133. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and John J. McCloy1
M: … higher level than the ——— to how you can expedite this thing and get it totally ratified before elections take place.
K: But that’s within the next three weeks!
[Page 386]M: Yes, but their thought is that Brandt make an offer to the East Germans or Gromyko on recognizing the GDR ——— idea that this will produce tangible results in Berlin and perhaps produce special relationship between GDR and Federal Republic. This seems to go completely contrary to the understanding that they had in regard to the entry of the GDR until there have been some concessions.
K: I don’t understand how Brandt is going to improve his position by making a ——— concession. If he has to get the German public … but never underestimate the depths of German stupidity.
M: This is the feeling I get but if there is nothing on this from the U.S. government, then others will be approached to give their blessing to this before the Laender elections.2 We are sitting in the wings in a neutral position and being completely outmaneuvered. We ought to be aware of this—it is the World War II peace treaty. For all practical purposes, Brandt is writing the fundamental peace treaty right now.
K: I have yet to see a European leader who is not profoundly disquieted by what the Germans are doing. But no one has the guts to say so publicly.
M: We’ve fought the war and we won, and here a small minority is taking the ball away from us in a way that will profoundly affect the rest of us.
K: Look at the Germans inside of Germany. I’m going to fix an appointment for you with the President. It’s useless to go the other route. I think you should talk to the President first and then Rogers. I share your concerns.
M: I am profoundly disturbed.
K: If you look at Chile and Germans, that’s where historical changes are going on.
It’s a terrible thing—people don’t recognize how precarious the situation in Germany is. They can say as much as they want about being related to the West.
M: Maybe we want to get Clay and Acheson in on this. I don’t know but I think it should be brought to the attention of the highest people.
[Page 387]K: You, Acheson and Clay should come in as people who understand this. The trouble is that the President will only be in Washington for two days. If we can’t fix it then, we will do it after the 15th.3
M: Okay. You may be approached on this. It is part of the ——— in Germany to avoid the possible consequences in Germany.
K: If I have anything to do with it, we’ll ———.
M: How about Irwin or Rogers?
K: Talk to either, but Rogers won’t be back till Wednesday either.
M: I’ve been through the fire with Brandt.
K: He’s a public relations guy.
M: I defended Berlin two or three times when the blue shirts were there.4
K: He’s a weak man.
M: If we had relied on Brandt we’d have lost the city.
K: Exactly.
M: He’s completely ———. I sent you a letter yesterday which straightens out what we talked about the other day.5
K: Good.
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 364, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. No drafting information or time is on the transcript, although “a.m.” appears in the heading. All omissions are in the original. According to a typed note, the transcriber “missed beginning of conversation—had to answer another phone.” McCloy was in New York; Kissinger in Washington.↩
- Reference is presumably to the state elections in Hesse on November 8 and Bavaria on November 22. In a telephone conversation with the President on November 9, Kissinger reported the result in Hesse: “They had an election in Germany which saved the Brandt coalition. The Social Democrats were told to vote for [the Free Democrats]. That would be worked out all together. The other vote went up which is an odd coincidence. The Christian Democrats gained.” (Ibid.)↩
- Nixon met McCloy, Acheson, Clay, and Thomas Dewey on December 7 at the White House; see Document 140.↩
- McCloy had been closely involved in German affairs since World War II, including service from 1949 to 1952 as the United States High Commissioner in West Germany.↩
- No further information about the letter or the discussion has been found.↩