361. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
  • Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium and Chief, USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Minister
  • Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Yuliy M. Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
  • Yuriy E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Minister
  • Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
  • Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., American Ambassador to the USSR
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
  • Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
  • William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
  • Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff


  • Cyprus; CTB and Ban on New Systems; Korea; MBFR; Middle East

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]


[Kissinger:] Before we turn to our main subject, do you have any ideas on the direction we might take in Vienna? Or is the present framework. …?

Gromyko: First, some time ago you will recall you intimated to me, in Vienna or in Geneva, that you were considering discussing in the framework of the Vienna talks new types of arms. Notice I don’t say “new systems”! But since then we have seen nothing new in the Western positions. So we come to the conclusion there is no new Western view.

That is my first point. My second point is: we feel now that what is being demanded of us by the Western side is completely unjust. All [Page 1062] these bargaining points—and that’s what they are—are impossible. We are told we have too many tanks. And we should just take them out—just for a thank you. And all this is called a mutually advantageous agreement. Maybe I’m exaggerating a little bit, but all this really conveys the spirit of what is happening in Vienna.

Now my third point is: It may well be that soon we may have the urge to discuss this again, maybe on a bilateral basis with the United States, before we decide on what further steps we may take in Vienna. I don’t want to be ahead of myself, but this may happen.

Kissinger: It is not excluded.

Gromyko: Not excluded.

Kissinger: Its rejection is not guaranteed. I’m practicing double negatives. But I’m a minor leaguer!

Can I interpret your beginning remarks about nuclear weapons to mean that if this were included, our proposals might look less unequal?

Gromyko: We said in Vienna that it would certainly facilitate matters if there could be a broader approach, both with the number of states involved and the types of arms. But it seems not to have been developed further.

Kissinger: We are studying it, and the possibility of including it is not excluded.

Regarding your third point, we would be interested in bilateral exchanges on that before major steps are taken in Vienna, because it might facilitate matters.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union, August to September 1975. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The dinner meeting took place in the Monroe–Madison Room at the Department of State. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.