16. Draft Memorandum of Conversation1

DRAFT RECORD OF 4:15 P.M. SESSION, CHANCELLOR’S OFFICE

PRESENT

  • The Chancellor
  • The President
  • Brandt
  • Secretary
  • Carstens
  • Kissinger
  • Duckwitz
  • Hillenbrand
  • Diehl
  • Fessenden
  • Ahlers
  • Pedersen
  • Pauls
  • Ziegler
  • Ruete
  • Sonnenfeldt
  • Osterheld
  • Holzapfel
  • Weber

Middle East—The President opened the discussion by saying that we were undertaking exploratory talks on the Middle East, at the present stage in the UN on a bilateral basis. Our general concept is that Four-Power discussions later might produce some recommendation for settlement. “Recommendation” is the key word; there is no thought of imposing a settlement, especially on the Israelis. The President explained that he had already had useful bilateral talks in the UK and would be having them in Paris.2 The problem is not easy. The Israelis insist on the recognition of Israel as a state; their Arab neighbors insist that Israel withdraw from the occupied territories. The Israelis also insist that there be a credible guarantee of no further military threat. They want to retain a few territories, such as the Golan Heights and certain other areas. One possibility is a UN guarantee, but this is not credible to the Israelis because of their previous experiences. Another possibility would be a guarantee by the United States and the Soviet Union, with perhaps other major powers. This would be more credible to the Israelis.

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The President said a Middle East settlement is very important because it is one of the key areas in the world where a military confrontation could drag the two major powers into a conflict which neither side wants. The problem was a most difficult one; no “instant solution” was at hand. He asked Secretary Rogers for his appraisal.

The Secretary said he felt there was some slight hope for progress. Certainly the talk in the UK had been constructive. He added that one thing is clear: It is essential that the starting point for a solution must be assurance to Israel of its continued existence. The Secretary said they would hold further bilateral talks with the French and then again with the Soviet Ambassador after their return to Washington.3 They will discuss the matter with the Soviet Ambassador orally because the Soviets have told them they will not respond yet in writing to our request for clarification of their proposal.

East-West Relations—The President opened the discussion by saying that the Soviets have already shown great interest in SALT discussions. He said he had earlier stated, before the election, that there must be progress on political questions, such as the Middle East and Vietnam, before SALT talks. This statement had been interpreted in many quarters as a precondition to the opening of SALT talks. The President speculated on why the Soviets were so anxious for SALT talks. Two reasons seem plausible: (a) They wanted to avoid the excessive budget expenditures. This, the President commented, would not be sufficient reason for us to engage in SALT discussions; security, not budget and financial considerations, were the dominant factor for the US. (b) A second reason for wanting SALT discussions was to head off the danger of an arms race, which allegedly increases the danger of war. However, this is a questionable thesis. History shows that political difficulties lead more often to war than the mere fact of an arms race. Therefore, we have told the Soviets that the best way to move ahead on SALT talks is to make simultaneous progress on several political fronts: i.e., the Middle East, Vietnam, and the division of Europe.

The President said that in discussions so far with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington he has made clear that any agreement on SALT talks would involve full consultation with our NATO allies and no impairment of NATO’s strength and credibility. Specifically, the President said, nuclear arms available to NATO forces would not be part of a SALT agreement.

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The President then pointed to a potential danger for the alliance in SALT talks. Experience has shown that any bilateral disarmament discussions with the Soviets (test ban, NPT) tend to increase the sense of euphoria and sap the determination in NATO to maintain our own defense capability. This is a real dilemma because it is only a strong NATO which makes possible disarmament talks with the Soviets. Therefore, it is most important, even while talks may be going on with the Soviets, to continue to hammer home the necessity of maintaining our own defensive strength. It is not easy for a politician to get across to the people in a democracy that we should simultaneously maintain our military strength and negotiate with the Soviets.

The President then said there had been a disturbing development in recent years. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the US lead in strategic missiles had been so massive that no rational decision makers on the Soviet side would have risked war. Unfortunately, the US lead today has been sharply cut because of a very major Soviet effort to increase its own missile capability. Accompanying this has been an equally significant improvement in the quality of Soviet conventional strength.

