Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

132. Message From President Nixon to German Chancellor Brandt¹

Washington, October 31, 1970.

Dear. Mr. Chancellor:

As you know, I have recently had a conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.² Though it cannot be expected to bring about any major change in our relations, the conversation was helpful since it allowed for clarification of views.

Among other issues, we discussed Berlin. The Foreign Minister presented the well-known Soviet position on the Federal political presence in West Berlin, which he considered the central issue. If that were solved—eliminated or severely curtailed—then the USSR and the GDR were ready to find a solution to the access problems. In response, I made it very clear to him that the umbilical cord between Berlin and the Federal Republic could not be cut, that all political ties simply cannot be severed. I underscored that West Berlin cannot be allowed to become a third German state. On the other hand, I noted there might be room for common understanding if the Soviets would agree to improved access arrangements to Berlin and improved communications within Berlin in return for a somewhat lowered profile of Federal activities in Berlin.

In your letter of October 14,³ which I very much appreciated, you again noted that the FRG–USSR treaty cannot come into force until there has been effective improvement in Berlin. In my conversation with Mr. Gromyko, I stressed the same point. He did not comment on that, though he did express appreciation for the positive view I had taken of that treaty. When the Foreign Minister raised the question of a European security conference, I also took that opportunity to stress the importance of progress in Berlin. You had made a similar point in your letter in relating the question of Soviet interest in genuine détente and the “test of Berlin.”

In addition to considering topics such as Vietnam and the Middle East, we discussed at some length the general status of US-Soviet relations, and the fundamental importance of stable relations to the cause of world peace. I stressed to the Foreign Minister that the US cannot develop its relations with Moscow at the expense of our allies. Incidentally, in my recent meetings with President Ceausescu I also made the point that while we wanted to do nothing that would complicate his relations with the USSR, we would make no arrangements with the latter that were inimical to the interests of Romania or any other third country.

Together, we shall be watching closely the further evolution of Soviet conduct on these questions, particularly with respect to Berlin. Deep and broad consultations between our Governments during this period will take on increasing importance.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon ⁴

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 753, Presidential Correspondence File, Germany, Chancellor Willy Brandt, May–Dec 1970. Personal and Confidential. Drafted by Lord. Haig forwarded the message on October 31 for “immediate delivery to the Chancellor or an official in his office with immediate access to him.” (Ibid.) No original or signed copy has been found. Although he had initially maintained that a letter was not necessary, Sonnenfeldt argued in an October 30 cable to Kissinger that, due to speculation about the meeting between Nixon and Gromyko, it had become “important to get a message to Brandt setting out our version of the talks.” “The Soviets,” he added, “will continue to plant the seed of confusion and distrust with respect to the Gromyko meeting with the President. Our continued silence is only serving the Soviets.” (Ibid.) In a November 2 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig suggested the following item for discussion with the President: “Tell President of your message to Brandt covering discussion with Gromyko. (Rush may be upset about channel and could complain to Rogers. Hal will talk to him this a.m.).” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Top Secret Chronological File 1969–1975, Box TS 2) For a copy of the message, as received by Brandt on November 1, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1969–1970, Nr. 220, pp. 835–836.
2. See Document 129.
3. Document 127.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.