Attachment
Executive Summary of a Report Prepared by the
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board3
Washington, December 2,
1976.
INTELLIGENCE FOR THE FUTURE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
General
The report does not present a prioritized inventory of intelligence
requirements for the future. It is, rather, an overview of the
problems, potentials and prospects which lie ahead for the
intelligence community and derivatively, for those whom intelligence
serves.
Conceptions of the future being fallible, judgments in the report
must be subjected to extensive, critical evaluation. We view this
process, wherein certain perceptions will be discarded and others
modified, as a proper utilization of a report of this nature.
Further, we hope that similar endeavors will be repeated at regular
intervals to keep pace with the dynamics of change.
Observations
The Board rates of overriding importance, the development of
initiatives to restore public understanding and trust in
intelligence and intelligence institutions. This can be an important
adjunct to security legislative and fiscal support for intelligence
programs; to the passage of legislation for the protection of
sensitive intelligence sources and methods; to the maintenance of
security discipline by personnel within the intelligence community;
and to sustain the ability to recruit people of integrity and high
competence.
Strategic weapons intelligence and the Soviet Union will remain
predominant targets. However, the role of tactical and technical
intelligence in support of military commanders must continue to be
given adequate attention in the decade ahead. In particular, as the
U.S. faces a growing need to import critical commodities,
maintenance of unhampered sea lines of communication will be
essential. Fulfillment of this mission could be jeopardized by a
Soviet naval threat of growing so
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phistication. Effective intelligence is the
first step towards coping with this threat.
The future significance of economic intelligence will be dependent
upon several factors: refinement of analytic techniques which
minimize the flow of redundant and irrelevant data; sharpening of
requirements so that the policy-makers’ genuine needs are addressed;
recognition by producers that comprehensive analysis must
incorporate all relevant disciplines—political, military,
technological, as well as economic; and improved means of tapping
the economic expertise of the private sector. We underscore the need
for a continuing, close working relationship between principal users
and producers to assure that these factors are given proper
consideration.
The Board has reviewed and references in its report several recently
published studies by the intelligence community which contain a
number of innovative and technological approaches aimed at improving
intelligence for the future; certain of these approaches are very
encouraging and will be given detailed consideration by our
successors. Also enclosed with the report is a two-page summary of
Findings and Recommendations from an April 1976 report by a Board
subcommittee which assesses National Intelligence Estimates and
makes suggestions for their improvement.
Among the most important innovations to pursue, we believe, are:
—a breakthrough in automating the processing of foreign language
voice intercepts to aid in reducing voluminous data collected
without loss of important intelligence;
—[less than 1 line not declassified] to avoid
loss of intelligence capabilities at critical intervals;
—means for reducing the vulnerability of our space reconnaissance
systems [less than 1 line not declassified]
and by developing the capability to produce greater numbers of less
sophisticated, less expensive systems;
—comprehensive examination of the government’s responsibility to make
the public aware of, and to provide the means of thwarting,
intrusions to privacy by foreign intelligence services and the
illegal efforts of private citizens intercepting communications and
computer data links;
—refinement of the concept of “competitive analysis,” following
completion of the experiment being conducted under the auspices of
the DCI concurrent with production
of this year’s NIE on Soviet Forces
for Intercontinental Conflict;4
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—a means of seeing that which is hidden, as we face increasingly
sophisticated efforts to conceal and deceive.
The concept of “streamlined” management, born 20 years ago with the
inception of our space reconnaissance program and employed since in
the operation of that program, needs to be carefully preserved. The
imposition of layers of administrative and budgetary review will
ultimately prove more costly, less effective and potentially
destructive of the unique capabilities of this program. To preserve
streamlined management the issuance of new guidance from the
President will be required.
Recommendations
As an aid in determining future capabilities and limitations in the
intelligence system, we recommend that 3 to 4 models of the world 20
years hence be developed, under the auspices of the National
Security Council so as to reflect a senior, policy-level consensus
of the ranges of probabilities in world relationships, and that the
Director of Central Intelligence undertake a community-wide
estimation of the intelligence system’s performance under each of
the projected futures.
Crises stemming from nuclear weapons proliferation and acts of
terrorism will involve the Chief Executive more frequently in the
decade ahead and effective intelligence in these areas will be
vitally important. To assure its availability and utility, we
recommend that the subject and structure of intelligence support to
crisis management be given the most thorough review. This review
should be directed by the National Security Council.
Concealment and deception by the Soviets require greater attention
and novel approaches to better understand and cope with the serious
vulnerabilities they pose to U.S. security interests. We believe a
major contribution toward greater understanding could be achieved by
a 1–2 year study effort conducted by a “tiger team” of highly
competent analysts, insulated from daily bureaucratic life, and
given access to all relevant intelligence and operational data. We
recommend that the Director of Central Intelligence evaluate such a
proposal with a view towards its early implementation.
With respect to certain kinds of intelligence such as weapons
systems, the decision-makers’ real need is for a “net assessment” of
the opposing forces. Issues such as capabilities of Soviet ICBM, and the Soviet air defense
system really ask whether U.S. Minuteman missiles are vulnerable to
Soviet attack and whether the B–52 will be effective against Soviet
defenses. Net assessments will grow in importance and a renewed
effort is required to determine how they can be performed and within
what institutional framework; a proposal is currently before the
Board.
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Soviet technological innovations, especially in their military and
economic applications, warrant the keenest attention by the
intelligence community. As the USSR breaks new ground, unfamiliar to the U.S., the
prevention of surprise will become more difficult. Special efforts
at targeting Soviet research and development are warranted. We urge
that the DCI take a new look at
this problem with the view of recommending a more intensive and more
imaginative effort in the future.
How the U.S. is perceived by others, both adversaries and allies,
will remain a key issue for intelligence, and grow in importance as
the U.S. continues efforts to rely on credibility, rather than
force, as the means of sustaining foreign policy relationships.
Previous intelligence community efforts to assess foreign (USSR) perceptions of the U.S. are
applauded; we urge that they be made more comprehensive and that
they be kept current.
The past decade has seen an emphasis on technological improvements in
intelligence collection systems. Human source collection and
analytic processes have not experienced corresponding advances. A
vigorous effort needs to be undertaken to achieve major improvements
in these human aspects of intelligence: the recruitment of agents;
the management of data; and in-depth understandings of foreign
relationships.
There are nearly 2,000 Communist bloc officials resident in the
United States; each year, in excess of 4,000 Soviets enter the
United States as commercial or exchange visitors; and 200 Soviet
ships call at 40 U.S. deep-water ports. Counterintelligence records
demonstrate that a high percentage of the individuals in each
category are intelligence or security officials. Currently, five
separate agencies engage in foreign counterintelligence activities,
each on its own. There is no U.S. counterintelligence policy and no
coordinated statement of counterintelligence objectives. A
Presidential review of the U.S. counterintelligence policy is
required as a basis for the formulation of a national
counterintelligence policy and a statement of counterintelligence
objectives.
Security discipline of personnel within the intelligence community
has been difficult to maintain in the face of a culture which has
come to abjure secrecy; we endorse Deputy Secretary of Defense
Ellsworth’s suggestion
that a blue ribbon commission examine these changed values in
American society with a view to determining how to restore adherence
to the principles of confidential service to the government.
