28. Editorial Note
On October 1, 1969, West German Ministerial Director Bahr called Henry Kissinger to discuss several issues, including the possibility of an informal visit to Washington. In an October 5 memorandum, Kissinger briefed the President on his conversation with Bahr and the resulting controversy with the Secretary of State:
“Egon Bahr, a close confidant of Willy Brandt, called me last week to say that there was no bad feeling in the SPD about our call to Kiesinger and that the SPD hoped to work closely with us. He indicated [Page 85] that he wanted to come over and talk with us; I told him not before the German Government was decided on and he indicated he would call back today (Monday) to discuss this further.
“I informed Elliot Richardson of the conversation. On Friday, Secretary Rogers called me to oppose any mission here by Bahr. (An erroneous report that Bahr was coming today (Monday) had been circulating in Bonn and here.) I agreed to make no arrangement for a visit, but also asked State not to insult Bahr, and through him Brandt, by telling him before he calls me back that he should not come. Obviously, if Brandt wants to use Bahr to open personal contact with you, you should have the option of considering it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 280, Agency Files, Department of State, Vol. IV)
Although no record of his conversation with Rogers has been found, a transcript of the telephone call between Kissinger and Richardson is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.
On October 7 Kissinger called Richardson to bring him “up to date on the Bahr situation,” particularly in light of a recent telegram (Document 30) reporting that Bahr intended to raise the issue of voting rights for the Berlin delegates in the Bundestag. Although he thought Bahr a “slippery fellow,” Kissinger argued that it would be difficult to refuse his request, now reiterated in a second phone call, to establish contact with the White House. When Richardson expressed concern that Bahr might attempt to negotiate on Berlin voting rights, Kissinger insisted that the issue was “not for the White House to discuss.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) Shortly thereafter, Kissinger and Rogers continued to debate by telephone the pros and cons of the proposed Bahr visit. The transcript of the conversation reads:
“K[issinger] said he had another call from Bahr. When K talked to Rogers before, he didn’t know what Rogers was talking about but now he has read the cable. K said the issue of voting rights had never been discussed at all. When Rogers asked, K gave his personal view which he would have given anyone. Rogers indicated that Bahr said he was coming over here to talk to K. K said he saw the cable which it was based on and it was factually wrong. He (Bahr) claims that Brandt wants Bahr to come to say he talked to somebody. K said he was worried that if we turn him down, particularly if it is understood there will be no negotiation on voting rights …if we refuse to let him come in the light of what’s already happened … [British Prime Minister] Wilson sends [Foreign Office Private Secretary] Youde over from time to time and we see him. K would like to recommend that we let him come and that Marty [Hillenbrand] and Rogers’ people be kept fully abreast and nothing be discussed about Berlin.
[Page 86]“Rogers felt that if you start that practice, they will all bypass the State Department. K said he wouldn’t let that happen—we didn’t do it on Kiesinger. This is just a case where they feel like being able to say they have the same sort of relationship. It is not something on which K would make an issue. K asked if Rogers would discuss this with Marty and then get back to him. K’s own judgment is that it would be better to let him come and make sure when he is here that there is a united front and that we don’t do any negotiating over here that would involve concrete issues and then put him over to Marty. Rogers said he would talk to Marty. He had a problem on the timing of it—before the government is installed. He thought we may be running a risk especially if it doesn’t work out the way Brandt expects. K didn’t think there was any possibility of that. Rogers asked if we should assume that Brandt is Chancellor. K said not formally, but they have only a 1% chance that something will happen the other way. K added that is why the Bahr visit should come before, after we may have more problems. Bahr just wants to tell us what Brandt’s thinking is on policy direction. He wants the President to know. It is basically clear that no decisions will be made. Rogers indicated that Brandt told him exactly what he wants to do. K said this is not something that is worth the two of them disagreeing on, but if the President has strong feelings, he would carry his wishes out, but he didn’t think this would happen.” (Ibid.)
Later that afternoon, Kissinger called Nixon to review the problems that Bahr posed for the bureaucracy. A transcript of the conversation records the following exchange:
“P[resident]—I have no concern on the German proposal.
“K[issinger]—Bill is afraid that they will get into the habit of end running him. Every German Chancellor has had a direct line with the White House. It is pressure for them because [Brandt] will be of a different party than [Kiesinger]. I have no personal view except that it has been standard. I have no objection if State Department wants to sit in on the conversation.
“P—All this business about end running is ridiculous.
“K—It is absurd. This guy is in no position. Brandt is trying to show good will toward you and probably get a little publicity for himself.
“P—The situation is all decided as far as Brandt then.
“K—There may be a 1/2% chance, if they can bribe votes. It is decided for all practical purposes.
“P—Why don’t you let them come over and let State sit in? We don’t care who sits in. I suggest Hillenbrand.
“K—It is simply to let this guy say he has had the meeting. He isn’t at your level.
[Page 87]“P—I didn’t know, he didn’t want to see me.
“K—It is something that Wilson does all the time when there is a meeting coming up between Wilson and yourself. He will send his man. I regret that the issue ever came up.
“P—Hillenbrand can sit in.” (Ibid.)
After his conversation with the President, Kissinger explained the decision to Rogers: “Bahr said he just wanted to explain his philosophy and K felt Bahr just wanted to talk to someone for an hour. Rogers asked if Brandt said he wanted Bahr to come. K said yes, and he had no reason to doubt that this was true. K said Marty could sit in on the meeting, in fact, it would be helpful.” (Ibid.) For memoir accounts of the above, see Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, pages 269–270; Kissinger, White House Years, pages 410–411; and Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pages 286–287.