159. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • Leonid I. Brezhnev, General-Secretary of Central Committee of CPSU
  • Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
  • Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
  • A. Alexandrov-Agentov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
  • Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
  • Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Council
  • Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff


  • Vietnam; Middle East; Nuclear Non-Aggression Pact; Economic Relations; European Security; Summit Preparations; Announcement of Kissinger Visit

Dr. Kissinger: [Referring to the disparity of attendees on the two sides]2 You trust more people than I do.

Brezhnev: I can send them out!

Let me say first, I think we have done most important work in the last few days. Let us be as constructive as possible.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.


Brezhnev: I would like to ask you if you have anything new to communicate to us.

Dr. Kissinger: No, Mr. General-Secretary, I don’t really have anything new. I have summed up my impressions to your Ambassador which I will report to the President. I am convinced that the Soviet side is sincerely interested in making the Summit a major departure in U.S.-Soviet relations, that it is not just a tactical move, but affects every aspect of your behavior, even personal. We’ve made very great progress in this visit which practically guarantees the success of the Summit. What has before been a political concern has now become a human concern.

I have told you and your Ambassador our concerns on Vietnam; I don’t believe a useful purpose is served by repeating myself. It is the only obstacle on our side in the way. If the Vietnamese deal with us [Page 606] seriously, we will deal with them seriously. But not while we are being put under military pressure.

Brezhnev: How did the President react to all the communications you were able to send him from here?

Dr. Kissinger: I haven’t given every detail, because I did not want too many experts to analyze every proposal before I got back. I have communicated just the spirit of our talks.

Brezhnev: So as not to squander all the baggage you’re bringing back.

Dr. Kissinger: You understand me better than I thought.

Brezhnev: No, it’s natural. You did all the negotiating.

Dr. Kissinger: The President sent me a cable,3 part of which I have read to your Ambassador, that he thinks the Moscow Summit can be much more significant than the Peking Summit. This reflects his attitude.

I am sure the President will consider the principles4 we have agreed to an historic achievement, and I am convinced that except for minor modifications, the SALT proposal will be considered a constructive one. I will confirm it to your Ambassador Friday. But I’m certain that will be the reaction.

Brezhnev: Thank you for your communication. I guess that now we should be endeavoring to sum up the results of our discussions.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly.

Brezhnev: Summing up the results, we have said many things on the significance of the forthcoming meeting. We have emphasized that the meeting may be not only useful but also historic and perhaps epochal. On the other hand, we have also talked of circumstances that make the Summit meeting impossible. This is not a way of attempting to bring pressure on you; understand me correctly on this point. The Summit after all was born not only with due regard for American wishes but also on the basis of reciprocity on our side. It is certainly understood on both sides that the possible results may prove to be important from the standpoint not only of our two countries but also world politics. If results are viewed from the point of view of what they can do to reduce international tensions, that would be a weighty [Page 607] political asset for both, and would be welcomed everywhere in the world.

In addition to what we have already discussed on Vietnam, I would add a couple of words more. Now it is the most acute question which may reverse the entire course of events. Both agree this is indeed the case and we’ve discussed many constructive things in this place.

As we see it, you have still not received a reply from Hanoi on your latest proposals, and we have not either.

Dr. Kissinger: Have you transmitted our proposals?

Brezhnev: No, since there was no direct request from your side. We would be prepared to if you express the wish.

I want to voice a thought that is constantly in my head. According to your proposals to Vietnam, there is to be a plenary on April 27, followed by a private session on May 2. I have no knowledge of their position, but what if the Vietnamese suddenly suggest May 6, or May 1, or May 5? Are there any reasons why an alternative between May 2 and 6 couldn’t be accepted? I see it as a purely procedural matter, not to be elevated into a principle.

Success always depends on one’s approach. Even a slight break in the clouds can be covered again. I merely wish to mention this again, not for the sake of further discussion. I do not think a procedural question should be turned into an obstacle to success.

On the general points, I see no need to repeat ourselves; all our views have been set and I have nothing further to add. That’s all I have to say on Vietnam. This is the one remaining problem. I am sure you will faithfully communicate to President Nixon not only our formal proposals but also the general spirit of give and take, and I am sure he will react perspicaciously to all you have been saying.

