Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, January 10, 1969, 2349Z.

4936. Subject: US Position on Bundesversammlung. Ref: Berlin 0020.² For Ambassador Lodge from Secretary.

1. Appreciate interesting report of your talk with Abrasimov.

2. With respect to your comment to Dept (para 12 reftel) that you believe we should intervene to prevent use of Berlin as site for Bundesversammlung, we have given this matter most serious consideration and have concluded that we cannot now intervene without serious damage to our interests in Berlin and Germany. My reasons for this conclusion are:

a. At the November Quadripartite Dinner, my British and French colleagues joined me in telling Brandt that we regarded this question as one that the Germans would have to decide themselves.³ Since then we have publicly reaffirmed our position.⁴ Brandt has thanked me for the US stand on the problem.⁵ The German public and others would interpret our backing away from this position as a sign of US unreliability and weakness. It would be a severe psychological blow to the people of Berlin and the FRG. This would be a heavy price to pay.

b. Even if we were willing to pay this price, it is extremely doubtful that it would buy us a significantly greater margin of security in Berlin. Once we have given up the Bundesversammlung in Berlin, the Soviets would move to put pressure on some other aspect of FRG support and activity in the city which they could allege was provocative. There is nothing inherently provocative or damaging to legitimate Soviet rights in the Bundesversammlung. The Soviets claim it is provocative; they can readily turn the same claim against any other FRG activity.

c. I am aware of the divided counsels which have existed in the FRG Government on this question. But we can only deal with the position taken by the German Government as a whole, which has been to hold the meeting in Berlin. I agree with you that holding the Bundesversammlung in Berlin is not without some risk. But there are even greater risks in the US (and Allies) reversing position on this matter, forcing the Germans to reverse their own position and giving up a legitimate Allied position in Berlin with every prospect that new Soviet demands against us and the Germans in Berlin would be made thereafter. In short, having made the decision, which I continue to believe was the right one, we must stay with it.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll on January 9; cleared by Leddy, Puhan, Dubs, and Brown; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and USNATO.
2. Document 2.
3. As reported in telegram 5803 from USNATO, November 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38–6)
4. See footnote 4, Document 2.
5. Brandt’s letter of December 20 and Rusk’s reply the next day are both in telegram 291061 to Bonn, December 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–2 GER W)