189. Note From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
HAK
I have just had a phone call from a rather desperate-sounding Birrenbach in Duesseldorf who said he had been unable to get through to you.
He was calling on Barzel’s instruction to say that contrary to Brandt’s assurances last September to consult with Barzel on Berlin the latter had only just seen the Western plan. Moreover this was just “by the way.” Barzel feels that Brandt has broken his word and can no longer withhold attacking the Government in the Bundestag in regard to Berlin.
Barzel insists on an early meeting with the President, evidently to put before him the CDU’s strong reservations to the Western Berlin plan. Birrenbach intimated that Barzel can hold the CDU only if he can tell the Fraktion that he will be received by the President.
I told Birrenbach that you were in a meeting and that that undoubtedly was the reason why you had not been able to receive his call. I said I could give him no reaction to Barzel’s request but would pass it on. I asked whether they had been in touch with our Ambassador. Birrenbach said not since Barzel learned of the text of the Berlin plan. (In fact Barzel on February 17 gave the Bonn Embassy a detailed bill of his grievances) see the attached telegram.)2
Birrenbach said that Barzel, as head of the Fraktion, insisted that you should be contacted directly on the matter of a meeting and he requested that you return his call this weekend.
This is tricky business. A CDU attack on the SPD in regard to the Berlin plan is also an attack on us, since we tabled it. On the other hand, Brandt apparently did break his commitment to Barzel to [Page 566] consult. When Frank of the Foreign Office eventually showed (but did not hand over) the text to Barzel, Frank alleged that the allies had not wanted the CDU to be informed.
In any case, I do not see how the President can now permit himself to get sucked into this fight. However, Barzel plans to be in the US in April and you might consider offering an appointment at that time. I strongly recommend against a special trip now. It is up to the Germans to get their domestic house in order. My hunch is that in the end Barzel will not take on the allies but rather emphasize the breach of faith by Brandt on the matter of consultations.
I do think you should return Birrenbach’s call.3
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Bahr/Rush–Backup. No classification marking. Sonnenfeldt wrote “Urgent” at the top of the page.↩
- According to the attached telegram, Barzel told an Embassy officer that “he could have brought the Brandt government down at any time during the past week owing to the government’s tactics with regard to the draft agreement,” in particular, the government’s failure to consult the opposition. After registering specific objections to its provisions, Barzel concluded that the “Western draft represented the status quo minus and was therefore not acceptable to him.” (Telegram 1892 from Bonn, February 17; another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) See also Document 179.↩
- In a telephone conversation at 5:33 p.m., Birrenbach told Kissinger: “I have called you on behalf of Barzel. You have heard of the new Western proposal on Berlin. They accepted it without talking with the opposition. This is against the agreement (last fall). The CDU has supported the government in spite of their objections. We prefer not to have difficulties in Berlin. But Barzel is not able to remain silent because of what he knows about the German proposal unless he can say he will have the possibility of seeing you and the President before these proposals go into a definitive state.” In reference to Barzel’s request to see the President in April, Kissinger replied: “I am always glad to see him. I recommend that you request an appointment with the President through the Ambassador. I cannot be accused of interfering with German domestic politics. Whether the President consults with Barzel is a problem for the government and not me. I understand your position. If you request it through the Ambassador it will come to me and I will take it up with the President but I cannot give any assurance.” (Transcript; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 366, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) In a March 2 meeting with Rush, Barzel formally requested an appointment with the President during his visit to the United States in April. Rush supported the request as a means to encourage a “bipartisan approach to the Berlin issue.” (Telegram 2517 from Bonn, March 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 GER W) After a month’s delay, the Department informed the Embassy on April 1 that Barzel’s appointment with Nixon had been approved for April 14. (Telegram 55269 to Bonn, April 2; ibid.)↩