Dr. Kissinger: Could I say something on Vietnam now?

Brezhnev: Please.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General-Secretary, there are two things to be considered. First, the Vietnamese have now three times cancelled private meetings to which they have agreed. Considering our attitude to private meetings, this has to be considered. As your Ambassador can testify, for me to plan a trip is extremely complicated. It is a question of courtesy. It is also technically a problem. Secondly, substantively, we have made a major concession in agreeing to go to a plenary meeting, contrary to our public declarations, without assurances of progress or any stopping of the offensive. We agreed to this because as a great power we should not indulge in petty childish maneuvers. If we have a plenary on April 27, and a second is held on May 4, there will have been two plenaries without a private meeting. As I said, for technical [Page 608] reasons, a meeting after May 2 is impossible. A date earlier than May 2 would be possible, but a date later than May 2, no.

As for our proposals, if you were prepared to communicate them to Hanoi, it would be considered a great courtesy.

I showed the note we received from the North Vietnamese5 to your Ambassador, who sees more of these than our Foreign Ministry.

Brezhnev: Maybe Rogers’ post should be abolished.

Dr. Kissinger: Or may be Dobrynin should be given an official function.

Brezhnev: He has a second post—the channel.

Dr. Kissinger: Our policy is, anything that comes to the White House is never let out of the White House. All of your communications go only to President.

The North Vietnamese in their note said they could come to a private meeting one week after they were notified of a plenary. We gave them nine days. So we were accepting their proposal. I just wanted to explain to the General-Secretary that we were not giving an ultimatum.

Brezhnev: I was on no account speaking for the Vietnamese. I was just thinking what if, perhaps, they might suggest May 2nd, not May 4th. The point I was making was that this should not be a stumbling block to progress.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Brezhnev: I was speaking merely from the point of view of, let’s say, you wanted to come to Moscow on 21 April and we wanted 22 April. If you insisted, we would have agreed. We would not treat it as a matter of principle.

Let’s turn to other matters.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we understand each other’s positions.

Middle East

Brezhnev: I’d like to give you additional text by way of explanation on the Middle East.6 As we see it, the gist of the conversations [Page 609] Gromyko had with the President and with Dr. Kissinger7 remains valid, and now the problem is to somehow formalize this in some kind of arrangement, without making public any of the provisions outlined in those conversations. I think we should formalize these provisions in some way.

Dr. Kissinger: Formalize where?

Brezhnev: In the form of some kind of closed agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: At the Summit, or can it wait until September? [Alexandrov enters]

Brezhnev: I had meant at the Summit, but in as narrow a circle as the President wants it to be, without the presence of the entire delegation.

Nuclear Non-Aggression Pact

Brezhnev: I have one other matter to pass on confidentially to the President. The form is not important, we would be ready to accept any form suggested by the President. It would be of immense significance if we could formalize, if not in this document, maybe in some special document, an understanding that our two countries will not use nuclear weapons against one another.

I feel that would be a “peaceful bomb” whose explosion would have a very positive effect and would be aimed at improving the general international situation and at lessening international tensions. As to form, we would be prepared to do it in a treaty or an agreement. The form is not important, but the principle is important. It would be of great interest to the governments and peoples of the U.S. and Soviet Union. If the President for some reason feels that this question should be discussed for the time being in the confidential channel, we would agree to that too.

Economic Relations

Brezhnev: I’ll not now burden you with remarks on other matters such as commercial matters, such as Most Favored Nation treatment. I have been informed by my comrades, and we accept them with satisfaction. Trade is a question of importance to our two countries. There [Page 610] would be no problem also with cultural ties or environmental cooperation. I am sure solutions to these will be reachable by both sides and will be appreciated by both sides. On the economic side, I have spoken of large-scale point ventures; we feel this would appeal not only to business circles but also to the people. It would be beneficial to both sides.

European Security

Brezhnev: I don’t know if you have received the news of the Elections at Baden-Württemberg.8 [He has difficulty pronouncing the name.]

