Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

300. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State¹

Brussels, November 14, 1968, 1217Z.

5773. Secto 9. Following is summary of Secretary’s hour and a half bilateral with Willy Brandt November 13. Summary is uncleared, subject to revision. Talk covered the following areas:

1. German request on possible GDR harassment of Berlin access

2. Interzonal trade and Berlin

3. Current French attitudes

4. Defense

5. European special trade arrangements

6. Soviet Union and conspiring Czechoslovakia

7. Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia

8. Continuity of US policy

1. German request on possible GDR harassment of Berlin access—The Secretary mentioned that Chancellor Kiesinger had spoken to Ambassador Lodge,² and apparently the British and French in Bonn, concerning the possiblity of a US warning to the Soviets against East German actions on access to Berlin. The Secretary said it would be helpful in the future if in such cases we could get the raw materials of such reports to make some evaluation of what was happening and whether the Soviets or the East Germans were behind it. We maintain a 24-hour watch on subjects like this and if we had German raw materials, we could feed them in for use with our own. The Secretary said we would in any case be seeing the Soviets on this subject in Washington on November 13.³

2. Interzonal trade and Berlin—The Secretary asked Brandt about the current situation of interzonal trade. Brandt replied interzonal meetings were continuing on a regular basis of once a week meetings alternately in East and West Berlin. The other side was not interested in an increase of trade, although he did note that some East German trade experts were interested in increase.

The Secretary said he was concerned about Berlin despite assurances Soviets have given on this subject. He was uneasy about the situation in Eastern Europe and of course Berlin is a vital point.

Brandt said in addition to over-all problems of Eastern Europe, he worried about the internal situation in Berlin. The economy was not bad, but as years go by without upturn in outlook for city, we might reach point where worsening psychological situation resulted in real trouble. The IMF meeting was a case in point. This was not a decisive question in itself but had represented a German effort to bring in new activities not related to status. If the decision is negative, it will add to fears that Berlin is not the place to have even non-political meetings.

Brandt said the question of whether Bundesversammlung should meet in Berlin should be seen in same light. The French are not enthusiastic. The British have today advised the Germans against the meeting in Berlin. Perhaps none of these meetings are vital for Berlin, but the West has nothing to put against these elements to counteract the negative trend.

The Secretary said we had thought it a good idea if the IMF meeting could take place in Berlin. He has talked to Mr. McNamara along these lines. But apparently when matters got down to the point of decision, even some NATO Allies are begging off and the prospects are not too good.

The Secretary said advice on the Bundesversammlung was more a matter for his successor than for himself. In response to his inquiry, Brandt indicated there had been three previous meetings of the Bundesversammlung in Berlin and that the NPD had not participated in these meetings although Von Thadden and his colleagues had been present as representatives of the Deutsche Reichspartei.

The Secretary said that since the last three meetings of the Bundesversammlung were held in Berlin, not to have the next one there could create a problem. Brandt said Bundestag President Gerstenmaier had told him he intends to convene the Bundesversammlung in Berlin, but had not decided on a date, which will be some time between January and March. Gerstenmaier told Brandt the British had sent an Embassy officer to make same representation to him as it had to FonOff. Gerstenmaier had replied to him that if Allies are against the meeting, he would prefer to have a joint position from them rather than their individual nation views.

The Secretary said he gathered French attitudes on Berlin had been especially restrictive lately. Brandt said that the French had been somewhat more cooperative in the last 10 days or so. But this did not go very far. He had made a long list of things which had been blocked up to date in the Bonn Group, sometimes as much as a year, because of French uncooperativeness.

3. Current French attitudes—Brandt asked Secretary for his view of reports of general shifts in French attitudes. The Secretary said he heard these reports from other sources, but not the French.Their bearing has improved, but there is no sign of a change of substance or policy. Our problem with the French is the same as it was 10 years ago: whether or not to have a love affair with France at the expense of the rest of Europe. Had Eisenhower accepted de Gaulle’s Directoire proposals in 1958 or Kennedy in 1961, we could have had a lovely relationship with the French, but what of the rest of Europe. The Secretary said some reports claim US disagreement with the French over nuclear questions. But we never have had any indication from de Gaulle, the French Prime Minister, or from any other official speaking for the French Government of French interest in questions of nuclear cooperation between France and the United States.

Brandt said that pursuant to a suggestion by the Secretary the Germans had made efforts after Czechoslovakia to renew the Franco-German study group on military questions. Senior German military officers reported that their French colleagues had views quite similar to theirs on questions of European defense, but this had little political fallout. The Secretary said that we had found French officials more cooperative in some small things. It must be assumed in cases like French participation in the recent naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean that they take place with the knowledge and consent of de Gaulle. If there is a little quiet improvement, we should let it develop.

