Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

232. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 4, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Ulbricht Resignation

Declining health was probably the immediate cause of Walter Ulbricht’s resignation.² He was forced to cancel a recent visit to Romania, and rumors have been flying that he was quite ill. Nevertheless, the succession seems to have been foreshadowed during the visit to Moscow last month when Ulbricht went out of his way to bring his successor, Erich Honecker, to all the meetings with the Soviets, and sent Honecker in his place to the Bulgarian Party Congress last month.

In the short term the change over probably will not be translated into any new or different policies. Honecker has long been the designated successor. The new leadership will probably be nervous and concerned that the population not become restive or be led to believe that favorable changes are in the making. The Soviets will share this concern for stability. They may have even tried to reduce the element of surprise by floating rumors of Ulbricht’s resignation over the past two weeks (including a broad hint to one of our officials in Berlin).³

The resignation could have been held up until the East German Party Congress this month as a more appropriate forum. However, Honecker (and perhaps the Soviets) may have felt that the Congress would be useful to build up his new leadership and to introduce any further changes in the top command that may be necessary to secure Honecker’s position, and convince the population he is fully in charge.

If the East German party successfully negotiates this period of uncertainty, it is likely that the Soviets will find Honecker easier to deal with than Ulbricht. Honecker will be too dependent on the Soviets to take the independent positions that Ulbricht often did, especially on the questions of negotiations with West Germany, the four power talks on Berlin and Ostpolitik in general.

In this sense, then, there may be a prospect for a modification in the tough Soviet stand in the Berlin negotiations. Ulbricht had been dragging his feet in his attitude toward Brandt’s government and an agreement on Berlin, largely because he had insisted that international recognition of East Germany should have first priority over a Berlin agreement. The West Germans may also find it easier to deal with Honecker if only because Ulbricht symbolized the division of Germany, the Berlin Wall, etc.

Any change in the direction of greater East German flexibility, however, will probably await the internal consolidation of the new regime.

The new leader, Erich Honecker, has the reputation of the “youngest of the old guard,” since he is grouped politically with the older “Ulbricht faction” that has dominated the East German party since the end of the war. He is not Moscow trained, however. From 1937 until the end of the war he was in prison in Germany; on release he resumed work in the Communist Youth movement, rising rapidly to the second position behind Ulbricht in the early 1960s. Most observers feel that Honecker is the leader of a hard line faction in the East German leadership, and is thus likely to continue the Ulbricht line.

However, Ulbricht has presided over this party for so long that any new leader may find it far more difficult to rule in the same fashion, thus the change in East Germany marks the beginning of a new era with consequences that are difficult to foresee.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. IX. Secret. Sent for information. Haig initialed the memorandum for Kissinger, who was on vacation in Palm Springs, California. Butterfield also stamped the memorandum to show that the President had seen it; an attached slip indicates that it was “noted by Pres” on May 10. According to another copy, Hyland drafted the memorandum on May 3. (Ibid., Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII)
2. Ulbricht formally resigned as First Secretary at a meeting of the SED Central Committee on May 3; he retained the largely ceremonial post of Chairman of the State Council until his death on August 1, 1973.
3. See Document 222 and footnote 5 thereto.
4. In another May 4 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger summarized a May 3 CIA intelligence memorandum on the implications of Ulbricht’s retirement: “CIA concludes that in moving Ulbricht upstairs to an honorific post, the East German and Soviet parties appear to have acted with a forethought and control which Communists rarely achieve in the delicate matter of political succession. Ulbricht’s position has been weakened somewhat in the last year by his addiction to overambitious economic planning and by Soviet annoyance over his obstructionism in policy toward West Germany. But he does not appear to have been forced out, and he probably agreed that the time had come to give way to his hand-picked and long-groomed successor, Erich Honecker.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 33, President’s Daily Briefs, May 1–15, 1971) In a note to Kissinger the same day, Haig attached a copy of the intelligence memorandum to a copy of the memorandum to the President, explaining that the former was received afterwards. (Ibid., Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII)