259. Editorial Note
On June 21, 1971, Assistant to the President Kissinger met Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Ambassador Rush in the Map Room at the White House from 5 to 6:04 p.m. to review the Berlin negotiations. Kissinger also met Rush both before (4:37–5:00 p.m.) and after (6:04–6:06 p.m.) the meeting with Dobrynin. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) According to the memorandum of conversation, the three men discussed Berlin:
“The meeting took place because I had promised Dobrynin to introduce him to Rush and make clear that we understood the agreed procedures for proceeding on Berlin.
“After introducing Rush and some pleasantries, I told Dobrynin that the President had met twice with Rush. I had met separately with Rush and Bahr and jointly with them for extended conversations. As a result, we had agreed on the following: (1) The President wanted to reaffirm his desire to expedite a Berlin agreement; (2) Rush had been instructed to be as flexible as possible within the general framework of American policies; (3) we proposed a continuation of the Bahr/Falin/Rush talks. As they were finishing each section, they were to agree on how to handle it in the Four Power context; (4) the Advisors’ meetings were a bad forum because our advisors were instructed by the regular bureaucracy and would, therefore, reject even matters that Bahr, Falin and Rush had already agreed to. Therefore, there should be a stalemate in the advisors’ talks, and Abrasimov should suggest at the next Ambassadors’ meeting on July 7th or 8th that henceforth matters be moved into the Ambassadorial context. At these Ambassadorial meetings, Rush could propose a compromise formula that had previously been concerted; (5) Falin, Bahr and Rush should agree among each other how to handle it. For example, the question of transit could be handled by Abrasimov putting forward a modification of the Soviet position which was still unacceptable, but which showed some progress. Rush could then proposed a compromise which knocked out some of the ideas of Abrasimov, but which would come close to or be the agreed language. On other topics, the process could be reversed. In any event, there had to be some bargaining or some seeming bargaining in order to explain why the progress; (6) I told Dobrynin that I had carefully gone over with Bahr and Rush the proposals that he had made for specific formulations and that the answer would be given by Rush. I did not want to inject myself into the detail drafting process; (7) on the specific matter of Soviet presence in Berlin which he had raised at the last meeting with me, Rush had been given new instructions to conform with what I had already told Dobrynin; (8) I had [Page 758] worked out a procedure with Rush and Bahr according to which, if nothing new happened, the three would agree by the end of July on a Berlin solution and the Four Powers by the end of August.
“Dobrynin asked whether, under the formula we proposed, it was the Soviets who had to make all the compromise proposals in the Big Four context. Rush explained that this was not the case, and that either side could make proposals, but that the precise details should be worked out by the three. Dobrynin said he thought this was a positive program and that it might lead to a result.
“I then asked Rush to wait for me outside, and turned to other matters.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 1])
The next morning, Dobrynin called Kissinger to clarify the arrangements for talks on Berlin both in the special channel and the four-power forum.
“D: I would like to check one thing which we discussed yesterday. I received [a] call from our Ambassador [Falin]there were the gentleman [Rush] which was yesterday…
“K: I understand.
“D: Our Ambassador spoke with a third man [Bahr] who was here, not in our meeting…
“K: I know exactly what you are saying.
“D: That gentleman told our Ambassador the meetings, three of them, on the 21st and 23rd of this month will not take place.
“K: They will next week. There was a misunderstanding between the third man and the man you met yesterday. He said to fix the first three days he was back, and he thought they were this week.
“D: So it will be next week.
“K: Yes.
“D: The second man will not arrive at the capital at all? He will go to the four powers next week.
“K: They will meet three times.
“D: But when are the four…?
“K: Be on the 25th. The four are going to the meeting.
“D: Then I guess he is going still to that.
“K: But they will meet next week on the 29th, 30th and 1st.
“D: Can I tell him that for his own information.
“K: Yes, tell him it was a technical misunderstanding.
“D: Yes, and you better check with that third man to make sure he will tell our Ambassador.
“K: Okay.
[Page 759]“D: And then the second point, this third man when asked what [he] was going to do about (councilor? [advisors])…
“K: That we haven’t told him yet. We have to straighten that out.
“D: You will?
“K: I will do that today.
“D: Good, because I received a telegram.”
(Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 394, Telephone Conversations, Dobrynin, Anatoly Fedorovich, Feb. 1970–Aug. 1971)
After his conversation with Dobrynin, Kissinger sent the following special channel message to Bahr:
“Dobrynin tells me that Falin is confused as to the reason for the delay in the meeting between you, Rush and Falin. Can you explain to him that it was due to your misunderstanding as to the time of Rush’s return. Also, Rush and I worked out a procedure by which we believe your agreements can be moved into the Four-Power context. Rush will explain it to you but it involves a substantial downgrading of the advisors. Rush and I mentioned that to Dobrynin about the same time that you said the opposite to Falin. Could you concert with Rush so that we can get our lines cleared? It was good to see you.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Europe, Box 60, Egon Bahr, Berlin Files [2 of 3])
Bahr replied by special channel on June 24. The text of the message, as translated from the original German by the editor, reads:
“I explained to Falin the misunderstandings on the agree dates. I tried to dispel his obvious mistrust with the firm conviction that, as a result of the discussions in Washington, no one could possibly doubt the serious intention of the USA to come to an agreement.
“Regarding further procedures, I merely said that the three of us [Rush, Falin, and Bahr] must arrange them. In Washington they are contemplating in great detail the various possible ways to introduce this at the official level. Falin recalled that the three of us would still need three to four meetings, which he had expected this week. This is the reason why he “restrained” Kvitsinky. It may well be a problem that the Soviets are waiting for the result of the discussions between Ambassador Rush, Falin, and me in order not be beat around the bush during the [quadripartite] negotiations.
“Best wishes.” (Ibid.)