Dr. Kissinger: The Germans can make even the names of states sound like profound philosophical statements.

Brezhnev: Or make it sound as if one land is bigger than the Soviet Union! These elections have shown that no great sensations have taken place.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: I mention this just by way of information. Since that is the case, now is a decisive moment when our two countries should take the necessary steps to further ratification of the treaties and to sign a protocol on West Berlin. This is something we are duty bound to do. This is way we see it. We’ve exchanged views. I would merely like you to point this out to the President. Also, we should, we feel, take the necessary steps for the preparation and convening of a European Security Conference. I am sure you understand well, and can convey this to the President.

Summit Preparations

Brezhnev: I would also like to recall our arrangement at the start that we would be frank, and to make one small comment. We can’t understand why, and for what reason, in the period of the most intensive preparatory work for the Summit, a campaign of anti-Sovietism has been fanned in the U.S. We know anti-Sovietism has been around for a long time in the U.S., but the fanning and intensification now we do not understand. We could reply, but I just wanted to mention it. Convey this, and the tone of my remark, to the President. As we see it, this is an unnecessary business.

[Page 611]

Let me now finally sum up the results of our work. You and I have done a big job, a necessary and useful piece of work. I don’t know about my colleagues, but I know that the President will be pleased with what you have done. I say that in all seriousness. But that isn’t main note on which I would like to end. I have been thinking of our past, our present and our future.

I don’t know in whose interests this is—in the interests of what circles this is being done—but it is clear to us that in the years since the war, everything in the U.S. has been geared to creating and spreading an impression among lending circles and among the American people, a spirit of mistrust of the Soviet Union, depicting the Soviet Union as a dangerous and menacing state bringing war and promoting Communism. That has been the general trend in the U.S. What it has yielded the U.S. and the Administration, I don’t know. But it certainly does not promote good will, and it hurts relations between our two countries and world peace. No words can characterize the false nature of these ideas.

What we have achieved in preparation for the Summit has not been done for the movement. I want to state here what I have said publicly. Without forfeiting or sacrificing our principles, we are going forward to the Summit with an open mind. Our attitude is one of principle, and not dictated by any momentary considerations. We are interested. As a matter of principle in cooperation and in lessening tensions, and that will be our attitude in the future—not only in relations with the U.S. but on a global scale. With each passing year, we will be able to make step after step in improving peace, advancing to our great goal that the two greatest nations in the world should act in a way promoting peace, resolving all problems in the world by peaceful methods.

Tell the President that our actions are not and will not be dictated by momentary considerations, both in relations between us and in global policies.

That is the summary of the results. One very small comment on the nuclear question. I would like that part of our conversation not to be registered in a piece of paper but only in our oral conversation.

I have had a brief look at the announcement. Except for some minor alterations, it is generally acceptable, with the understanding, that the content of our talks will not be public either in the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: You can be absolutely certain.

Brezhnev: After this, I can shake your hand and wish you a safe return. I will hurry back to inform my colleagues, but you can be sure I won’t go back on anything I have said here.

As regards further exchanges, I trust they will continue thru the Kissinger/Dobrynin channel. Such exchanges are necessary to bring all problems to the point where they are ripe for solution.

[Page 612]

Though this is a secret visit, you have had a chance to see something of Moscow, and you will have seen that preparations for the Summit are under way not only in substance but also in other areas.

Dr. Kissinger: I have been very impressed.

Brezhnev: There is nothing artificial. This is the normal work of the day.

Dr. Kissinger: Even the most anti-Soviet person in the U.S. could not call the General-Secretary an artificial individual.

Brezhnev: There is nothing “synthetic” about me. I am living flesh.

Dr. Kissinger: That is obvious. Mr. General-Secretary, may I make a few observations on what you have said.


Dr. Kissinger: First, I cannot leave any misunderstanding on Vietnam. We have no flexibility on May 2. It can be earlier, but it cannot be later. But we have discussed that. It would be physically impossible. May 8 would be the next possible time.

