335. Memorandum For the President’s File by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1
- Meeting with Chancellor Brandt on Tuesday, December 28, 1971 at 1:30 p.m., The President’s Residence, Key Biscayne, Florida2
- The President
- Chancellor Brandt
- Mr. Sahm
- General Haig
Following press photographs, the President, Chancellor Brandt, Mr. Sahm and General Haig moved from the living room to the President’s library. President Nixon welcomed Chancellor Brandt and informed him that he had looked forward to their meeting in this particular setting which would provide for the kind of informality that would generate the most frank and free exchanges between the two leaders. The President proposed conducting the meeting in a way that would bring the discussion first through various worldwide problems of interest to the two governments and then to specific bilateral issues. He asked whether or not Chancellor Brandt had any other approach that he would prefer or any specific topics that he would wish to include.
President Nixon stated that he would like to discuss first the Soviet summit meeting scheduled for May. This meeting had been most carefully prepared and followed specific and concrete achievements on issues of concern to the United States and the Soviets. The President recalled that he had at the previous meeting3 told Chancellor Brandt at the time of that meeting that the moment was not propitious for such a meeting with the Soviet leadership, but events over the past year had now crystalized in a way which offered some promise for a constructive meeting in Moscow. The President reassured Chancellor Brandt [Page 941]that the discussions in Moscow would in no sense result in agreements arrived at the expense of old friends. He stated that both the summit in Peking and the summit in Moscow had been undertaken with a firm commitment to that underlying philosophy.
The issue of MBFR was a topic which could only be pursued within such a philosophy. No discussions should be held with the Soviets on this issue until the most careful consultation and preparation had been completed by the western powers and only then could the topic be discussed by them with the Soviets.
President Nixon asked Chancellor Brandt for his assessment of Messrs. Brezhnev and Kosygin, both of whom the Chancellor had met on recent occasions.4 The President noted that he would discuss with the Soviets such problems as South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. He noted that recent experience in South Asia confirmed the definite conflict of interests between the Soviets and the People’s Republic of China in that particular area.5
President Nixon then turned to the situation in Western Europe. He noted that although problems elsewhere in the world were of great importance, the focal point of world power and our center of interest must remain in Europe, adding that the key to Europe is Germany and this is a fact well known by the Soviets. The President asked Chancellor Brandt for his views on the future of Europe.
Chancellor Brandt stated that he had been for some time a proponent of improving relationships between the West and East but in doing so he had only proceeded in the confidence that Germany’s NATO partners, especially the United States, were fully cognizant and supportive of his actions. The last NATO Ministerial meeting6 confirmed this support.
The Chancellor stated that he would like to give the President his impressions of the Soviet leadership, but also touch upon the European economic community and NATO after discussing in a broader context East-West relationships. President Nixon agreed with this approach.
Chancellor Brandt stated that he had visited Moscow in the summer of 1970 and that had been his first trip to the Soviet Union. [Page 942]Subsequently, he saw Brezhnev again in September and during this meeting he noted a somewhat remarkable change in Brezhnev. During the first four and a half hour meeting in August, 1970 Brezhnev appeared very unsure of himself, especially in the area of international affairs. The meeting had been one-on-one with only interpreters present and during that meeting Brezhnev even resorted to reading from point papers that had been prepared for him.
Conversely, during their meeting in September, Brezhnev was far more relaxed, far more at ease with the subject matter and obviously very confident that he was in charge. He had told Chancellor Brandt that he was completely responsible for Soviet relations with Western Europe and the United States while Kosygin was concentrating on India, Scandinavia and other less important areas.
Brezhnev described how the Politburo functioned with respect to foreign policy, emphasizing that it was in fact the Politburo itself which had the final say on all foreign affairs.
During this meeting Brezhnev asked Chancellor Brandt whether or not President Nixon was truly interested in peace. The Chancellor assured him that he was. During the earlier meeting last summer Chancellor Brandt assiduously avoided raising the issue of China, having been informed that it was an issue of great sensitivity to the Soviet leadership. However, because of the more relaxed and open atmosphere of the September meeting, Chancellor Brandt asked Brezhnev for his views on China. Brezhnev replied that this was a very difficult subject and stated that he would like to think about it overnight before responding.
