Office of the Historian

260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany1

Washington, June 24, 1971, 0046Z.

112959. Subj: Berlin Talks—Soviet Presence. Ref: Bonn 6947.2 For the Ambassador.

1.
You are authorized to broach the question of an increased Soviet presence in West Berlin at the next Ambassadorial session if, after reviewing outcome of the current advisors meeting, you continue to feel that progress toward a worthwhile Berlin agreement is dependent on this issue.
2.
Department concurs with the tactical approach outlined in paras 5 and 6 of the reftel with the following alterations:
(a)
We do not see much point in asking the Soviets to give further details on the meaning of the individual requests contained in the Soviet draft of March 26 since this could involve us in premature detailed discussion of the whole range of Soviet demands. Instead we would think that the Western Ambassadors should simply state that after reviewing Soviet wishes the Western side is prepared to consider certain specified increases in the Soviet presence in the context of a successful agreement. In accordance with NSDM 106 it should be understood that any actual expansion in Soviet presence should be well distanced from the conclusion and implementation of a Berlin agreement.
(b)
Initial offer can, at Ambassador’s discretion, include (1) fur outlet (Soyuzpushnina) with consignment warehouse; (2) return of Lietzenburgerstrasse property to Soviets either for utilization in West Berlin or exchange; and (3) permission for already present Intourist to sell tourist reservations. Since Intourist is already in West Berlin we see no reason to authorize additional travel agency Merkuri. In addition, we prefer to withhold any permission for Aeroflot office to tie in with possible future developments involving additional Western air carriers.
(c)
We are also prepared to include either in initial offer or later round permission for Soviet employees of Soviet enterprises to reside in the Western sectors but permission must be on a case-by-case rather than a blanket basis. We think it important to maintain control over the number and identity of Soviet residents and prefer to avoid as far as possible situation where only means of dealing with known Soviet intelligence agents is through expulsion after residence is established. For similar reasons we also think it important to monitor and regulate the number and identity of Soviets who work in West Berlin but do not reside there.
(d)
We believe that permission to centralize all or most Soviet offices at Lietzenburgerstrasse should be held at least for second round. This will be of considerable importance to Soviets once they know they can get additional offices and return of Lietzenburgerstrasse property. By holding it for second round, although not necessarily until final negotiating phase, we may be able to get more in return in terms of FRG representation or other outstanding issues.
(e)
Department does not wish to include question of establishing Soviet state trading agency with resident visa official in discussions with British, French, and Germans at this time. In view of inherent risk that word of our possible willingness to make this concession would reach Soviets prematurely, it is preferable that discussion of this possibility should be postponed until we have clearer idea of what remains to be settled in final bargaining stage. At that time we shall wish to weigh overall Soviet negotiating stance against possible effects of such concession on Allied position in Berlin as a whole, including US capacity to enhance its presence in East Berlin and afford protective services (without official dealings with the GDR) to American citizens who encounter difficulty there.
Rogers
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sutterlin on June 23; cleared by Hillenbrand, Haig, Morris (DOD), and Stimson CIA; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Berlin. Hillenbrand forwarded the telegram to Rogers for approval on June 23 with a memorandum in which he explained: “The instructions do not authorize the Ambassador to propose as large an increase in the Soviet presence as he has recommended. We would have been prepared in EUR to include one or two additional offices but it was impossible to obtain Defense clearance. This message will, however, permit the Ambassador to broach the subject and there may be a tactical advantage in moving rather slowly on any concessions until we are more certain that the Soviets will go further than they have so far in accepting our minimum requirements for a satisfactory agreement.” (Ibid., POL 28 GER B)↩
  2. Document 250.↩