European Security

Dr. Kissinger: As regards Germany, my analysis of the situation is the same as that of your Foreign Minister, if I understand him correctly. I have not seen our official analyses yet, but my personal analysis is that there has been a slight weakening of the Brandt Government but not a significant weakening of the Brandt Government.9 In my judgement—again I am only speaking personally—it means that the treaties will be rejected by the upper house and will therefore have to come back to Parliament to pass by an absolute majority in June. It is my judgment that they will still pass. We will use our influence where we can.

Brezhnev: America can certainly speak in a loud voice when it wants to.

Dr. Kissinger: As I told the General-Secretary, when I return I will discuss with the President what we can do. Having worked so long on the Berlin agreement, we want to see it achieved. It is one of the useful results of the exchanges between the President and the General-Secretary.

Brezhnev: I trust you will convey the general tenor and our tone to the President on our policy toward Europe, which contains nothing bad for Europe or for the U.S.

[Page 613]

Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure. We will see what we can do, possibly a letter to the Chancellor, or something else.

Brezhnev: This requires looking at things thru realistic eyes, and perhaps everything will fall into place. I’m not in any way suggesting any concrete steps, because I am sure the President knows better. To help your own ally. I already told Chancellor Brandt in the Crimea10 that we had nothing whatsoever against the allied relationship between the FRG and the U.S. I am sure Chancellor Brandt told the President this but I wanted to reassure you.

Dr. Kissinger: We will approach it in a constructive spirit. I will communicate thru the special channel. I will see your Ambassador Friday, but I can tell you now we will approach it in a constructive spirit, and with a desire to get the Treaties ratified.

Brezhnev: Good, thank you. I like living examples. Now the time it will take to achieve the results we want—a true mutual understanding—will depend on the speed and size of the steps we take. There is a story of a traveller who wants to go from one place to another village. He does not know the distance; he knows only the road and his goal. He sees a man along the road chopping wood, and asks him, How much time does it take to get to that village? The woodsman says he doesn’t know. The traveller is somewhat offended at woodsman, because he is from there and surely must know. So the traveller heads off down the road. After he had taken a few strides, the woodsman calls out, “Stop. It will take you 15 minutes.” “Why didn’t you tell me the first time I asked?” the traveller asked. “Because then I didn’t know the length of your stride.”

I think this example applies also to foreign policy.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good story. Certainly our intention is to take big strides.

Brezhnev: Good. By the time we meet again, we will be able to tell whose stride is larger, the Soviet side or the American side.

Nuclear Non-Aggression Pact

Dr. Kissinger: On the renunciation of nuclear weapons, I agree with the General-Secretary that we should exchange further communications thru the special channel, so that we can decide what is possible and how to handle it. Let’s not do anything in other channels, because that will lead to a stalemate.

[Page 614]

Middle East

Dr. Kissinger: As regards the Middle East, I have explained to the Foreign Minister yesterday and your Ambassador can confirm, the realities of what can be done in America with respect to any agreement that may be reached. As an objective reality, it will be impossible to complete any agreement before mid 1973. We cannot do it before the elections, and cannot do it immediately after the elections. November and December will be taken up with constituting a new government. And the agreement can be done only by the new government.

Brezhnev: I understand that. But I feel that an agreement in principle should be achieved and set down at the Summit.

Dr. Kissinger: Secondly, we have this problem. The President must be able to come back from the Summit and be able to say truthfully that no secret agreements were made. Therefore, I suggest we have a preliminary discussion at the Summit. Then when I come back in September, we could talk of completing an agreement. We will keep our word.

Brezhnev: We are not speaking in terms of a formal agreement at the Summit, but there has to be an understanding on the substance. Otherwise, it would go against what Gromyko and the President agreed in September.

Dr. Kissinger: Gromyko made a proposition. We listened to it. We agreed to discuss it; we did not accept it.

Gromyko: The President said we would seek agreement at Summit. It was said that if we reached understanding, the question would be solved.

Brezhnev: This is a question that requires complete clarity on our part. That is the way we responded to the report of the conversations Gromyko had with you. It is a difficult matter how to formalize what is agreed. I want to make one substantive point. There is in Egypt today a vast army, nearly 100,000 strong. I tell you this only confidentially.