The following morning, Brezhnev again avoided the subject and Chancellor Brandt again raised it by stating that the Federal Republic was seriously considering recognizing the People’s Republic of China. Mr. Brezhnev stated that he hoped this would not occur tomorrow.7 Brezhnev then went on to talk for approximately an hour on China. The discussion was open and devoid of outward suspicion of Chinese motives. There were no derogatory remarks made about President Nixon’s visit to Peking.
Chancellor Brandt stated that he believes there is now a genuine interest in Moscow in normalizing relations with Western Europe and the United States. The Soviets probably seek more economic and technical cooperation and are definitely interested in a reduction in armaments. Chancellor Brandt stated that the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union demanded the greatest caution however, because [Page 943]of the effects of the process on Eastern Europe. The Eastern Europeans are in a dilemma on this topic since increased contacts contribute to increased pressure for greater autonomy among the Eastern states.
Chancellor Brandt states that he believed that the Soviets were genuinely unhappy about the actions they had undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 19688 and therefore are themselves inhibited in undertaking greater normalization. The last crisis in Poland9 showed a definite shift in Soviet policy. This was handled differently from the Czechoslovakia crisis. There were no anti-German statements made by the Soviets and the situation was genuinely handled as an internal domestic problem. Nevertheless, the danger remains. Perhaps the greatest danger is that of Communist Chinese influence in Eastern Europe. Should Chinese influence result in breaks between Moscow and certain Eastern European regimes, the Soviets will probably intervene. In this respect Albania is probably not so important, but Romania and Yugoslavia constitute most serious problem areas. Although the Communist Chinese have little influence in East Germany, they are also working there and the Soviets are suspicious of their activities.
In commenting on the Chinese character, Brezhnev had employed a four-stage argument with Chancellor Brandt. The first dealt with the historical character of the Chinese people which was strange and difficult for Western nations to understand. Brezhnev had told Chancellor Brandt that if one were to say to the Chinese that that wall is white, the Chinaman would reply that this is not so; it is in fact black. And this is the kind of logic that one is confronted with when dealing with the Chinese. Stage two involved the Chinese approach to interstate relations. Brezhnev had conceded that the Chinese might now be interested in some normalization in the area of trade, but he described this trade in kopeks rather than rubles. The third stage of the China problem mentioned by Brezhnev was the diversionist activities of the People’s Republic which they were utilizing on a worldwide basis. These diversionist tactics, Brezhnev recounted with some emotion, were anti-Soviet. Brezhnev recalled the story of the Soviet engineer who visited a Chinese-run hotel in Algeria and who had found that each meal was garnished with reams of Chinese Communist printed propaganda. Brezhnev had specifically recounted the activities of leftwing Maoists in Bengal.
The fourth stage of argumentation used by Brezhnev dealt with the overall importance of China as a nation. Here again he employed [Page 944]a degree of emotion referring to China as a nation of 800 million backward people who tilled the soil with their hands rather than sophisticated machinery and whose technological advancement was decades behind the industrial powers of the world. China had no automobiles and the upper class still rode bicycles. Even the Soviet Union was now replete with automobiles.
Chancellor Brandt described this argumentation by Brezhnev as somewhat similar to the youth who strolls through the woods crying loudly in order to do away with his own fear. In short, Brezhnev appeared to be adopting the tactic of belittling the Chinese because of a fundamental fear of China’s power.
Chancellor Brandt described Mr. Brezhnev as an active, optimistic individual in contrast to Kosygin whom he described as conservative and pessimistic. The Chancellor noted that this difference in the character of the two leaders may be the reason that President Pompidou favors Kosygin while on the other hand Chancellor Brandt favors Brezhnev. Chancellor Brandt stated that in his view Kosygin may step down soon.10
Turning to the specifics of West German-Soviet relations, Chancellor Brandt noted that West Germany was having some problems with the Soviets on the treaty problem. The Soviets strongly resented the linkage of the Berlin agreement and the treaties of 1970. For this reason, they developed a counter-linkage concept of their own. It would be a year and a half since the Soviet and Polish treaties had been signed and they were still not ratified. During that period there had been some improvement in German-Soviet relations with an increase of about 3.5 percent in trade and some additional cultural and technological exchanges. In addition, the Soviets had turned away from their unfriendly attitude toward West Germany.
