Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

179. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 11, 1971, 1710Z.

1652. Subject: Views of CDU Leader Barzel.

1. Summary. In a long conversation February 10 between the Ambassador and CDU leader Rainer Barzel, the latter presented his views on the Berlin negotiations, Eastern policy and FRG politics. His positions on Eastern policy although presented with vigor were moderate in CDU terms. Barzel presented himself as the nearly assured successor to Kiesinger as party chairman and candidate for Chancellor. He indicated that he had formed an alliance with Franz Josef Strauss to this end. At the same time, he did not appear to believe that the chances of replacing the Brandt government before the 1973 elections were great. End summary.

2. Barzel began by saying he had written Chancellor Brandt last week to complain that for three weeks he had had no consultation or information concerning either the Bahr/Kohl talks or the Berlin negotiations. Brandt had replied offering to meet him next week but Barzel had told him that he would either have to receive him today or there would be trouble on Berlin during the Bundestag budget debate February 12. Brandt had then offered a meeting later on February 10.²

3. Barzel said the first question he was going to ask Brandt was whether there was any truth in reports of the February 10 press that Bahr/Kohl had reached agreement that the GDR would not respond to FRG election activities in Berlin with Autobahn harassments. There was an implication in these reports, Barzel said, of an agreement to diminish such activities following the Berlin election campaign. Barzel said the one thing he did not want was that Bahr/Kohl should negotiate on Berlin access before the Four Powers had reached agreement on this point.

4. Barzel asked Ambassador Rush for his assessment of the progress of the Berlin talks thus far. The Ambassador reviewed the development of the talks, stressing Soviet on and off tactics and Soviet efforts to divide the alliance, particularly through repeated efforts to establish separate bilateral negotiations. The Ambassador said he had the impression that the Soviets would not be ready to do real business on Berlin until they have convinced themselves that these splitting tactics would not succeed.

5. Barzel agreed. He was convinced the Soviets were following a policy of using the Berlin talks to divide and weaken the alliance by trying to set one ally against the other in a war of nerves. He considered that the price for a Berlin settlement had already been paid in the form of German signature of the Moscow treaty. He was not ready to subscribe to any further payment. Because he and the Ambassador had a relationship of close confidence, particularly on this matter, he wished to make clear that for the CDU there were certain specific limits beyond which the party would not go on a Berlin agreement even if this agreement had received the prior approval both of the Soviet Union and of the US.

6. Barzel said he had with reluctance accepted the constitutional organs formula developed by the government. But he was not ready to remove Federal agencies or their personnel or to accept a situation where Bundestag factions and committees were excluded from going to Berlin. The CDU would oppose any such solution. Ambassador Rush observed that the extreme Soviet position was that they would give anything the West wanted on access if the Federal presence were totally removed, but then it would be access to a dying city. We did not intend to make any such agreement. We wanted to maintain a strong political presence. In view of the stress the Soviets were placing on Bundestag committee meetings, it might be difficult to reach an agreement without including some face-saving formula on this subject. But this was a decision wholly for the FRG to make, we hoped in continued agreement between government and opposition. Barzel said the main thing as he saw it was for the Western allies and the FRG to stay together and for the political parties in the FRG to stay together in maintaining a common position on Berlin. With such a common position, they might still get something worthwhile by the end of the year if the Soviet leadership did not change. If not, it would not be the end of the world.

7. Barzel said he had kept very much in mind the concern of top American leaders about developments in Germany as he had encountered it on his last trip to the US.³ This had been directed not so much to the external consequences of Ostpolitik, but about the divisive effect on the German body politik. He shared this concern. That is why he had exerted himself to such a degree before signature of the FRG-Soviet treaty to bring his party to a decision not to take a final position until all the returns were in and why he had again mentioned in his speech to the Duesseldorf party convention⁴ the possibility of CDU support for the policy if it brought actual results with regard to Berlin and improvements for the East German population. Barzel said he hoped he and the Ambassador could stay in closest contact on this issue. If a point came in the negotiations where some change in the common position appeared necessary, he would give it very serious consideration, although only if he were drawn into the consultation before the decision was made.

8. The Ambassador asked Barzel what he would do with regard to Eastern policy if the CDU were in power. Barzel said he would make a trip to Poland to see if there was any chance of coming to agreement with the Poles. He would also make specific proposals to Ulbricht, and after consultation with the US, he might ask the latter to inform the Soviets that the new CDU government was ready to talk seriously with it.

