Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

339. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 10, 1972.

SUBJECT

• German Bundesrat Vote Against the Eastern Treaties

As you probably saw, the Bundesrat, in a straight party-line vote, rejected the Eastern treaties yesterday 21 to 20. The next steps will be a series of three Bundestag readings beginning with the first on February 23–24. In each of these a simple majority (of those present and voting) will be required for passage. After the third reading, the treaties will go back to the Bundesrat. There can then either be a conference committee in which differences between the two houses might be ironed out. Or there could be a second Bundesrat reading without a conference committee. Assuming no change in government in Baden-Wuertemberg as a result of the election there in April, the Bundesrat presumably would again reject the treaties. In the then-required fourth reading in the Bundestag an absolute majority would be needed for passage. As you are aware, the timing of these actions could coincide roughly with the May summit unless both the German parties agree to delay the procedure until afterwards. (If the CDU loses the Minister Presidency in Stuttgart in April, the Bundesrat would agree to the treaties in its second reading and no further Bundestag vote would be required.)

In yesterday’s Bundesrat debate, Brandt partly followed the script I understand he outlined to the President:² he said that the treaties had been negotiated in closest cooperation with the Allies.³ But he also went beyond what he had told the President: he said the Eastern treaties had broken the ice for the Berlin agreement which President Nixon has just termed a milestone on the way to détente in Europe.⁴ This of course represents the not unexpected effort to engage the President’s interest in ratification of the treaties.

The CDU spokesman, Kohl, on the other hand, noted that the Allies, particularly the US, had made clear that the decision on the treaties was a German one.⁵ This, I think, reflects accurately what the President told both Brandt and Barzel. It is of course a useful line for the opponents since it decouples the Berlin agreement from the treaties.

Efforts by both sides in the debate to involve the US, and the President personally, will no doubt continue.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 686, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. XI. Secret; Eyes Only; (Outside System.) Sent for information. Haig and Kissinger both initialed the memorandum, indicating that they had seen it.
2. For the meetings between Brandt and Nixon on December 28 and 29, see Documents 335 and 336.
3. For the text of Brandt’s address to the Bundesrat on February 9, see Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, pp. 79–90.
4. Reference is to the President’s Annual Report on Foreign Policy, submitted to the Congress on February 9, in which Nixon hailed the quadripartite agreement on Berlin as a “milestone achievement.” For the full text of the report, see Department of State Bulletin, March 13, 1972, pp. 313–418.
5. For the text of Kohl’s address to the Bundesrat on February 9, see Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, pp. 43–53.