Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

196. Message From the Ambassador to Germany (Rush) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Bonn, March 15, 1971.

Thanks very much for your helpful messages. I am relying upon our cables to keep you informed in general, but if at any time you should like further facts, opinions, or comments, please let me know. I should also like to pass on to you now a few supplementary remarks and observations.

1. It was only on Friday, March 5, that I heard from my Political Counsellor that the previous evening the Foreign Office had informed us that Bahr intended to discuss the draft of a proposed model transit agreement with Kohl at the talks to be held Monday, March 8.² At the same time, we received a copy of this draft of proposed model transit agreement. After discussions among the three Allied Ambassadors, we arranged to see Bahr in Berlin Sunday afternoon, March 7, where, as a result of a friendly and cooperative discussion, he agreed not to discuss the proposed model with Kohl. Also as a result of that talk plus private talks I have since had with Brandt, Scheel, Schuetz, and others, I think the following comments can be safely made:

(A) No progress will be made in the Four Power talks until the Russians are convinced that their divisive tactics and their attempt to have the problems of access and inner-city relations settled primarily between the GDR on the one hand and the FRG and the Berlin Senat, respectively, on the other, cannot succeed.

(B) Therefore, the FRG and the Berlin Senat, respectively, will not discuss transit or inner-city relations (except such items as Easter passes) with the GDR until a tentative agreement has been reached in the Four Power talks concerning these subjects and the Four Powers have given to the German parties the signal that they can proceed with their talks under the umbrella of the Four Power accord.

(C) In view of the Russian divisive tactics and the complex nature of the three sets of talks now going on, it is essential that close and continued consultations, with adequate time for full consideration of all moves, take place between the FRG, the Senat, and the three Allied Powers. Past procedures must be tightened up and improved. Bahr has fully agreed to this.

2. At the post-luncheon meeting with Abrasimov following the Four Power talk on March 9,³ I told Abrasimov that as a political fact of life no movement, if any were possible, could be made on the Federal presence issue until a tentative agreement on access has been reached. While refusing to accept this, Abrasimov did mention that certain elements were of primary importance to him, namely,

(A) Very few Bundestag committees and Fraktionen meetings should take place in West Berlin, and these should consist only of those dealing with matters of a nonpolitical nature pertaining to Berlin;

(B) A single Federal Republic office should represent the twenty-odd FRG Ministerial offices of the Republic now in West Berlin;

(C) An explicit statement that West Berlin is not a Land or part of the FRG;

(D) A unilateral statement by the Allies, outside the Four Power agreement, prohibiting neo-Nazi activities in West Berlin; and

(E) Some form of Soviet commercial representation should be allowed in West Berlin.

He seemed anxious to bring out the first two points, which may be the result of instructions from Moscow as mentioned to you by Dobrynin.⁴

3. I think that some difficulties have occurred in the past because of lack of adequate communication between the Foreign Ministry and the Chancellor’s office and between the Chancellor’s office and the Allies. Therefore, I am making a special effort to see Bahr and, less frequently, Brandt so that they are fully aware of all items with regard to the talks. In this connection, they greatly value the relationship with you, and it is very helpful from every standpoint.

4. We now have the text of the full notes of the March 8 discussion between Bahr and Kohl,⁵ and the resemblance between the points made and words used by Kohl and those of Abrasimov in the Four Power talks is quite striking. Both use such terms as “in conformity to custom,” “international norms,” “transit traffic exclusively for peaceful purposes,” that the transit agreement followed from “the sovereign equality of states,” etc. It is obvious that the respective talks and strategies are extremely closely synchronized.

5. With regard to another subject, thank you very much for your thoughtful message with regard to the visit of Senator Allott.⁶ He is a really outstanding person, and I thoroughly enjoyed my discussion with him. If we only had more Senators like him, our country would be infinitely better off.

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]. Top Secret. The message was sent through the special Navy channel in Frankfurt; a handwritten note indicates that it was received in Washington at 2208Z.
2. See Documents 192 and 193.
3. See Document 193.
4. Dobrynin mentioned instructions for Abrasimov during his meeting with Kissinger on February 26; see Document 190.
5. An Embassy translation of the official record of discussion between Bahr and Kohl on March 8 is enclosed in airgram A–275 from Bonn, March 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)
6. Senator Gordon Allott (R–Colorado), chairman of the Senate Republican Conference (Policy) Committee.