Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

15. Draft Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, February 26, 1969, noon.

DRAFT RECORD OF 12 O’CLOCK SESSION, CHANCELLOR’S OFFICE

PRESENT

• The Chancellor
• The President
• Brandt
• The Secretary
• Carstens
• Kissinger
• Duckwitz
• Hillenbrand
• Diehl
• Fessenden
• Ahlers
• Pedersen
• Pauls
• Ziegler
• Ruete
• Sonnenfeldt
• Osterheld
• Holzapfel
• Weber

After the welcome by the Chancellor, the President opened the discussion by saying that he was in Europe to establish a “line of communication” between the new U.S. administration and the German Government, both the present one and the government which will follow after the German elections. The President said he wanted to reiterate what he had already told the Chancellor in the car coming in: The U.S. relationship with the FRG is at the heart of our foreign policy; therefore, we want the closest communication and cooperation. As we look to those who might oppose us (the Soviets), we realize that they regard the great NATO Alliance as the key issue for them. If they can weaken the NATO Alliance, it will be a great accomplishment for them. Because of this Soviet objective, it is therefore necessary to do all possible to strengthen our alliance. There are very few differences between German and U.S. foreign policy objectives. We agree on fundamentals. We both want a united Europe, we both want British entry in the Common Market, we both believe it is necessary to maintain and strengthen the military commitments to NATO. We realize that the FRG has a special problem in dealing with its friends within the Alliance. We know the FRG wants good relations with the United Kingdom, with France, and with the U.S. There are occasions when there are sharp differences; last week’s events brought these clearly to the fore.²

The President said he regarded his Berlin trip, not as a provocative action, but as something which he was required to do because to do otherwise would have been a sign of weakness. The U.S. feels it must maintain a firm, though not a belligerent or a provocative posture. There will be at some time bilateral U.S.-Soviet discussions covering such subjects as the Middle East and possibly SALT. The President emphasized very strongly, however, that there will be no discussions with the Soviets which will weaken the Alliance or the Federal Republic. The President said he intends to maintain the closest communication through the respective foreign ministries and the German Embassy.

On other matters, like offset, the President said he thought these were better discussed at the technical level. The President added that he was glad to hear during the private talk that a group was going to Washington in March. He was sure that they would be welcomed by Secretary Kennedy. It was most important to work out satisfactory solutions and maintain monetary stability. The President then called upon Secretary Rogers to speak.

The Secretary said that in his talks with Foreign Minister Brandt, he had explained that the U.S. recognizes the political problems with which the FRG is faced.³ He recognized also that the difficulties between the United Kingdom and France posed problems for the FRG. These differences, the Secretary felt, are considerably exaggerated in the press. He added that there will also always be differences between friends. The Secretary said that he had explained these to both the British Government and press.

The Chancellor said that the President’s trip to Europe has great symbolic importance and added that he hoped the present seemingly confused situation in Europe would not mislead the President. He agreed with Secretary Rogers that the press considerably exaggerated the Franco-British affair and urged that all keep a cool head. The Federal Republic will do its best to help solve these difficulties. He added that the FRG is sometimes accused of being hesitant and indecisive. This is wrong; the contrary is the case. The FRG remains steadfast in pursuing its goals. He said that he wanted to emphasize very strongly that the most important goal of German foreign policy was European unity and this goal is supported by the entire cabinet, the German Government, and the vast majority of the people.

The Chancellor then said that a recent public opinion poll showed that 76% of the German people stand for closest cooperation with the U.S. This is the highest favorable response ever recorded for a view on a political question and shows clearly that the German people realize what is important and know what they owe to the Alliance. The FRG, like other European countries, does not want to be completely dependent on “big brother,” but they also know that none of the individual European countries today has the ability to defend itself alone. The FRG is prepared to do its part to strengthen the Alliance, and since Czechoslovakia, steps have been taken to strengthen German defenses.

As for national problems, the Chancellor said German unity remains a fundamental goal but the government is realistic about this as well. They know the difficulties and that the way is long and hard. The FRG also understands that the U.S. and Soviets must have certain contacts on matters which affect freedom and peace in the world today. But, as the President himself said so clearly, these contacts will be undertaken in closest consultation with the Allies. Furthermore, the Allies are fully confident that there will in fact be such full consultations.

The President said he would like to reaffirm that we assume, until we have evidence to the contrary, that a major Soviet objective is to weaken the Alliance and especially the FRG. The President said he wanted to assure again that, this being the case, we intend to do nothing which will weaken the Alliance or the FRG. In other words, the President said, we know what the game is about. The Alliance, which has kept the peace for the last 20 years, is absolutely crucial.

The Chancellor said that, on Berlin, we must keep the city free and viable. These are the objectives which determine FRG policy toward Berlin today. We must also not allow the vital arteries between Berlin and West Germany to be severed. There is a crisis regarding Berlin over the holding of the Bundesversammlung. There are differing opinions within the FRG on the wisdom of holding the Bundesversammlung in Berlin. There is no question, however, regarding the right of the FRG to hold the meeting there, but the Soviets are disputing this right. The more the Soviets pressure and threaten us on this, the more firm we have had to become. In the last week, the FRG has received hints of Soviet willingness to reach an understanding on this, which has been the subject of some talks between the Chancellor and the Soviet Ambassador. The Chancellor said he has told the Soviet Ambassador that if the Soviets are prepared to make some convincing contribution to removing the obstacles to German viability and freedom erected by the East Germans, then perhaps something can be worked out. The Chancellor said he did not know what would come out of these talks, adding that the subject is being discussed in Berlin today. The Chancellor said he wants on the one hand a genuine offer for an understanding; but on the other hand any decision to move the location of the Bundesversammlung must be on the basis of a real contribution by the Soviets. If there is no such real contribution by the Soviets, the Bundesversammlung will in fact be held in Berlin. The Chancellor added that the people of Berlin were very courageous and that it was a great thing that the President was going to visit there.

The President replied that he wanted to assure the Chancellor of full American support for Berlin. As he had told Ambassador Pauls in Washington, he had explained to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington that the Berlin trip was not a provocation but was a reaffirmation that Berlin and its freedom have the support of the U.S.⁴ He had also told the Soviet Ambassador that, in case of any Soviet actions affecting Berlin, these could be very detrimental to any bilateral talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which might take place.⁵ Our posture is one of firmness but not belligerence. This policy had been the policy of several American Presidents and was one which he would continue.

On the Bundesversammlung decision, the President said this should be taken by the FRG in the light of its own interests. If the FRG gains concessions from the Soviets which are very significant and lead to a change in the locale of the Bundesversammlung, we will respect and support that position. If on the other hand the FRG decides to go ahead with the Bundesversammlung in Berlin, we will respect and support that position.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which is marked “Uncleared: For Embassy Use Only.” For an explanation, see footnote 1, Document 14. Another, nearly identical, draft is in the National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 70 D 387, Box 484, CF 338, President Nixon’s Trip to Europe, 2/23–3/2/69, Chronology; Memcons—Vol. I of VIII. Pedersen also took notes of the conversation. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 75 D 229, Pres. Trip to Europe, Feb.–Mar. 1969) For a German record of the meeting, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. 278–283.
2. Reference is presumably to the “Soames Affair”; see footnote 2, Document 14.
3. A brief account of Rogers’ meeting with Brandt, as well as a summary of the discussion between Nixon and Kiesinger, is in telegram 3003 from Paris (Secto 19), February 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US)
4. See Document 5.
5. See Document 11.