Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

164. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS DB–315/00308–71

Washington, January 20, 1971.

COUNTRY

• West Germany

DOI

• Mid-January 1971

SUBJECT

• Comments of State Secretary Egon Bahr on U.S. Views of Ostpolitik and the Role of West German Ambassador Pauls

ACQ

• [1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

• [1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

White House Situation Room: For Dr. Kissinger

To State: No Distribution Except to Dr. Ray S. Cline

To DIA: Exclusive for Lt. General Bennett

To NMCC/MC: Exclusive for Army ACSI, Major General McChristian: Navy ACNO (Intel), Rear Admiral Harlfinger: Air Force AF/IN, Major General Triantafellu

To NSA: Exclusive for Vice Admiral Gayler

1. In a discussion in mid-January 1971 of West German-U.S. relations, West German (FRG) Chancellery State Secretary Egon Bahr remarked that Chancellery Minister Horst Ehmke had observed during his December 1970 visit to Washington that while the top U.S. officials had expressed unequivocal trust in the FRG’s Ostpolitik, the entire upper-middle and middle officialdom appeared to be skeptical or hostile. The Americans are agreed that the FRG should pursue a policy of détente, but do not wish to have this exert a negative effect on the military readiness of the Western Alliance. The visits of several Christian Democratic Union politicians to the U.S. had reinforced the tendency within the U.S. officialdom to look with reserve on the FRG Ostpolitik.

2. Bahr went on to say that the key position in this question was occupied by Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Henry Kissinger, and the hopes for an improvement in the U.S. attitude lay in his hands. What was surprising was the fact which emerged from Ehmke’s talk with Kissinger that Kissinger appeared extremely ill-informed on FRG policy and was ignorant of important elements and concepts of Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Bahr said that one might conclude from this that FRG Ambassador to Washington Rolf Pauls was not effectively briefing the U.S. Government. Pauls was merely acting as a message-carrier and higher-grade analyst and was not dynamically explaining and interpreting FRG policy. Pauls’ U.S. contacts obviously gathered from the Ambassador’s pro forma passage of messages that Pauls was only performing a duty and not acting with conviction, and this had a deleterious effect on U.S.–FRG relations. Bahr did not wish to imply that Pauls was not loyal to his government, but it was apparent that he did not back the FRG policy with personal conviction and dedication.²

3. When asked if Pauls might be recalled, Bahr replied that as long as the Ambassador made no serious mistake he saw no prospect in the foreseeable future of replacing him with another man, perhaps a confidant (Vertrauensmann) of the Chancellor. Pauls had made a good reputation as Ambassador to Israel, where he has supported wholeheartedly and without reservations the arms delivery policy of Konrad Adenauer and, particularly, of Franz Josef Strauss.

4. (Headquarters Comment: In making these statements, Bahr was speaking officially, without assuming an American audience. It is clear he now believes Ambassador Pauls is not helping the Ostpolitik, but sees no opportunity to replace him with a more effective spokesman for the Chancellery. The views on U.S. Government attitudes and abilities which Bahr credits to the December Ehmke mission to Washington suggest that Ostpolitik advocates in the Chancellery credit the White House with a better potential for accepting their viewpoint than they do various officials in the Department of State. Bahr’s judgment was, presumably, influenced by Ehmke’s reporting.

5. [1 line not declassified]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VIII. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only; Routine. Prepared in the CIA.
2. In a January 23 letter to Sutterlin, Fessenden reported: “The Ambassador [Rush] had a long talk with Pauls the other day and found Pauls extremely annoyed with Ehmke for having made his ill-advised [December] trip. Pauls also showed signs of unhappiness with Bahr and Ehmke and the pace of the Ost Politik.” (Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 74 D 430, Department of State—Sutterlin)