226. Editorial Note
On April 23, 1971, Assistant to the President Kissinger met Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in the Map Room at the White House from 1:04 to 3:31 p.m. to discuss several issues, including the Berlin negotiations. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) According to the memorandum of conversation, Dobrynin requested an appointment upon his return from Moscow, and the meeting was “cordial but businesslike.” When Kissinger asked about the failure of Ambassador Abrasimov and Ambassador Rush to meet as planned in Berlin on April 16, Dobrynin replied that “Abrasimov had had the impression that Rush was evading him. He [Rush] had left early from a lunch that he had attended and at which Abrasimov had intended to ask him for a private meeting.” Kissinger later commented in a parenthetic note: “I consider this very improbable. If Abrasimov had been instructed to have a private meeting, he would have found a way of making this known.” After discussing the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Kissinger and Dobrynin continued their exchange on Berlin:
“Dobrynin said that the Western response had been very disappointing to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government had tried to meet our points on a number of key issues but had failed to obtain our support. At the last meeting, Rush had been very negative and so had Hillenbrand in conversations with Vorontsov. The Soviet Government was wondering just what was going on. I told Dobrynin that the President was not prepared to issue orders until we had agreed in principle on the direction we were going to take and that until then Rush was going to get the ordinary instructions from the bureaucracy.
“Dobrynin agreed to my proposal that instead of Abrasimov and Rush meeting, there should be meetings between Falin and Rush. Dobrynin wondered whether we could not ask Hillenbrand to participate in these meetings. I said this would be very hard from the instruction point of view—it would put matters into normal bureaucratic channels. Dobrynin wondered whether I could have a talk with Bahr, since Bahr, he said, knew the Soviet position very well and might have some ideas on how to handle it. I said I would talk to Bahr in Woodstock, Vermont this weekend. I would assure him that we would go as far as we could consistent with our obligation to our Allies and our relationships with the Federal Republic. But it was necessary that the Soviet Union understood our special problems.”
The Berlin question also arose during a discussion of a proposed summit meeting.
“On the other hand he [Dobrynin] was bound to tell me that he did not think a visit was likely until after the Berlin question was settled. [Page 676] It would be impossible to convince their Allies—Soviet Allies—that such a meeting could be fruitful unless the Berlin questions was settled first.
“I reacted sharply. I told Dobrynin that I had heard many eloquent descriptions of the difficulties of linkage. We had promised a Summit Meeting over a year ago in order to make some progress in basic Soviet/American relationships. If this was to be the case, then it was inconceivable for the Soviet Union to make prior conditions. I did not yet know what the President’s reaction would be but I suspected that if there existed a definite plan to have a conference, the President might feel that he had some obligations of good faith. If the conference were used to bring pressure on him, his reaction was likely to be the opposite.
“Dobrynin said that I must have misunderstood him, the Soviet Government wanted a Summit Meeting but it was a reality that there should be some progress on Berlin, not a condition. I told him I was familiar with that formulation since I had used it very often to justify the theory of linkage and I simply wanted to stress that it was an unacceptable formulation to use towards the President. We agreed that I would consider further the issue of the SALT exchange and that we would be in touch next week.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 1])
For their memoir accounts of the meeting, see Kissinger, White House Years, pages 827–828; and Dobrynin, In Confidence, pages 220–221.
After meeting Dobrynin, Kissinger sent the following special channel message to Rush:
“I saw Dobrynin on his return. He claims that Abrasimov was mystified by your behavior, specifically that you seem to have departed prematurely from a lunch at which he had intended to ask you for a private meeting.
“I proposed that you meet henceforth with Falin. Dobrynin agreed in principle, stressing that Falin was the top Soviet expert on Germany.
“Bahr came through the other day. He suggested that the way to break the deadlock was to get away from the juridical arguments and stress only the obligations and undertakings of each side. Dobrynin picked up this theme independently, emphasizing that the Soviet Union had no intention of affecting our legal position. I would like to pursue this idea of dropping the legal formulae from both drafts if you think it has merit when I see Dobrynin on Monday [April 26].
“May I have your answer by then.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2)
During a conversation with the President in the Oval Office at 2:52 p.m., Kissinger emphasized the linkage Dobrynin made [Page 677] between “some progress in Berlin” and the summit proposal.
Kissinger: “I said, ‘You’re making a terrible mistake.’ I said, ‘If we have a goal, then the President, who never plays for little stakes, would recognize that it has to fit into this framework. If you’re trying to hold him up with Berlin as a means to get to the summit, you don’t understand him. I’m not even sure if he’ll let me continue talking to you on Berlin under these circumstances.’ I thought this—”
Nixon: “Sure.”
Kissinger: “—this was the only way of doing it, because we really cannot promise to be able to deliver on Berlin.”
Nixon: “No.”
Kissinger: “I mean the Germans have screwed it up to such a farethee-well, that they may not be prepared to yield anything. I’m seeing Bahr this weekend. He’s up there. I’ll have a better estimates, at that Woodstock conference.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation Between Nixon and Kissinger, April 23, 1971, 2:52–3:36 p.m., Oval Office, OVAL 487–21) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
Kissinger then told Dobrynin in a telephone conversation at 5 p.m.: “I have had a talk with the President. The Berlin reaction was what I predicted.” “On specifics,” Kissinger continued, “I will talk to you next week after the weekend conversation,” referring to his upcoming meeting with German State Secretary Bahr. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 366, Telephone Records, Chronological File) Regarding the meeting between Bahr and Kissinger at the Bilderberg conference, see footnote 2, Document 224.