The President then pointed to a serious political problem in the US. There is a very strong move to bring home US troops from Europe.4 Before Czechoslovakia a majority of congressmen would have favored this. The President stressed that he personally does not share this view. He believes we should maintain our commitments for European defense and that this is especially important whenever we undertake negotiations. The President said that the other side of the coin is that it is very difficult politically for us to carry our share of the load if the Europeans are not prepared to carry theirs. There are two basic theories regarding our force posture in Europe: (a) There is the “tripwire” theory which says we need a bare minimum of forces because any military attack against Western Europe is enough to set off the full US deterrent. Under this theory, conventional forces don’t matter, and we can “go nuclear” immediately. (b) The second theory holds that there would be a substantial amount of time for holding and that, therefore, conventional forces should be kept at a credibly high level. The President said that he believed we need to maintain substantial conventional forces and that the present level of our forces in Europe should be maintained. In addition to the purely military reasons for this is the need to have adequate conventional forces to resist political pressures short of open military attack.

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The Chancellor thanked the President for his appraisal of the East-West political and strategic situation. He agreed completely that there is an inseparable connection between military strength and successful negotiations with the Soviets. He also fully understood that the American military contribution to NATO defense is closely tied with Europe’s own willingness to contribute to its defense. He stressed that the presence of US troops in Europe is of the greatest importance to the FRG. The events in Czechoslovakia had heightened an awareness of the central fact that the American military presence in Europe was the best guarantee for European peace.

Mediterranean—The Chancellor said a new element is the rapidly increasing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. This makes Europe very uneasy; the Soviets already control the Baltic and the northern Scandinavian waters. Now they are carrying out a kind of pincers in the Mediterranean. Some Europeans argue that the Mediterranean should be “neutralized,” with the Sixth Fleet pulled out. The Chancellor said he was very much opposed to such proposals.

The President replied that the idea of neutralizing the Mediterranean bordered on the ridiculous. Neutralization only works where it is guaranteed by the major powers who might otherwise have a conflict. The presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is essential.

Secretary Rogers agreed that neutralization requires much mutual trust and good faith, and we are a long way from this in the Mediterranean.

East-West Relations—The Secretary then said the problem with the SALT topics is whether the Soviets may be using discussions in this field to overcome the stigma of Czechoslovakia. We think there should be progress towards political solutions in all fields, not just in SALT. The steps seem to be clear: find out what the Soviets really have in mind, consult fully with the allies, and maintain our military strength. The Secretary added that we do not like the word “détente.” It lulls people in the West into reducing their military strength. We should certainly undertake concrete steps to improve relations with the Soviets, but avoid creating euphoria. In sum, we are willing to enter talks with the Soviets, but are somewhat wary regarding their motives for these talks.

The Chancellor said that he felt the German position on East-West relations has not always been understood in the American press. It has never been the German intention in pursuing a more flexible Eastern policy to abandon in any way their attachment to a strong NATO. There has also been criticism of German Eastern policy in Europe, particularly in France. There has even been a charge that the FRG induced the events in Czechoslovakia by its Eastern policy. It has never been the German policy to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and its [Page 46] so-called satellites. Germany has always been quite aware of the limits of its policy. Its only objective has been to open contacts with Eastern Europe and improve the political climate.

The President said that he had never given any credence to the idea that the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia because of German expansionism. That was a pretext and not a cause. He felt that it was difficult to read the situation in Eastern Europe at this time. He expressed his own feeling that trade and other contacts in this area, like tourism, should be pursued, but he also believed that the recent Soviet declaration of a “socialist Commonwealth” may deter that.5

Brandt said he wanted to make two comments. First, on consultation, he realized that real consultation, in substance rather than mere form, greatly increased the burdens of the US. Second, he expressed the hope that in settling political problems with the Soviet Union, such as the Middle East and Vietnam, attention would also be given to European problems, on which there had been no progress in recent years. For example, some real progress towards a stable settlement in Berlin would be highly desirable.

Brandt added that the Eastern European countries, despite Czechoslovakia, still seem to be interested in contacts. For example, they had had interesting talks with the Poles in November. The Rumanians and Yugoslavs were obviously interested. Even the Czechs say they now have the green light from the Soviets for economic cooperation with the West. Economic contacts, even tourism, seem to be going up.

