a great coup which may tip the scales in favor of the SPD. His agitation may well have been increased by the latest election poll. We understand from the head of the Infas Polling Institute that the SPD/FDP is given a 20-seat majority over the CDU at this point.

I would urge, if the intention is to respond to the Chancellor’s congratulatory message on the reelection of the President, that consideration be given to sending a similar message to Barzel. This may help to correct in his mind what he considers to be the current imbalance in our approach.

Hillenbrand

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12–6 GER W. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.
2. For the text of the letter from Bahr to Kohl on November 8, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 1212; the letter from Kohl to Bahr on the same date was identical.
3. Nixon defeated George McGovern, the Democratic candidate for President, on November 7 by a landslide in both the popular vote and electoral college. The texts of Brandt’s congratulatory message of November 8 and Nixon’s reply of December 16 are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 754, President’s Correspondence File, Germany, Willy Brandt, 1972.
4. Neither the congratulatory message from Barzel nor a response from Nixon has been found.