4. Defense—Brandt said that the Germans would give specifics of their decisions in the DPC meeting November 14. An increase of 740 million DM had already been approved for the 1969 budget prior to Czechoslovakia. But in a Cabinet meeting earlier the same morning the Germans had decided on steps which would bring a total increase between 2.3 and 2.5 billion DM for defense in the medium term financial plan. Most of the decisions involved qualitative improvements rather than increasing manpower, although decline in latter would be halted. The Cabinet had also explicitly endorsed the necessity to find a satisfactory offset solution: Brandt asked whether it would be helpful for the United States to have a statement on balance of payments in the NATO communiqué. The Secretary replied it would be helpful to have such a sentence included. Czechoslovakia had muffled the attack within the Senate on US troops in Europe. But Senator Mansfield and his colleagues would return to the attack. Two points are involved. One is what the Europeans are doing for their own defense. The German record here is good. The second problem is the balance of payments. If we were able to deal with these two problems, we could hold back this withdrawal viewpoint, which is linked with isolationism.

The Secretary noted that the JCS motivated by purely military consideration had revised its ideas as to the desirability of rotation of the two withdrawn brigades of the 24th Division. The Secretary said he was not referring to the exercises of the brigades in Germany, which should take place at least once a year, but military experts believe that if the brigades should rotate their station each 6 months as now agreed they would lose a good deal of valuable training time in each move as they were readied to move from the US to Germany and return. The question was whether we could not leave one brigade on station in Germany and have the others join on exercises but not to rotate them. The Secretary said he raised this issue to maintain good faith because rotation had been a part of the trilateral agreement on this subject which had been worked out between Mr. McCloy and the Chancellor. He asked Brandt to think it over. He noted that Lemnitzer had discussed it with de Maziere. Brandt replied he would discuss the matter with Schroeder.

5. European special trade arrangements—The Secretary said difficulties were building up on the question of proposals for a European special trade arrangement which could “blow us out of the water” as regards a liberal US trade policy. Brandt said that US had given the German FonOff a rather strong memorandum on this subject Nov 11.⁴ He said Debre had made the point in the last meeting in Brussels that the trade arrangements were not a substitute for British membership in the Common Market but facilitated and prepared the way for membership. Secretary pointed out that the German paper established situation from which we would draw no political advantages and for which we have to pay high price in trade. In effect we would be paying a high price, “but would not get the horse.” In the scheme proposed, the participants would agree to pay high prices on agricultural products in return for concessions on industrial goods. The United States would lose on both counts. The Secretary said that the démarche which Brandt had received on this subject had been personally reviewed and signed by him. He described the dangers of a possible revival of protectionist sentiments in the US.

Brandt said French had been moving toward a more constructive position on trade arrangements and technical cooperation. If we take approach however that it has to be all or nothing, then it would be nothing, and situation would get worse. His purpose was to get the British to the table with the French and Germans and to see what practical progress could be made. Secretary replied this was all right in theory as long as it was not a table conspiring against the US.

6. Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia—The Secretary said that when the Soviets decided to invade Czechoslovakia, they knew that they would clearly incur very high costs, including the hatred of the Czech people, division in the Communist world and a very strained relationship with the West. The men who made this decision despite the cost must have had something serious in their minds. Was it fear for maintaining their position or reversion to a more primitive Stalinism? We did not know the answer but must watch this situation very carefully. We must not permit Soviet leaders to feel they can move forward to take up elements of slack in the international situation. Secretary said that was why he would be hesitant to advise that the Bundesversammlung should not take place in Berlin. If this were to happen, the Soviets might draw the wrong conclusion.

The Secretary said Soviet system was not stable in long-range terms. Communist and Eastern European countries cannot survive peaceful coexistence without change. Communist scientists were given some freedom and inevitably asked for more. Soviets gone to extreme lengths to emphasize their desire to continue normal relations with us after Czechoslovak intervention. Yesterday Kosygin had made the same points with McNamara. Brandt commented that the Soviets had not moved very far in their relations with the Germans, but polemic attacks had decreased and they appeared ready to discuss specific issues like renunciation of force agreement. The Secretary noted the contradiction between Soviet action in Czechoslovakia and their line on business as usual. Shortly before the invasion they had taken a rather forthcoming position on missile talks. Their next move had been to inform us of the intervention. The Secretary said we had nothing going on with the Soviets behind the scenes except that we were keeping them informed of Vietnam talks in Paris; Czechoslovakia had cut off discussion of other topics.

8. Continuity of US policy—The Secretary said he had participated in a long talk on foreign policy between the President and Mr. Nixon.⁵ The talk pointed up the fact that there was no major issue between the two administrations about NATO policy or German-American relations. There would be continuity in US policy.

In reply to a question from Secretary, Brandt said he thought German elections would take place Oct 12, 1969. In reply to a question from the Secretary Brandt said that April 11–12, 1969 would be acceptable date for him for NATO twentieth anniversary.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, USEC, and Berlin.
2. Lodge reported this conversation in telegram 19184 from Bonn, November 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 16)
3. See Document 299.
4. Not found.
5. Richard Nixon was elected President on November 5.