34. Editorial Note
On October 16, 1969, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff prepared a memorandum, at the request of Assistant to the President Kissinger, reviewing the status of contingency planning for Berlin in light of the incident the previous day at the new Soviet checkpoint in Babelsberg. The Soviet action was, he noted, “the first real threat” to Allied access since the so-called “tailgate controversy” in the fall of 1963, when Soviet forces repeatedly delayed Allied convoys on the Autobahn outside the city. According to Sonnenfeldt, all [Page 99] Berlin contingency plans assumed that the Allies would refuse to “observe Soviet unilateral departures from standard procedures.” The Allies would test Soviet intentions first by low-level diplomatic protest and then by a limited “physical probe” of the access routes to the city. If this action clearly revealed an impasse, the situation would then enter a third phase “where neither the response format nor the individual steps are automatic.” As Sonnenfeldt further explained:
“From this point, the course of Allied action (US, tripartite, quadripartite, or NATO-wide) and the direction (against the GDR, the Soviets or the Bloc) are wide open to negotiation and governmental decision. The range of possible activity increases in severity and scope. On the diplomacy front it includes protests in capitals and in Moscow. The economic and administrative countermeasures include, for example, withdrawal from or cancellation of scientific and cultural conferences and exhibits involving the Soviets (or Bloc countries), harassment of Bloc inland waterway traffic, restraint on the movement of Soviet trade missions in NATO countries, tightening frontier controls over Bloc personnel, prevention of overflights of Bloc aircraft and closure of ports to Bloc shipping. The military countermeasures include non-combatant actions such as the assembly of tripartite probe forces of increasing size (company to battalion) and lead ultimately to the employment of military forces.”
Kissinger marked this passage of the memorandum and wrote in the margin: “Let’s get WSAG on this.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 689, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. I)
On October 21 the Washington Special Actions Group, chaired by Kissinger, met in the White House Situation Room from 3:28 to 5:12 p.m. to discuss Berlin, Sino-Soviet hostilities, and the Middle East. The minutes of the meeting record the discussion on Berlin as follows:
“Secretary Johnson asked the chair to take up Berlin as the first agenda item. He stated that there is a need to brief the President, Secretary Rogers, and Secretary Laird on the subject of Berlin contingency planning. The subject is enormously complex. The problem is not, however, one of substance but one of methodology. How should Berlin be presented?
“Kissinger, while disclaiming extensive familiarity with Berlin planning, reported his understanding that the plans, in the phases beyond diplomatic measures, were merely a collection of possible responses without evaluation as to priority of implementation. He inquired whether the plans have been reviewed in the light of the existing political climate in Europe and adjacent areas.
“Hillenbrand then reviewed the status of Berlin planning. Because of the complexity of the problem, the Berlin files are being computerized to deal with the mass of data. The overall quadripartite planning [Page 100] effort has been synthesized in a document known as BQDCC-1—a capsulated form of all major contingency plans, and some minor ones. It has been reviewed this year and is backed up by individual plans drawn in considerably more detail. There are various groups that are— or could be—involved in Berlin planning. These are the basic quadripartite group in Bonn, the Washington Ambassadorial Group, the Berlin Task Force, and Live Oak, a military headquarters (with staff and excellent communications) commanded by General Goodpaster (SACEUR/USCINCEUR) as the third of his responsibilities. During the recent check-point flurry Live Oak was alerted. Jack Pine is a backup headquarters (on standby status) located in Wiesbaden under CINC USAFE. There are U.S. unilateral plans which backup the quadripartite plans, but it is doubtful that a U.S. President would ever want to use them. Perhaps the major inhibition to unilateral action is that forces would have to transit the British zone to reach Berlin.
“The quadripartite plans have been leaked to the Soviet Union by a French agent. This leakage may have had a good effect in keeping the lid on Berlin because the NATO plans—above division strength— look quite horrendous. One should assume that all quadripartite plans have been compromised. This assumption should not, however, be interpreted as requiring a change in any of the plans inasmuch as their deterrent value is considered to be meaningful.
“All of the quadripartite plans embody U.S. concepts regarding desirable courses of action. NSAM 109, which has been reviewed and reaffirmed, represents the military rationale behind the plans. The document probably remains secure. One important fact which relates to all of the Berlin plans is that neither the U.S. Government nor any other government is committed to specific action.
“Secretary Johnson said the type of information presented by Hillenbrand is what should be given to Mr. Nixon and that State would prepare a briefing. Kissinger agreed with the recommended course of action, saying that he would discuss the matter with the President, having Wednesday, 29 October as a target date for the briefing. He turned to Sonnenfeldt for comment. Sonnenfeldt urged that any WSAG planning for Berlin should deal with counter-measures (beyond probes and protests) to be taken after the fact of a major provocation such as a blockade. Kissinger outlined the three elements he considered essential for the briefing: (1) a summary of the organization aspects of Berlin planning, (2) how the planning is done, and (3) a range of possible situations.
“Hillenbrand cautioned against doing much in the way of revised planning because of the deterrent effect of existing plans, the complexity of quadripartite negotiations, and the possibly destabilizing consequences should the Soviets be made aware of allied efforts toward [Page 101] revised crisis planning for Berlin. Kissinger replied that the interest of the President is not toward major revisions, but only to ascertain that the plans we have are still good.
“All agreed on the need for the briefing. Kissinger then inquired about what should be done following the briefing. How can we get at the plans on the basis of their merits? Do we have suitable alternatives, in today’s world, should we need to act in Berlin? First of all, he suggested, we should look at all of the unilateral plans and then the key quadripartite plans to see if we still find them acceptable. Hyland opined that we should develop a statement of priorities, which Hillenbrand agreed is possible, but only on a unilateral basis. Hyland acknowledged this is true, but the fact in no way diminished the need for the exercise. Sonnenfeldt reiterated his concern that we plan beyond an impasse, considering what courses the U.S. would choose and what we should try to get our allies to do.
“Secretary Johnson said we should develop scenarios covering what and how we should seek to implement in a Berlin crisis. If we are blockaded—in earnest—tomorrow, what course would we recommend to the President so that he in turn could persuade our allies? Can this sort of thing be drawn from existing plans? Hillenbrand said it could. Kissinger said the style of the President is to weigh various courses of action. The briefing, therefore, would be the first step, followed by a WSAG review of the plans in an attempt to establish priorities. He asked the Group to think about how the WSAG review should be conducted.”
According to the summary of decisions for the meeting, the participants agreed that: (1) a briefing on Berlin contingency planning would be prepared for the President; and (2) both unilateral and quadripartite contingency planning for Berlin would be reviewed “with special emphasis on establishing priorities among alternative courses of action.” (National Security Council, Minutes Files, Box 120, WSAG Minutes, 1969 and 1970 (Originals)) No evidence has been found that the President received the proposed briefing on Berlin contingency planning. For text of NSAM 109, “U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict,” see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIV, Document 185.