9. Ambassador Rush asked Barzel what he thought might happen if the Berlin talks broke down. Barzel said he thought there might be a year or two of friction or difficulty with the Soviet Union but he did not personally think matters would go any further even though many of his visitors made more alarming forecasts. The main requirement in this situation would be to maintain the psychological and economic morale of the Berliners themselves. With patience, we could live through such a period as we had before.

10. Describing his recent visit to Poland,⁵ Barzel said he believed that he had by hard bargaining brought the Poles to take actions with regard to the establishment of the Chamber of Commerce which they had insisted at the outset would be taken only after ratification of the FRG-Polish treaty. He believed other practical steps would follow because the Poles saw that a Berlin solution and ratification of the treaties was far off. Essentially, the Poles were in a very unfortunate situation caught in a vise between the Soviet Union and East Berlin. They had very little freedom of movement and they wanted to exploit what little they had by contact not only with the French but also with the FRG and anyone else who would enter into them. There was real concern both among the Poles and in his own mind about the possibility of Soviet intervention at this time. Consequently he had advised his CDU colleagues to hold back in further contacts with the Poles in order not to add an element of nervousness with the Soviets.

11. The Ambassador asked Barzel how he would evaluate his own domestic political standing. Barzel said he thought it had improved. He had not wished to push forward because this was not his way and because he wanted to see where the CDU would come out as regards its political posture on Western policy, Eastern policy and on the avoidance of socialist experiments. He was satisfied with the results of the Duesseldorf convention in this regard. His own Land organization had now asked him directly whether he would be a candidate for Chancellor and he said he would throw his hat in the ring if they considered it right. They had urged him to do so. Many others were coming to him with the same idea.

12. The Ambassador asked Barzel whether there was not an alliance in the making between Schroeder and Kohl which might block him. Barzel said he thought this combination existed, but did not think it would amount to much. Of course a place would have to be found in any CDU leadership team for Schroeder, who was a valuable man and well thought of. Besides, Barzel said, he was Fraktion chairman and without serious competition in that regard. One could not run for office as head of the opposition by making press conferences outside of the Bundestag; the action was there.

13. The Ambassador asked Barzel about the position taken by Strauss in this matter. Barzel said Strauss supported him as CDU/CSU Chancellor candidate. In fact, he said, Strauss had agreed to take an active role under him in the Fraktion as the CDU’s main spokesman on economic questions when Stoltenburg carried out his planned shift to the Schleswig Holstein Land government.

14. The Ambassador asked Barzel whether he thought the CDU had a chance to come to power before the next elections in 1973. Barzel said Brandt would continue to hold on even if he was reduced to a one-vote majority and that it would take “something quite wild” to bring him down. Barzel said he would himself take the job even if he had a majority of only a few votes because he knew he could depend on a much wider majority on foreign policy issues and could draw support from the FDP on domestic policy. Moreover, the political constellation in the Laender was even more favorable towards the CDU than at the time of Adenauer.

15. Comment: Barzel was energetic and confident. He did gain some ground and support at the Duesseldorf party convention. His emerging alliance with Strauss, which we reported some months ago, appears to have become firmer. He is also reliably reported to have come to terms with former Labor Minister Katzer, leader of the CDU left wing through promising the latter a cabinet position in the event the CDU returns to government. But Barzel still faces considerable strong opposition from Schroeder and Kohl, who in fact appear to be moving towards cooperation, from CDU Secretary General Heck and possibly in the last analysis from Kiesinger himself who is increasingly resenting Barzel’s efforts to unseat him, when the former finally comes to the conclusion that he himself does not have a real chance. The leadership struggle in the CDU appears to be moving closer to resolution. But the timing and nature of the outcome is not yet clear. At the same time, nearly all of the leading contenders appear to agree that only a major accident will bring down the Brandt government and to be aiming instead for the 1973 elections.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Berlin, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and Stuttgart.
2. As Barzel later reported to an Embassy officer, Brandt “coolly confirmed” on February 10 that the Western allies had tabled a draft agreement but did not apologize or comment on the lack of consultation with the opposition. (Telegram 1892 from Bonn, February 17; ibid.) On February 11 Scheel told Rush that Barzel would see but could not take a copy of the draft agreement. (Telegram 1659 from Bonn, February 11; ibid.)
3. Barzel met Nixon and Kissinger at San Clemente on September 4, 1970.
4. The CDU held its party convention in Düsseldorf from January 25 to 27.
5. Barzel was in Warsaw from January 20 to 23. For his published accounts of the trip, see Barzel, Auf dem Drahtseil, pp. 134–137 and Im Streit und umstritten, pp. 186–188.