President Nixon noted that it was evident that West Germany was no longer the Soviet Union’s whipping boy. Chancellor Brandt agreed stating that he had information that the Soviets were actually reindoctrinating their people and especially their military away from an anti-German preoccupation. Defense Minister Grechko had recently commented on this in Sweden stating that he is weaning the Soviet army away from its formerly hostile attitude toward the Germans. This has been accomplished at some risk to the Soviets because in the past the anti-German bugaboo had always been the rallying cry for Warsaw Pact unity in times of crisis and this trend confirms Soviet intentions are long range in character.[Page 945]
President Nixon asked the Chancellor about the Soviet attitude toward East Germans. Chancellor Brandt replied that there were some recent indications of increased tensions. Certainly there was evidence that the Soviets had pressured the East Germans to be more flexible and forthcoming with respect to the Berlin Agreement. Chancellor Brandt noted that the East German leaders were opposed to improved communications between East and West Germany. On occasion the East German newspapers had commented that West Germany was closer to the Soviets than was East Germany. The traditional fear of West German visitors had its impact and East German control of the people was, of course, a factor. Nevertheless, the Soviets have pressured the East Germans to loosen up and to be less intransigent. It is possible that Ulbricht was replaced by Honecker to assist the process. Honecker is more responsive to Soviet control and at the same time more flexible. Honecker however is not a representative of the new forces in East Germany. He still represents the apparat whereas in several years the new managerial class will have a greater voice in East German affairs. President Nixon asked whether or not the new class were dedicated Marxists and Chancellor Brandt replied that they were less so than the apparat. President Nixon asked whether Ulbricht was a tougher leader than his successor and the Chancellor confirmed that that was his impression. President Nixon stated that initially Ulbricht had been very close to the Soviets. Chancellor Brandt confirmed this but stated that he had become less so in recent years.
President Nixon asked which of the two leaders were most respected by the people of East Germany. Chancellor Brandt stated that Ulbricht had been despised for many years, although he became more popular as Soviet influence waned in East Germany.
President Nixon thanked Chancellor Brandt for his appraisal but emphasized that Soviet motives must always be judged in terms of the Soviet assessment of Germany as the key to Europe. The Soviets recognized that Germany is the moving force. On the one hand, free Germany needs Soviet cooperation; on the other, the Soviets need a cooperative Germany due to Germany’s central position in Europe. Western Europe without West Germany is nothing.
The President asked Chancellor Brandt why he thinks the Soviets are being more conciliatory to the Federal Republic. Chancellor Brandt stated that it is probable that the Soviets tend to overestimate German power. This is based on their historic view of Germany. It is probable that they want better terms for three reasons:
- They hope at least temporarily to get acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe. The Soviets know that they cannot hold Eastern Europe forever, but they would like to prolong the process as long as possible.
- There is also a genuine desire for increased exchange.
- It may be that the Soviets genuinely want better relations with the United States and assume that improved relations with West Germany will assist this trend.
President Nixon stated that if all this were true, it further emphasizes the importance of reaffirming U.S. and West German ties and the respective ties of both countries to their NATO allies. It is probable that another factor in Soviet interests for normalization is a genuine fear of China. China is a reality and will soon be a substantial nuclear reality. China’s threat to the Soviets in many ways is not measurable since it involves leadership of the communist world. This is the greatest fear of all to the Soviets—doctrinal influence with the radical elements of the third world. The Soviets remain conflict-oriented. At present it is the East flank which gives them worries. Thus, they must wish to normalize the west flank. This fact notwithstanding, the U.S. decision to visit Communist China was not directed against the Soviets. Nevertheless, it could not but have had a disturbing effect in Moscow. China is Moscow’s rival.
Chancellor Brandt then turned to East-West trade. He noted that West Germany had trade with Romania, Yugoslavia, and also with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Poles wanted more while the Czechs are less interested. Hungary is also less interested. Chancellor Brandt emphasized that West German policy is to influence their firms to concert with other West European firms and to plan jointly on the whole subject of trade with the east, and to get guarantees against Soviet and Polish splitting efforts.
The Chancellor asked President Nixon to discuss the results of Secretary Stans’ visit to the Soviet Union.11 President Nixon stated that Stans was received warmly and had extensive talks with the Soviet leaders. The Soviets are definitely interested in increased trade with the U.S. but of course also wanted credits and most-favored-nation treatment. This is a topic which will be discussed in May at the summit.