Dr. Kissinger: You can be absolutely sure.

Brezhnev: It is also necessary to bear in mind that the general situation in Egypt may unfortunately come to the point where they can get out of control. You know we steadfastly seek a solution. But there are processes at work. The Army is becoming excited. In fact an Army as big as that cannot stay tranquil all the time, especially in these conditions. Conditions such that at some stage it may get out of control, and the entire situation may take a different character.

When we part, I have to attend some meetings with my colleagues. We will discuss other matters, but they’ll certainly ask questions on this: What can be achieved at the Summit on this, and what do we have to leave for the September phase?

[Page 615]

Dr. Kissinger: We can begin immediately a discussion of principles in the special channels. At the Summit, these principles can be elaborated on, and we can show a positive direction. And we are prepared to make a public arrangement on what the Foreign Minister calls an interim solution. So, it is hard to predict which part will be left open. We can certainly indicate a general direction at the Summit.

I have told your Foreign Minister about the aspects of your proposals which present major difficulties for us. For two years, there were considerable theoretical discussions which were divorced from reality. What we promise, we will do. But I want to make sure we promise what we can deliver. If we use the same ingenuity we showed in negotiating the Berlin accord, and given the ingenuity your Foreign Minister possesses, we should be able to have agreement at the Summit. It depends on how hard we work in the interval. We will do it with a good will and intention to have major progress at the Summit. There are really only one or two points which need clarification.

Brezhnev: I’ll tell you honestly. I certainly cannot say that satisfies me. As Gromyko told me clearly,—I have complete confidence in him—concrete things were discussed in Washington in September. Implementation could not begin until after the elections, but a principled agreement could be achieved at the Summit. That is what I understood.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

Brezhnev: I had thought that this matter had been in principle agreed on, and that we were now beginning to think along the lines of how to speak to the Arab leaders without divulging the origins. But as things stand now, I do not know how to talk to Sadat, in particular. If I’m deprived of this weapon, that is the agreement with you, I don’t know how we can approach the Arab leaders without causing an explosion.

I certainly appreciate the fact that Dr. Kissinger may have certain justified problems and difficulties in giving a lucid answer just now, but I would like to agree that exchanges should begin without delay in the channel to clarify matters as agreed in the conversations between the President and Gromyko.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me briefly review the situation. When your Foreign Minister was in Washington, we were talking hypothetically, about how to handle an agreement if there was one. Then we studied for two months whether there was a possibility of fruitful discussions between us. We then started discussions and decided there was a possibility. These discussions have not yet yielded concrete results. If there are concrete results by the Summit, of course we will carry it out. We are not opposed to an agreement; we don’t have an agreement. We have kept our word. What is left for September is a purely optical problem.

[Page 616]

[At this point, the General-Secretary left the room for a moment.]

Gromyko: Do you have a record of my conversation with you?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I did not accept your proposal. I said your proposal of withdrawal was positive, and a major concession. I didn’t accept the details, but said I would talk with Dobrynin to try to work it out.

What did the President say to you?

Gromyko: He said, “I do see a good basis for a possible agreement,” and suggested I talk it over with you. And you said that a final agreement of substance should be taken at the Summit. If we agreed, there would be no problem and you would bring pressure. And we’d divide it in two parts, one public and one confidential.

Dr. Kissinger: That part is not the problem.

[The General-Secretary then returned.]

Brezhnev: The situation is made complicated by the fact that you are using diplomatic language and I am just a realist politician. Therefore, I have found a provisional way out. Don’t look so glum.

Dr. Kissinger: No, no.

Brezhnev: To confirm what I said in my letter to the President.11 Agreement should be reached in the spirit of the conversations with Gromyko, and the President said12 he regarded with approval the ideas I put in the letter, and this I interpreted to mean we had an agreement. Since your thinking must be close if not identical to that of the President, the only way out is to have an agreement, leaving the details for the channel.

