Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

224. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 22, 1971, 11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• The Berlin Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• German
  • Egon Bahr—State Secretary, Federal Republic of Germany
  • Rolf Pauls—German Ambassador
• American
  • Henry A. Kissinger—Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt—Senior Staff Member, NSC
  • James S. Sutterlin—Director, Office of German Affairs

After an initial exchange concerning the forthcoming Bilderberg conference in Woodstock, Vermont² Mr. Kissinger asked where State Secretary Bahr felt we now stand in the Berlin negotiations.

The State Secretary replied that before coming to Washington he had reread the record of the senior level meeting held by the Four Western Powers last November in Bonn and he had found this extremely rewarding.³ At that time the Western representatives had listed the essential points to be achieved in a Berlin settlement, such as access improvements and Soviet acknowledgment of the Federal presence in West Berlin. Martin Hillenbrand had been somewhat skeptical at the time that the objectives were realistic as defined. Now, in Bahr’s view, almost all of the objectives are covered in the Soviet draft agreement. The Soviet side is in effect prepared to accept almost everything we demanded. The problem is that the Soviets have done this in a form which is completely unacceptable to the Western side. Concessions are presented as the gift of a sovereign GDR and changes in the situation in West Berlin are dealt with in such a way as to suggest a controlling role for the Soviet Union there.

Bahr noted that the Western draft tabled last February is also formulated in such a way as to support the Western legal position on Berlin. The juridical points of view of the two sides, as represented in the drafts, simply cannot be brought together. Bahr recalled that earlier in the talks the Western side had suggested that juridical questions be put aside and that efforts be concentrated on finding a way of bringing about pragmatic improvements. If we can reach an understanding with the Soviets that nothing in an agreement should prejudice either side’s juridical position then he was convinced a Berlin solution would be possible in a short time. One had to approach the texts from the point of view of what would have to be eliminated. The Ambassadors naturally would find this difficult since they must work in accordance with the general instructions received from capitals and do not have authority to make direct decisions.

Mr. Kissinger asked how it would be possible to avoid taking a juridical position when dealing with access, for example. Bahr replied that the Russians say the Three Western Powers have no rights whatever in the field of civilian access. What the Soviets have provided in their text is unsatisfactory since they simply inform the Western Powers of what the sovereign GDR has stated it is prepared to do. However, during the talks Abrasimov has said that the Soviets are prepared to give a Soviet guarantee on access. As Bahr saw the situation, it would be satisfactory if the Soviets would give to the Western Powers in their own name a statement in which they would indicate that such and such steps would be possible. The Soviets would thus be directly involved.

Mr. Kissinger asked how Bahr felt the question of Federal presence in Berlin could be dealt with without prejudice to juridical positions. Bahr said that just as the Soviets would give a statement to the Three Western Powers concerning access, the Three Western Powers would give a statement to the Soviets defining the relationship between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. This would start with a statement that West Berlin is not to be regarded as a Land of the Federal Republic and would include a positive statement concerning the ties which the Three Powers have authorized.

Recalling Bahr’s statement that almost all of the Western demands were met by the Soviet draft, Mr. Kissinger said that it was his impression that the Soviet formulations were more far reaching with regard to reductions of the Federal presence in West Berlin than the FRG could accept. Mr. Kissinger mentioned in particular the prohibition in the Soviet draft of committee and Fraktion meetings as well as of political party activities.

Bahr answered that the Soviet draft does in fact lack a little bit. This consists mainly of three things. First there is no clear provision for utilization by West Berliners of Federal passports, secondly participation in FRG delegations by West Berliners is not covered, and finally there is the problem of committee and Fraktion meetings. Bahr thought that this third problem would be the most difficult to handle. He said that from the FRG’s point of view there could be no prohibition on meetings of Federal political parties in Berlin. They were, on the other hand, prepared to accept some compromise concerning committee and Fraktion meetings. The FRG could agree, for example, that committees and Fraktionen would only meet in Berlin to deal with legislation which would be applicable in Berlin. Bahr said that he had had several constructive conversations with Dr. Barzel who had been quite cooperative. He was convinced that the Government would find support in the opposition for this kind of compromise.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that practically all legislation passed in the Bundestag becomes applicable in Berlin and he wondered whether the Soviets would accept such a compromise. He also pointed to the possible danger that if such a compromise were developed the Soviets might then try to limit the extent to which Federal legislation is taken over in Berlin.

Bahr acknowledged that this could be a problem. He thought that basically the Soviets have a different approach to the subject. It might, for example, be better to say that Federal personalities and Gremien will not, while in Berlin, act against the provisions of the agreement reached by the Four Powers. He said that consideration was also being given in Bonn to the possibility of reestablishing a Berlin committee in the Bundestag. If this were done, there could be a gentlemen’s understanding that only this committee would meet in Berlin although there would be no specific prohibition against other committees.

When Bahr was about to leave, Ambassador Pauls reminded him to mention the subject of the Soviet presence in West Berlin. Bahr commented that he had intended to discuss this subject with the State Department.⁴ However, he would mention that the Federal Republic could accept any arrangement on an increased Soviet presence in West Berlin which was satisfactory to the Three Western Powers with the possible exception of a Soviet Consulate General. The FRG considered such an office undesirable. However, during the flight to the United States his assistant had suggested to him that the establishment of a Soviet Consulate General might not be so disadvantageous and he was reconsidering the matter. Bahr noted that the Three Western Powers do not have Consulates General in the Western sectors. Other countries such as Switzerland and Greece do. If the Soviet Union has a Consulate General it would be placing itself in the category of other countries which have such offices rather than in the category of the Three Powers who control West Berlin. Mr. Kissinger asked Mr. Sutterlin to comment on this point. Mr. Sutterlin said that the question of agreeing to any increase in the Soviet presence in West Berlin was tactical as well as substantive. Tactically it did not seem an appropriate stage to pursue the subject with the USSR.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6. Secret. Drafted by Sutterlin. In an attached May 7 memorandum to Eliot, Jeanne W. Davis, NSC Staff Secretary, reported that the memorandum had been approved for limited distribution within the Department of State. The meeting was held in the White House. The memorandum is part I of II. Part II, a brief discussion of the recent visit to China by Klaus Mehnert, a German professor, is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. IX.
2. Bahr and Kissinger met at the Bilderberg conference on April 24 and 25. No substantive record of their discussion has been found. On April 24 Bahr gave Kissinger a revision of the Soviet draft agreement. The original German document, including Kissinger’s marginalia, is ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [2 of 3]. For an English translation, see Document 230. According to Kissinger, “Bahr and I reviewed the state of the negotiations. He had an ingenious suggestion: that both sides drop the legal justifications for their positions and work instead on describing their practical responsibilities and obligations. I agreed, subject to discussion with Rush, provided the access procedures were spelled out in a degree of detail that precluded later misunderstanding.” (White House Years, p. 828) See also Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, pp. 360–361.
3. Regarding the senior-level meeting of November 17 and 18 in Bonn, see Document 137.
4. Bahr also met Irwin on April 22 to discuss the Berlin negotiations. An account of their discussion is in telegram 70601 to Bonn, April 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)