Gromyko also emphasized the need for trade while in Washington.12 Mr. Brezhnev had written on the subject.13 The Soviets of course do not like linkage of this subject. Nevertheless, U.S. policy assumes progress in political areas must precede progress in trade for as a practical matter the Congress would not support any other approach. If the Soviets are fishing in troubled waters in the Middle East or elsewhere, [Page 947]they cannot expect increased trade. Furthermore, the Soviets have more to gain from increased trade.
Chancellor Brandt stated that Brezhnev had asked him to join in the creation of a joint five-member trade committee to explore increased trade with West Germany. Brezhnev had stated that the Soviets also want producer goods but had only offered raw materials for which West Germany has no need as a quid pro quo.
President Nixon stated that the United States views trade much like West Germany. It must be broadened slowly and carefully. It is in our interest only in the context of political gain.
The President asked whether the Middle East had been raised in the discussions with Brezhnev. Chancellor Brandt stated that is not specifically, but that he had a definite impression that the Soviets were not looking for a crisis but a way out of one in that area. He added that Brezhnev had commented that their arms policy with respect to Egypt involved only doing what was necessary for the defense of Egypt. President Nixon stated that he shared the judgment that the Soviets do not want a confrontation in the Middle East. The economic burden of Egypt must be substantial. Cuba costs the Soviets a million and a half a day; the Middle East in the neighborhood of a billion and a half a year. The Soviet economy is now flat. Therefore leadership may now feel it is time to focus on internal problems, to reduce external commitments and to satisfy some of the demands of the Soviet people. In a sense, Soviet progress which had been diverted to improve the lot of the Soviet people had been welcome as it might ultimately temper expansionist trends.
The foregoing review confirms that both sides must maintain the closest contact on trends within the Soviet Union before the Moscow summit. The United States will do nothing behind the back of its allies. Above all, West Germany is the cornerstone of our Europe policy.
President Nixon then asked Chancellor Brandt to comment on the Soviet-German treaty. Chancellor Brandt stated that there were some differences of view internally on procedural arrangements needed to ratify the treaty. In any event, a vote is expected in early May. West Germany had not thought about the processing of the treaty in terms of the timing of the President’s Moscow trip, but had wishes to have it formalized before the next NATO Ministerial meeting at the end of May or early June.14 This may not be possible however.
Both the Soviet and Polish treaties should be ratified before summer. The Polish treaty is easier. Also, the Berlin agreement should be signed before the summer.[Page 948]
President Nixon asked if the Soviets had not used reverse linkage. Chancellor Brandt confirmed that they were doing so, but that he was against this Soviet tactic. Both leaders agreed that the Berlin agreement was a definite achievement for United States and the West German diplomacy and a manifestation of great cooperation between the two powers. President Nixon stated that the United States would support the Berlin agreement on its own merits, but that the treaties and their processing within the German bureaucracy was an internal matter. He noted that the U.S. press might speculate on both of these subjects and that the Chancellor should know that the U.S. supports the Berlin Agreement and that the treaties are an internal matter for the German people to decide although the U.S. will do nothing on that subject to embarrass the Chancellor. Chancellor Brandt stated that he agreed with this policy but might wish to make it clear that the treaties were accomplished in close consultation with West Germany’s allies.
President Nixon stated that Christian Democratic leader Barzel wished to visit Washington early next year and that he would have to act favorably on such a request although he would do so with benign neutrality.
Chancellor Brandt stated that with respect to the issue of the entry of East and West Germany to the United Nations he would not favor such a move before the end of 1973, if that soon. Some German allies are pushing on this issue, but it is not a welcomed initiative. President Nixon stated this was one of the reasons the United States had refused to accept the universality issue with regard to Taiwan. Brandt stated that it would be necessary to achieve additional progress with East Germany on access, traffic control, etc., before UN membership could be considered. In any event, the Federal Republic will have to maintain the one-nation concept.
