Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

2. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State¹

Berlin, January 8, 1969, 1520Z.

20. Subject: Meeting With Ambassador Abrasimov. From Ambassador Lodge.

1. At meeting today in East Berlin with Ambassador Abrasimov, discussion focussed on Germany, Berlin, and US-Soviet relations. Despite our differences, particularly over holding the forthcoming Bundesversammlung in West Berlin, we talked for nearly two hours in a cordial atmosphere. Even on the Bundesversammlung, Abrasimov’s statements seemed to show a certain amount of restraint.

2. I raised the subject of Berlin by saying I hoped that nothing would happen here which would prejudice general relations between Washington and Moscow.

3. Replying that this depended entirely upon “you,” Abrasimov launched an attack on the decision to hold the Bundesversammlung in West Berlin, including the role of US “permission” in the decision. He said that this represented a provocation against the USSR and the GDR, and that it could not be excluded that they would react strongly to the provocation. Abrasimov said that their patience in the past with regard to illegal FRG activities in West Berlin should not be taken as acquiescence but rather as a reflection of the Soviet desire to promote peace and quiet in Europe. Abrasimov returned to this theme repeatedly during the discussions but at no time did he imply that the Soviets would do more than they did at the time of the CDU conference.²

4. In reply I reviewed our position on the Bundesversammlung and again stressed my hope that nothing would be done here to jeopardize US-Soviet relations. I recalled that frequently GDR activities occurred in East Berlin which could be adversely criticized, and as illustration I cited enlisting East Berlin youths into the East German army. There were obviously many matters on which we disagreed but which we should always keep in perspective.

5. When asked why holding the Bundesversammlung in West Berlin could be considered a provocation against the Soviet Union, Abrasimov replied as follows: although the GDR is a sovereign, independent state with its capital in East Berlin, the USSR, with the agreement of the GDR, has retained responsibility for access to West Berlin. Therefore when officials of the Federal Republic travel to West Berlin to engage in illegal activities such as the Bundesversammlung, they “bring into doubt the security of access” for which the Soviet Union is responsible.

6. Abrasimov said that the West Germans for their own reasons wanted to aggravate relations between Moscow and Washington. He asserted that such FRG activities as the Bundesversammlung had as a major purpose sowing discord between Moscow and Washington and increasing tensions in Central Europe. Abrasimov could not understand why the US permitted Bonn to do this.

7. I challenged his assertion by saying that on the basis of my firsthand knowledge in Bonn, this was not the intention of the FRG Government. I also said that the Soviet Union should not let the East Germans provoke a deterioration in US-Soviet relations. Abrasimov quickly assured me that as far as the East Germans were concerned, he could absolutely assure me that they would do nothing to prejudice US-Soviet relations nor would they “do anything against the US.”

8. At one point Abrasimov asserted that in addition to the provocative character of the Bundesversammlung being held in Berlin, other factors which displeased the Soviets were the planned participation of NPD and West Berlin delegates.

9. Abrasimov attacked the recent West Berlin court decision on the NPD by comparing the whole affair to a three act comic opera.³ He said Mayor Schuetz’s statement against the NPD was the first act, Allied approval of the Mayor’s position was the second, and the third act was the court decision reversing the outcome of the first two acts. I said that this court decision was in all likelihood not final and that we did not know how the NPD play would turn out because there would assuredly be a fourth act.

10. At one point in discussing the current status of Berlin, Abrasimov said that East Berlin’s incorporation into the GDR as its capital was a “fact” which the Western powers had to respect. For their part the Soviets respected the fact that West Berlin was a city occupied by US, UK, and French military forces.

11. I referred to Abrasimov’s reference to the new administration and said that I was confident that President-elect Nixon gave the highest importance to US relations with the Soviet Union. I said that relations between our two countries had evolved considerably since around 1950 and I hoped for further improvement in the future. He implied that a first step which the new administration might take “as a good-will gesture” would be US intervention to prevent the Bundesversammlung meeting being held in Berlin.⁴

12. Comment. For reasons which I have set forth in previous telegrams, I do not think holding the Bundesversammlung meeting in Berlin is worth the risk. I believe that the matter is chancy enough to justify our intervening. The FRG, while privately unhappy about it, lacks the political will to grasp the nettle.

13. At the end of the visit, Abrasimov raised his glass in a toast to an ending of the war in Vietnam and wished me success.⁵ I thanked him and said that Soviet influence in support of a negotiated settlement would be appreciated.

Morris

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris for Harriman, USNATO, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Sofia, Munich, Saigon, and for POLADs at CINCUSAREUR (Heidelberg), CINCEUR (Vaihingen), and CINCUSAFE (Wiesbaden).
2. The CDU held its national party congress in Berlin November 3–7, 1968.
3. On October 3, 1968, Schütz asked the Western Commandants to consider banning the National Democratic Party (NPD) in West Berlin. Before the Commandants could take action, the NPD in West Berlin decided to disband voluntarily, thereby avoiding any legal limitations. For discussion of measures to prevent the NPD from participating in the Bundesversammlung (Federal Assembly), see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XV, Documents 259, 262, 294, 296, 300, and 301.
4. In mid-December 1968 reports in the German press alleged that Kissinger, recently named the President-elect’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, had intervened to prevent holding the Bundesversammlung in Berlin. (See Kroegel, Einen Anfang finden!, pp. 286–287) According to Ulrich Sahm, Kissinger demanded, in a conversation with an emissary from Bundestag President Gerstenmaier, that the German Government change the location of the Bundesversammlung but declined to put his position in writing. (Sahm, “Diplomaten taugen nichts”, pp. 220–221) No record has been found to substantiate or contradict these allegations. On December 14, however, Kissinger drafted a brief press statement supporting the official denial of American intervention issued the previous day by the Department of State. (National Archives Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 4, HAK Administrative & Staff Files, Memoranda to Ronald Ziegler) The text of the Department’s statement reads: “US position has been and remains that the decision as to location of the Federal Assembly should be left to German authorities; any report alleging that US has intervened against Berlin is false.” (Telegram 287238 to Bonn, December 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 GER W)
5. On January 5 President-elect Nixon announced that Lodge would be his Personal Representative to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam. Lodge, who left his post in Bonn on January 14, assumed his new responsibilities on January 20.