91. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Leonid I. Brezhnev, General-Secretary of Central Committee of CPSU
- Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
- Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
- A. Alexandrov-Agentov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
- Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
- Mr. Samoteykin, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
- Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
- Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
- Mr. Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
- Mr. John Negroponte, NSC Staff
- Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
SUBJECTS
- Basic Principles; Vietnam; SALT; European Security; Bilateral Relations;
- Announcement of Visit; Summit Arrangements; China
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have invested so much in the Berlin agreement that we are in favor of ratification of these agreements. In light of these discussions, we will see what additional steps we can take to assist ratification.
Brezhnev: We know that, and that is why we said we value President Nixon’s position regarding European matters very highly. I have said so publicly, too, in our Central Committee. My feeling is that European problems will be discussed in a favorable spirit.
Kissinger: We expect it too.
Brezhnev: We feel sure that when President Nixon hears what we have to say he will see that we are not trying to inject any “underwater rocks” in our European policy. We are not self-centered.
Kissinger: Will you be introducing new European matters at the Summit?
Brezhnev: We would like perhaps to have something to say on the European Conference. The general position and attitude of the U.S. [Page 276] Administration is known to us, that is to say, agreement in principle. What is needed is just a few specifics. By that time we may have ready in written form how to conclude a European Conference, that is to say the basic principles for a European Conference. Possibly even before the May meeting, we could agree on or discuss certain additional points bilaterally.
Kissinger: You will find it easier to discuss with President if there have been prior exchanges, so he’s not confronted with entirely new matters when he gets here.
Brezhnev: We will follow the channel.
Kissinger: May I raise in this connection the problem of mutual force reductions? In your considerations regarding the European Security Conference, has your thinking reached the point where you would be willing to have parallel discussions on force reductions?
Brezhnev: Just to return to European affairs generally, there will be discussed the ratification of the treaties, the Berlin agreement, agreement on principles of convening a conference, and the relation of the GDR to the FRG. Then on a purely confidential basis we would certainly like to know the answers to such questions as when the U.S. would support the admissions of both Germanies to the U.N.
With respect to force reductions, that question is one that we do not intend to withdraw from the agenda, but perhaps it is one that should not be linked too closely to the Summit so as not to impede matters of top priority. But at some stage we would be ready in the future to discuss it on a confidential basis bilaterally. Of course, the general portent of our proposals on this score is to have the least possible number of troops in Europe, reducing to a minimum the risk of war in Europe. At some stage, we will certainly start to talk to you on this. Even if at first there is only a very slight reduction, the mere fact of a reduction will have a tremendous significance. It will be a token of our desire for a reduction of tensions and a token of goodwill and spirit of confidence. No one is implying that we will have 3 million and you will have 600. There can be no unacceptable proposals made in this field. Mutually acceptable principles will have to be found. There can be no unilateral advantage.
Kissinger: How about if side by side with preparations for a European Security Conference we begin discussions on reductions, directed at basic principles?
Brezhnev: In general, that would be a very good thing. But what we both have to bear in mind is that the merging of these 2 issues would divert attention from the main issues. Because it is to be foreseen that with respect to a European Security Conference hundreds of questions will come up. Luxembourg, Switzerland, Denmark can all raise questions.
Kissinger: You like chaos.
Brezhnev: On the contrary. So let’s get this question out of the way first.
[Page 277]Kissinger: We do not think force reductions should be discussed at a European Security Conference, because a European Security Conference is a much larger forum. We think a force reduction should be discussed in a parallel body among the countries whose forces would be reduced.
Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, of course it is certainly possible that the Conference itself could say something favorable on approaching it. Perhaps the Conference could set up a special body or another organization with the necessary diplomatic and military personnel—naturally with the participation of countries concerned. On this question, we could use our bilateral channel to conduct quiet and steady discussions on this. But at the forthcoming meeting, we should register our general attitude and desire to advance to a European Security Conference.2
Kissinger: Assuming that ratification goes through, which we expect, we are prepared to do this. But our attitude is that side by side, we would have discussions on this subject in a separate forum.
Brezhnev: We are certainly in agreement to start in the confidential channel. As soon as we feel we have come to a common approach, we can then involve more openly the others who are concerned. Because of course attitudes and positions of states in this are different. Brandt at the Crimea asked me, should we also discuss Luxembourg and its 94 policemen? Should this be covered?
Kissinger: That is consistent with his practice of always getting to the fundamentals of an issue.3
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Memcons. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Guest House on Vorobyevskii Road. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 139.↩
- In a subsequent meeting on April 24 from 11:15 a.m. to 1:45 p.m., Brezhnev made a similar appeal to Kissinger: “Also, we [the United States and the Soviet Union] should, we feel, take the necessary steps for the preparation and convening of a European Security Conference. I am sure you understand well and can convey this to the President.” (Memorandum of conversation, April 24; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Memcons) For the full text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 159.↩
- On April 24, Kissinger sent Nixon a message regarding his trip to Moscow. With regard to a European security conference and MBFR he wrote: “Brezhnev at least agreed to consider our concept of separate explorations on MBFR in parallel with those on a European Security Conference. We have no assurance he will actually carry this out, however.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Memcons) For the full text of the message, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 161.↩