Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

33. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 15, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Possible Difficulties with the Soviets on Berlin Access

Yesterday afternoon at the new Soviet checkpoint (Babelsberg) on the Autobahn just outside West Berlin, the Soviets explained to Allied commanders new arrangements which will go into effect today at 8:00 a.m. (Washington time). A new barrier pass (Laufzettel) has “DDR” printed at the top and the East German national symbol in the middle. There apparently will be no change in the procedures for using the pass: the Soviets give the pass to the Allied traveler who in turn hands it to the East German guard at the barrier.

Last evening the Allied commanders advised the Soviet checkpoint officer that we had reservations about the new arrangements. The Soviet said he would pass the information to his superiors who might wish to meet with Allied representatives. The US and British Missions feel that Allied Protocol Officers should jointly call on the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin early today requesting that checkpoint commanders discuss the matter before the new arrangements are put into effect. US Mission Berlin considers the new barrier pass format is unacceptable.

Embassy Bonn has coordinated with the British on the initial actions to be taken but has thus far not been able to establish contact with the French (this is probably because Schumann is in Moscow and the French are consciously remaining incommunicado). US Embassy Bonn² and the British proposed the following course of action, which was approved by State and cleared by me in your behalf last night:³

• —Allied checkpoint commanders will seek out Soviet counterparts early on October 15 and register Allied objections to the proposed new barrier pass procedures.
• —Concurrently, Allied Protocol Officers will call upon the Soviet Embassy Protocol Officer in East Berlin and register similar objections indicating that the Allies regard the proposed change as unacceptable.
• —If the preceding steps have been unsuccessful, a single US vehicle will test the new procedure and if the Soviets insist at the checkpoint on acceptance of the new pass, the vehicle would turn back to West Berlin.
• —Concurrently, a British military police vehicle will also probe the Helmstedt checkpoint to ascertain if the new procedures have been established at the western end. No other Allied traffic will enter the Autobahn after 1:00 p.m. local at the eastern end and after 10:45 a.m. local at the western end if it has been determined that the single vehicle tests did not succeed.

Should the above procedures result in continued Soviet intransigence, protests will again be registered at the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. Consideration will then be given to escalating the diplomatic scenario to include possibly summoning Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to State or the White House to register a protest in the strongest terms in concert with similar British and hopefully French diplomatic approaches.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 689, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A note indicates that it was returned from the President on October 17.
2. The Mission in Berlin (not the Embassy in Bonn) forwarded these recommendations, as reported in telegrams 1797, 1798, and 1799, October 14. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38–10)
3. In telegrams 174573 and 174574 to Bonn and Berlin, October 15. (Ibid.)
4. In an October 16 memorandum to the President, Kissinger reported on the outcome of the incident: “Following a démarche by the Allied checkpoint commanders yesterday morning, the Soviet commander stated that the new barrier pass would not be used for Allied travelers, and that the old form would be retained. Two procedural changes would be made, however: the barrier pass would be used for individual Allied travelers both entering and departing Berlin (until now the pass was used only for outbound travelers), and Allied convoys would not be given a barrier pass when leaving Berlin as they had in the past. The Allied representatives informed the Soviets that the old pass form would be acceptable, and shortly thereafter the US probing vehicle passed through the checkpoint without difficulty. No Allied traffic on the Autobahn has been resumed. There has been no press inquiry.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 12, President’s Daily Briefs, October 11–21, 1969)