Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

163. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 15, 1971.

SUBJECT

• US Position on the FRG-Polish Treaty²

We had earlier recommended that you raise with Under Secretary Irwin (or dispatch an instruction to the USC) the question of the US position on the FRG-Polish treaty so that policy alternatives could be prepared for use at the time of ratification (log #24191, Tab B).³ You raised the subject with the Under Secretary during your December 10 luncheon, and also the Secretariat (on your instructions) informed State that it should come forward with a memo. Secretary Rogers has sent such a memo for the President.⁴

The Secretary’s memo unfortunately does not really consider our policy in the context of a ratified Polish treaty. He posed three options for our position in general:

• —continue in public statements to stand by the November 18 statement⁵ which expressed satisfaction at the initialing of the treaty, and pointing out that quadripartite rights and responsibilities are not affected;
• —state that we welcome the treaty, including its boundary provisions (this is essentially what the British said in November), and that our juridical position remains unchanged; or
• —state that we would respect the border and would support it at the time of a peace settlement; this statement could be unilateral, tripartite, or quadripartite.

The Secretary recommends that our position should be to welcome the treaty, and if the FRG does not object, to consider specific comment welcoming the border provisions. Thus, the Secretary’s recommendation falls slightly between his first and second option.

The first two options are virtually indistinguishable, while the third represents a significant modification of our position. The course recommended by the Secretary seems just fine for use, should the occasion arise, at any time prior to the ratification of the Polish treaty. (It is doubtful whether any occasion would arise in this period for the issuance of any sort of official USG statement, since the general public interest—very high when the treaty was signed in November—is rather low.) As the treaty is ratified, however, there will be occasion for a further enunciation of the American position.

The long-range study of Eastern Policy called for in NSSM 111⁶ (issued after the Secretary’s memo) will be treating these broader issues, in part on the assumption that the Berlin talks are successful and the Polish and Soviet treaties are ratified (copy of NSSM 111 at Tab C). The study will also examine questions relating to our rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole. It would seem that the best approach would be to approve the Secretary’s position for possible use in the period prior to ratification, but to treat in the NSSM 111 study the broader issue of our position toward the treaty (and our rights involved). In that way we would have the benefit of more careful analysis of alternative policy positions for use at the next critical stage— when the treaty is ratified.

If you wish to forward the Secretary’s memo to the President, the memo at Tab A⁷ does that, and also recommends that the Secretary’s position be approved for interim use, and that the NSSM 111 study consider the issue within the context of a ratified treaty. Alternatively, you may wish not to bother the President with this at this time, and simply send the memo for the Secretary, attached to the memo for the President at Tab A, which contains the same conclusion.

Recommendations

1. That if you wish to involve the President, you sign the memo at Tab A.

2. That alternatively you sign the memo for the Secretary of State (Tab A of the memo for the President).⁸

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–179, NSSM 111. Secret. Sent for action. Haig initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.
2. Regarding the Warsaw Treaty, see Document 137.
3. Attached at Tab B is a December 8 memorandum, in which Sonnenfeldt recommended that Kissinger raise the U.S. position on the Warsaw Treaty during his luncheon meeting with Irwin on December 10. “The main point,” Sonnenfeldt explained, “is that if you want the NSC system to become active on this issue—and to ensure your early involvement—action must be taken now.” Another copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VIII. On a December 9 memorandum from Davis, Kissinger checked that he had discussed the issue with Irwin and commented: “Let State do it as memo to us.” (Ibid., Box 340, Subject Files, HAK/Irwin Meetings, Oct 70—) Davis relayed this instruction to Irwin by telephone on December 11. (Memorandum from Irwin to Hillenbrand, December 11; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–POL)
4. Dated December 23; attached but not printed. (Also ibid.)
5. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 1112.
6. Document 156.
7. Attached at Tab A, but not printed, is a draft memorandum from Kissinger to the President.
8. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: “I have accepted rec[ommendation] 2.” In a January 20 memorandum to Rogers, Kissinger reported that Nixon had “approved the position you recommended for possible use should the occasion arise prior to the ratification of the FRG-Polish treaty.” He continued, “Since the underlying situation may change when the Polish treaty is ratified, the third alternative you posed may carry more weight at that time. In this light it would be useful to include within the framework of NSSM 111 a review of our posture toward a ratified Polish treaty in connection with the requested examination of questions related to our reserved rights and responsibilities with respect to Germany as a whole.” (Also in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–POL)