President Nixon stated that the issue of MBFR must also be approached with the greatest caution and care. He noted that Prime Minister Heath expressed this same concept as had the French. General Haig noted that no U.S. studies had come up with formulas which would not hurt Western European security, and for this reason discussion of balanced force reductions should be in terms of principles and most carefully approached. Chancellor Brandt stated that he agreed fully with this appraisal. Nevertheless, ultimately the subject will have to be looked at most carefully. President Nixon stated that it is a topic on which hope must be held out but reductions would only make sense if they did not hurt the alliance. In this regard, the increase of a billion dollars in force improvements by the Allies has been most helpful in the U.S. ability to hold the line on its own force levels. President Nixon stated that he sensed that even the Soviets are beginning to have doubts about the MBFR. Chancellor Brandt’s reply was that it is probable that the Soviets have not even really studied the subject.[Page 949]
President Nixon then complimented the Chancellor on his peace prize acceptance speech15 and especially on that portion dealing with youth. Chancellor Brandt noted that the anarchist trend among West Germany’s youth had cooled off. Nevertheless, there were continual problems in communication.
Chancellor Brandt raised the issue of the leadership problem in Yugoslavia. He noted that this experiment with collective leadership had failed in Croatia and had resulted in the dismissal of the party leadership there. All of these events highlighted the great danger of the situation in Yugoslavia following Tito. Brandt noted that German intelligence indicated that the Soviets were working with nationalist anticommunist Croatian forces abroad and were hopeful of imposing Soviet hegemony. Brandt urged that the United States undertake some measures to assist Tito without appearing to interfere. Tito needs an image of good relations with the United States and Western Europe. President Nixon instructed General Haig to follow up on this issue.
President Nixon stated that he understood that Brezhnev might have been quite tough on Tito during their recent meeting. Brandt stated that Brezhnev had tried to give the opposite impression.
Chancellor Brandt then asked about the Middle East. President Nixon noted that they were hopeful of achieving some progress, but that the situation looked quite discouraging. He stated that Mrs. Meir had relied on the President personally for the kinds of assurances that were essential. In this regard, recent events in South Asia had an important parallel in the Middle East. The Soviets would have been badly misled had they been permitted to achieve objectives through proxies in that area. Obviously, a similar situation existed in the Middle East. Chancellor Brandt stated that West Germany had just reestablished relations with Algeria and the Sudan,16 and that they were also increasing their activities in Egypt and Syria. The Chancellor noted that he had a good man17 who was close to the Israelis and the Arabs and who might be some help on the Middle East. The President told the Chancellor to contact Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger on this subject.[Page 950]
The President then asked the Chancellor to discuss his views on the European Economic Community. The Chancellor stated he was very pleased with the enlargement of the community and especially the United Kingdom’s entrance. The Scandinavians posed some worries in this respect however, and Norway might be the toughest problem. If it does not enter it could just slip into a neutralist stance. Britain’s entry in any event will change the entire structure of the community and Britain’s outward perspective will influence it. President Nixon stated that the Community is now like a three-legged stool. Chancellor Brandt recalled that this was precisely what Adenauer had feared.
Adenauer had told him earlier that if the three great powers belonged, two would gang up on one and Germany would be the one. Brandt on the other hand did not accept this concept. He preferred to believe that ongoing political cooperation will help European unity. In the context of Britain’s membership three fields of activity would be involved: 1. monetary; 2. foreign policy; and, 3. defense. Defense cannot be given too high a posture at the moment or the French will shy away. Within the Alliance, the European group is in a very good state. Former British Defense Minister Healy had launched the concept and German MOD Schmidt is now the Chairman. This body is now responsible for recent decisions to improve NATO’s defenses. Trade remains the main source of friction between the United States and West European unity. The monetary settlement cannot but help however, even though West Germany was not pleased with the French attitude on the monetary settlement. Germany never had a problem with the deutschmark and the dollar but rather with the deutschmark and the franc. There was already a 20 percent differential and Pompidou wanted another 6. President Nixon stated he actually wanted seven.
Brandt continued that he had settled on 5.5 percent but nevertheless Germany can live with the final outcome and will do so. Trade talks are now quite important and the issues must be moved forward. CAP18 and the grain issue is difficult. All of these things suggest that a new relationship or a new forum be created in which these problems can be discussed in a clear way. Agriculture is a difficult problem, especially with France. Over time it will change and the French will become more level. Right now they are very difficult on this subject. The requirement now is for an organized link in the economic field between the enlarged European Economic Community and the United States. A forum should be created which meets once or twice a year to discuss all problems.
