Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 6, 1969.

SUBJECT

• The Vote of the West Berlin Deputies in the FRG Parliament: Nasty Decision
• May Be Facing US

The Problem

We may soon be confronted with the delicate question of whether the Allies should alter their 20-year-old principle of not permitting the 22 West Berlin deputies to vote in the West German Bundestag. There is a strong possibility that the new SPD/FDP coalition government will pressure for this change, since the additional Berlin votes would offer the coalition a more stable and workable majority. The pressure could come at any time: more probably after the October 20th investiture of the Chancellor; but we may even be faced with a fait accompli if the Speaker of the Bundestag decides to count the Berlin votes on October 20. (If they were counted, Brandt would have a majority of 18 instead of the slim 12-vote margin he would have without the Berlin votes.)

Current Position

In order to preserve Berlin’s special status and Allied rights and obligations, the Three Powers have since 1949 taken the position (in the form of a reservation to the FRG Constitution) that Berlin deputies may not vote in the Bundestag. Accordingly, State has just issued an instruction² that, in the event the SPD/FDP requests that Berlin deputies be permitted to participate in the vote for the Chancellor, Allied opposition must be reaffirmed, since a change now would constitute Allied interference in the formation of the new government. If faced with a fait accompli on October 20, State believes the Allies should not challenge the election, but should publicly state that the Allied position in Berlin itself has not been affected. At my request, State is now exploring the possible options in the most likely event that we are faced with a request from Brandt after his election to permit the Berlin deputies to vote on the enactment of legislation.

I feel that by the time the current sensitive period of the formation of the new government has passed and Brandt is in the saddle, we should at least have examined whether there is advantage in changing our twenty-year-old position. The issues are complex since they involve not only our relations with the FRG and the German political parties, but relations with the Allies (the French are strongly opposed to any change), and with the Soviets who of course have long made an issue over West Berlin’s ties to Bonn, but might not be averse to lending Brandt a helping hand.

State is to submit a memorandum for your consideration.³

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, an attached memorandum from Sonnenfeldt, October 3, states: “In accordance with our conversation today, I have prepared a brief memorandum for your signature.” A note indicates that Kissinger’s memorandum was returned from the President on October 10.
2. Telegram 167314 to Bonn, October 2. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 GER W)
3. In December the Department drafted a memorandum for the President recommending that the Allies “withdraw their prohibitions against voting by the Berlin deputies in the West German Bundestag.” (Letter from Hillenbrand to Rush, February 18, 1970; National Archives, RG 59, EUR Files: Lot 74 D 430, Department of State—Hillenbrand) Hillenbrand explained in a letter to Rush on January 27, 1970, that Rogers, although inclined to be supportive, did not “believe that this is the correct time for us to take an initiative and he therefore decided not to send the memorandum to the President which we had prepared.” (Ibid.) On February 3 Rush replied that he accepted this decision, especially since Brandt recently confided that he was considering “legislation which would itemize the issues on which the Berlin Deputies would not be entitled to vote in the Bundestag.” “If the Chancellor decides to take this step,” Rush argued, “it would seem to be a very satisfactory way of meeting the problem. On its face it seems to be in accord with the way Henry Kissinger is thinking, since as you know, he told me that his view was that we should take no affirmative steps to grant voting rights but that if the Berlin Deputies were allowed by the German Government to vote on issues in the Bundestag we should not protest.” (Ibid.) For further discussion of the issue, see Sutterlin and Klein, Berlin, pp. 99–101.