Dr. Kissinger: Your Foreign Minister has reported to you correctly. What he said here is correct. I think we are confusing two things—the substance of an agreement and the mechanics of carrying it out. On substance, if we can reach substantial agreement before the Summit, we can confirm principles at the Summit. The problem here is that we don’t have an agreement. Therefore we should work on the substance and not on what happens when. My position is identical to the President’s. In fact I have a certain role in drafting these letters.

Brezhnev: I certainly know the part you play.

Dr. Kissinger: I suggest we get to work to see what we can accomplish before the Summit. We certainly favor completing the maximum amount at the Summit, and perhaps all of it.

[Page 617]

Announcement of Visit

Brezhnev: Can I say that I have certain doubts about the feasibility of announcing your visit? Because we did all we could to keep it confidential, and now the situation is that we will have to divulge the fact.

Do you think it is completely unavoidable in the United States?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: [Pause] OK [khorosho].

May I ask you to convey my best wishes to President Nixon and the hope that he will attentively and with a spirit of understanding attend to all we have discussed—Vietnam, Middle East, Soviet-American relations, and European matters. Tell him we will continue, as we have, our intensive work thru the channel, in which on our side all our important people will be taking part, and on your side mainly the President and Dr. Kissinger. Some of those asides I made to you when we were out walking.13 I hope you will recall and convey to President Nixon.

Dr. Kissinger: I will.

Brezhnev: I have to leave now, to chair an important internal meeting. We have discussed all substantive issues. May I wish you further success.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General-Secretary. Let me thank you for your courtesies. I return to Washington with even greater determination to make the Summit a success. I know from the cables the President has sent me that he feels we have an historic opportunity, and this is the spirit in which he comes here.

Brezhnev: I am pleased.

[The formal meeting broke up at 1:45 p.m. After a short break, an informal meeting began with Foreign Minister Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger on the text of the announcement of the Kissinger visit.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Memcons. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Guest House on Vorobyevskii Road.
  2. All brackets in the source text.
  3. Document 157.
  4. Before the final meeting with Brezhnev, Kissinger gave Dobrynin the latest U.S. redraft of the Soviet proposal for a joint document on “Basic Principles of Relations.” The text, including Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten revisions, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Exchange of Notes. For the draft Nixon took to Moscow in May, which is nearly identical to the version Kissinger gave Dobrynin on April 24, see Document 233.
  5. See footnote 11, Document 134.
  6. The unofficial translation and the Russian original of the second Soviet note on the Middle East are both in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Exchange of Notes. In addition to the “final settlement” outlined in their previous note (see footnote 5, Document 141), the Soviets suggested several provisions as the basis for a “confidential arrangement” between the superpowers. These provisions included the withdrawal of most Soviet military personnel from Egypt and the mutual limitation of arms deliveries throughout the region. Although they hoped to formalize the confidential arrangement at the summit, the Soviets recognized that its implementation “would begin immediately after the election in the USA and would be completed in the very beginning of 1973.”
  7. During his annual visit in late September for the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly, Gromyko also visited Washington, meeting Nixon at the White House on September 29 and Kissinger at the Soviet Embassy on September 30. The memoranda of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969– 1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.
  8. In a handwritten note to Kissinger, intended as preparation for the meeting with Brezhnev on April 24, Sonnenfeldt argued that the clear victory of the CDU in the Baden-Württemberg state election “will look ominous to Soviets.” In view of Brezhnev’s plea that Nixon intervene before the election (see Document 139), Sonnenfeldt offered the following advice: “B[rezhnev] may believe we could have done something. Let him believe it. You held out hope, indeed virtually promised to do something before May if Brandt survives.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 230, Geopolitical File, 1964–78, Soviet Union, Trips, 1972, April, Notes)
  9. Later that evening, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group submitted a motion for a constructive vote of no confidence in the Chancellor, the first time the maneuver had been attempted in the history of the Federal Republic.
  10. Brandt met Brezhnev at Oreanda in the Crimea September 16–18, 1971. Kissinger’s assessment of the meeting, is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 331.
  11. Dated September 7, 1971. The letter is scheduled for publication in ibid., volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.
  12. See Document 6.
  13. Reference is to the private remarks on Vietnam and the summit that Brezhnev made to Kissinger between meetings on April 22; see Document 148.