Office of the Historian

197. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Germany (Rush)1

Washington, March 15, 1971.

Dobrynin called on me today to discuss the Berlin negotiations prior to his departure for Moscow to the Party Congress.2 Dobrynin began by repeating his standard position that their claim on the East Germans for an access agreement would be improved if they could show some progress on the issue of Federal presence. When I refused to be drawn out, Dobrynin said that Moscow might be prepared to move ahead on access if we could show some advance on the issue of Soviet presence in West Berlin.

He will come in Friday3 before his departure for Moscow. What can I tell him?4

I see two possibilities: (a) to give him a concrete proposal, (b) to tell him you are prepared to discuss it in a flexible way with Abrasimov. The best would be a combination of the two with some indication of the direction in which we are prepared to go, coupled with the statement that details are to be worked out by the Ambassadors.

For a variety of reasons, the President is anxious to keep this channel open, especially at this time.

Allott was ecstatic about his reception by you.

Warm regards.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. The message was sent through the special Navy channel in Frankfurt; no time of transmission or receipt appears on the message. Kissinger sent a similar message to Bahr on March 15; the divergence in text is noted in footnote 4 below. (Ibid., Box 60, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [3 of 3])↩
  2. Kissinger met Dobrynin in the White House at 4:05 p.m. to follow up on their previous discussion (March 12) on SALT and Berlin. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) The memorandum records the conversation on Berlin as follows: “Dobrynin then turned to the issue of Berlin and raised again the issue of access versus Federal presence. When I told him that it was impossible to make further progress there, he said it would certainly help if he could go back to Moscow and at least show some progress on the issue of Soviet presence in West Berlin. He might then be able to sell an answer on the access procedures in return for some increase in Soviet presence in West Berlin.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 2])↩
  3. March 19.↩
  4. The message to Bahr, identical to this point, concludes with this sentence.↩