President Nixon stated that the U.S. may feel that the enlarged European community might concert against U.S. interests and could ultimately result in an economic confrontation with Europe. This would be [Page 951]very grave and would raise political overtones. For this reason the Chancellor’s idea has much merit. It is essential that the community not become protectionist. It is also necessary that Japan be considered. The United States, Canada, Western Europe and Japan comprise 90 percent of the production of the free world and it is essential that Japan not feel isolated. Should not Japan also be included? Chancellor Brandt stated that the Federal Republic of Germany has important trade with Japan.
Brandt noted that the French would be suspicious of an arrangement between the expanded market and the United States since the U.S. would look like a member without being one. This was a result of the Gaullist syndrome. President Nixon stated that the U.S. understood this problem and for this reason Great Britain might be a little Gaullist itself at the moment.
Chancellor Brandt stated that Pompidou had implied that economic integration in Western Europe also ran somewhat counter to détente adding that he did not accept this judgment and in any event it is a French problem. Brandt added that there is also a problem with the Swiss and the Swedes. If they are excluded, they can only run to the Soviets. The expanded community should not however enter into the former British areas in the Caribbean and elsewhere. This could be difficult for the United States. On the other hand, Africa, especially the Mediterranean areas, is a different question and Common Market activity there actually helps the United States.
An additional problem is that developing countries should also get preferential treatment from the community. The U.S. has tended to stay out of Africa whereas Germany has been quite active in that area. President Nixon stated that the U.S. welcomes Germany’s activities in Africa. Chancellor Brandt stated that the Africans must have help from Western Europe. Britain, France and Germany must fill the gap, and Germany is better able to do so because it has long since lost its colonial image.
President Nixon noted that the Caribbean and the declining British role there is potentially dangerous since the vacuum left by the British might easily be filled by extremist nationalist regimes. Therefore, the continued British presence, however small, is a stabilizing influence.
President Nixon thanked Chancellor Brandt for his frank and open attitude during the talks. He noted that the discussions could be continued at the working dinner that evening and suggested that Ambassador Rush and Ambassador Pauls be added to the dinner.19 Both men agreed to meet and continue the discussions the next day.
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President, Beginning December 26, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.↩
- For the German record of the meeting, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1971, Vol. 3, pp. 1980–1997. For memoir accounts, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 965–967; Brandt, People and Politics, pp. 297–302; and Sahm, “Diplomaten taugen nichts”, p. 291.↩
- Reference is to the meeting between Nixon and Brandt on June 15, 1971. See Document 254.↩
- Regarding Brandt’s meetings with Brezhnev and Kosygin at Oreanda in September, see Documents 330 and 331.↩
- Reference is to the undeclared war between India, supported by the Soviet Union, and Pakistan, supported by the United States and China. The fighting began when New Delhi invaded East Pakistan on November 22 and escalated when Pakistan attacked India on December 3. The two countries agreed to a ceasefire on December 17, the day after the fall of Dacca and the surrender nearby of remaining Pakistani forces.↩
- The most recent NATO Ministerial meeting was held in Brussels, December 7–10.↩
- West Germany and the People’s Republic of China established diplomatic relations on October 11, 1972.↩
- Reference is to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 by the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact.↩
- See Document 147.↩
- Kosygin remained Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier) until October 1980.↩
- Maurice Stans, Secretary of Commerce, visited the Soviet Union in late November for trade talks. Documentation on the visit is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IV, Documents 348–352. See also ibid., volume XIV, Document 14.↩
- Gromyko visited Washington in late September for meetings with Nixon and Kissinger. See Document 332.↩
- Scheduled for publication in ibid., volume XIII.↩
- The next NATO Ministerial meeting was held in Lisbon, June 1–6, 1972.↩
- For the text of the speech, delivered in Oslo on December 11, see Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9, pp. 302–319; for an English translation, see Brandt, Peace: Writings and Speeches of the Nobel Peace Prizewinner 1971, pp. 141–156.↩
- West Germany reestablished relations with Algeria on December 21 and Sudan on December 23; most Arab states had severed relations after Bonn recognized Israel in May 1965.↩
- In a special channel message to Kissinger on January 26, Bahr reported that Brandt was thinking of Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, former Minister of Economic Cooperation (1966–1968) and SPD party secretary, who enjoyed “the highest personal trust on the Arab side as well as in Israel.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [1 of 3])↩
- Reference is to the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union.↩
- See footnote 22, Document 334.↩