The Chancellor said that the new “Socialist Commonwealth” doctrine would be strongly pushed by the Soviets, but the Soviets will not be able to stop the process of liberalization. The events in Czechoslovakia were very different from those in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956. The fact is that the young people particularly simply refuse to accept the Communist system. As a result, however, a difficult and dangerous situation may be created because the Soviets will be tempted to do rash things to stop the clock.

The President, apologizing for putting the subject forward, asked whether frustration regarding early attainment of German reunification does not increase the possibility of Germany’s trying to reach an accommodation with the Soviets.

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The Chancellor replied that people in the FRG are sober-minded and realistic about reunification and there is no real tendency for seeking a deal with the East. In response to the President’s question, he said this applies even to young people.

The President then raised the question of why the Soviets were so interested in SALT discussions. The Chancellor replied that he thought the Soviets had arrived at a stage in their strategic arms development where they think they can now stop further progress with advantage to themselves. Brandt said the Soviet interest in SALT might result from two causes. First, the Soviets have very heavy domestic demands which must be met. Second, the key question of China, which the Yugoslavs, for example, believe is a major factor. As a result, the Russians are more interested in lessening tensions with the West. The Chancellor agreed and added that in addition the Soviets must in particular maintain larger conventional forces to deal with China.

The President thanked Chancellor and Brandt for these comments, adding that they were valuable in our own consideration of the problems involved. He said that we have not made final decisions yet on the SALT talks. Commenting on the two points raised, the President said China must indeed be a major concern for the Soviets. Perhaps they will need not only reductions of tensions with the West; they may feel compelled to go even further. Regarding Soviet internal demands as a motive for their interest in SALT talks, the President pointed out that a less comforting thesis could also be developed. Sometimes serious internal problems lead a country like the Soviet Union to a harsher line rather than a softer line.

Regarding Foreign Minister Brandt’s point about the added burdens of consultation, the President said one could also argue the opposite. As an example, before his trip, he had called a bipartisan conference of congressional leadership.6 Some of the congressional leadership do not agree with him on his basic European policies. Still, it was better to have this conference now rather than after his European trip. It is likely that he would have had even more trouble had he consulted after the fact. The same applies in the international field.

On Eastern Europe, the President made a special appeal for German contribution, saying that Germany has more knowledge, experience and contacts than any other country in this field.

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Monetary Matters—The President said that monetary matters will be of great importance in the period ahead. He felt the best approach for the present would be a very quiet and inconspicuous bilateral discussion between the leading countries, not an international conference. He had suggested this in the UK, where the response had been favorable. Treasury Secretary Kennedy, who is much preoccupied now with tax reform is not in a position to travel at the present time, although Under Secretary Volcker is more available for this purpose. On the other hand, we welcome the visits to Washington of responsible monetary officials, where Secretary Kennedy will be only too glad to talk with them. This kind of inconspicuous bilateral consultation is the best way to get together in this delicate field.

Trade Policy—The President said that Commerce Secretary Stans is planning a European trip next month and would welcome the opportunity for talks on trade policy. The President said that American and German views are very similar on trade policy questions, but we are constantly faced with protectionist pressures at home. Maximum consultation in this field is highly desirable.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is marked “Uncleared—For Embassy Use Only.” For an explanation, see footnote 1, Document 14. Another, nearly identical, draft is in the National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 70 D 387, Box 484, CF 338, President Nixon’s Trip to Europe, 2/23–3/2/79, Chronology; Memcons—Vol. I of VIII. For a German record of the meeting, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. 283–291.
  2. Memoranda of conversations in London and Paris are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI.
  3. Rogers met Dobrynin on the morning of March 8 for a discussion of several issues. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books) A memorandum of their conversation on Berlin is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38.
  4. Reference is presumably to the continuing effort of Senate Majority Leader Mansfield (D–Montana) to pass a resolution calling for substantial reductions of U.S. forces in Europe.
  5. Reference is apparently to the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. On November 12, 1968, in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish Communist Party in Warsaw, Brezhnev justified Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia the previous August as a necessary step to prevent capitalist interference in the socialist camp.
  6. Nixon met with Congressional leaders on February 19 to discuss his upcoming European trip and other issues. Notes on the meeting, written by Patrick J. Buchanan, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Beginning February 16, 1969.