The Operations Advisory Group (OAG) has developed a statement of criteria
to facilitate the determination of the types of covert action operations
authorized under your first Presidential Finding (Tab A).
You will recall that in your first Presidential Finding, required by
Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act,2
[3 lines not declassified]. This proposed
statement of criteria reflects our experience in carry[Page 269]ing out your wishes, including the
provisions of your Executive Order 11905 concerning foreign intelligence
activities. The purpose of the proposed criteria is to eliminate
ambiguity by defining your intent more precisely.
The first pages of the criteria statement review pertinent legal and
authorizing provisions, [1½ lines not
declassified]. In this connection, we have explained what we
understand to be your intent in making [less than 1
line not declassified] (paragraph 7). Paragraph 8 describes
procedures whereby CIA may check to
insure that tasks [less than 1 line not
declassified] are consonant with U.S. policy. Paragraph 9 cites
considerations in determining when an activity previously authorized by
a Presidential Finding has undergone a “significant change” or resulted
in a “new initiative” which would require a new Presidential Finding.
Paragraph 10 cites operations which require OAG review and approval and
Presidential Findings. Paragraph 11 requires reports to the OAG on those
routine activities authorized by [less than 1 line not
declassified] Presidential Finding.
I believe these criteria would clarify and amplify in an area where there
has been some confusion and would facilitate the OAG handling of the
responsibilities you assigned it in Executive Order 11905. If you accept
the unanimous recommendation of the OAG members and observers that you
approve the criteria, I will distribute them as an annex to my operating
guidelines for the OAG.
Tab A
Statement Prepared by the Operations Advisory
Group4
Washington, November 4,
1976.
SPECIAL ACTIVITY REVIEW AND APPROVAL CRITERIA
1. The purpose of this paper is to describe those “special
activities” that must be reviewed by the Operations Advisory Group
(OAG) either [Page 270] because they
require a Presidential Finding and reports pursuant to Section 662
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or because they
involve significant changes in previously approved “special
activities.”
2. Under Section 3(c) of Executive Order 11905 (19 [18] February 1976), it is the function of the OAG, the
successor to the 40 Committee, to
consider and develop a policy recommendation . . . for the President
prior to his decision on each special activity in support of
national foreign policy objectives
and
[c]onduct periodic reviews of programs previously considered by the
Operations Group.5
3. “Special activities in support of national foreign policy
objectives” are defined by Section 2(c) of Executive Order 11905 to
mean:
activities, other than the collection and production of intelligence
and related support functions, designed to further official United
States programs and policies abroad which are planned and executed
so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or
publicly acknowledged.
Annotations of Executive Order 11905 (10 March 1976)6 define “special activities in
support of national foreign policy objectives,” to mean covert
action.
4. The Chairman’s Guidelines for the OAG dated 19 July 1976 implement
the provisions of the Executive Order cited above.7 The Guidelines require
that
Operations subject to OAG review shall include those for which
certification (a Presidential Finding) by the President as
‘important to the national security of the United States’ is
required by Section 662(a) [Page 271]
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or similar
operations conducted by agencies other than CIA.
In addition,
new initiatives and significant changes (in terms of money or
political impact or operational direction) in previously approved
special activities will be submitted to the OAG as proposals and
will be considered in a formal meeting. The OAG’s policy
recommendation, including any dissents, will be submitted to the
President prior to his decision.
5. Section 662 was added to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974. It
stipulates that
[n]o funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act
may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency
for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended
solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the
President finds that each such operation is important to the
national security of the United States and reports, in a timely
fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the
appropriate Committees of the Congress, including the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives.
The legislative history of Section 662 indicates that the intent of
the Congress was to bring CIA
covert action operations under a new system of controls and
accountability, and that the words “operations in foreign countries,
other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary
intelligence,” as used in Section 662, were in fact a reference to
covert action operations.
6. In accordance with the Executive Order and the Guidelines,
proposals for covert actions to be carried out by CIA will be submitted to the OAG. The
OAG will develop a policy recommendation for the President. In
circumstances where a Finding as to the national security importance
of the activities is required by Section 662, that requirement will
be made known to the President. If the President makes a Finding,
the DCI, under delegation by the
President, will be responsible for reporting it to the appropriate
congressional committees.
7. The President has made a number of specific Section 662 Findings
and these have been duly reported by the DCI to the appropriate committees. [2
lines not declassified] which have also been reported by
the DCI to the appropriate
congressional committees, authorize CIA to continue to:
[3 paragraphs (11 lines) not
declassified].
The overall purpose [less than 1 line not
declassified] was to permit the CIA to carry out routine covert activity—[2½ lines not declassified]—without imposing
on the President a requirement that he make a sepa[Page 272]rate Finding with respect to each such
action. The [less than 1 line not
declassified] also included the following language:
. . . I [the President] also find important to the national security
of the United States the support necessary to the tasks and
operations covered by this Finding.
The main purpose of this language was to provide the CIA with authority [less than 1 line not declassified] to conduct covert
action operations, as for example, to pay salaries and overhead, to
pay for the procurement of items to support CIA [less than 1 line not
declassified] activities, and to pay the costs of the cover
and security support for these activities. In addition, this
language authorizes tasks that are incidental to approved covert
actions, as for example, withdrawal from an unsuccessful action.
8. In carrying out the routine covert actions [less
than 1 line not declassified] the CIA will make a determination when employing and
funding foreign personalities that such actions are in support of
current United States policies. In tasking its [less than 1 line not declassified] CIA may look to specific proposals
recommended by the OAG and approved by the President, guidelines
approved by the Department of State [less than 1
line not declassified] as the U.S. Government policy on
international issues or on other foreign developments as to which
U.S. interests could be advanced by covert means with limited
political risk, or where time is of the essence may receive specific
guidance from the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs or such office as the State Department considers
appropriate, in which case CIA
shall report such guidance to the OAG at its next meeting.
9. No CIA activity, other than one
“intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,” may be
carried out without a proposal for such activity being submitted to
the OAG and approved by the President, unless that activity has
previously been the subject of a Presidential Finding under Section
662. Where a CIA activity,
previously the subject of a Presidential Finding, will undergo a
“significant change” or may constitute a “new initiative,” such
change or initiative must prior to execution be submitted as a
proposal to the OAG and approved by the President. A “significant
change” or a “new initiative” shall be deemed to exist if the effect
of the change is likely to have a substantial political impact, if
the change is likely to increase significantly the risks of
exposure, if the change involves a significant increase in money to
be expended from that contemplated in the Finding under which the
activity is authorized [3½ lines not
declassified], or if there is any significant change in
operational direction. In cases of doubt the Chairman of the OAG may
determine whether a “significant change” or “new initiative” is
involved, in which case he shall report his conclusion to the OAG at
its next meeting, or he may refer the question to the OAG.
[Page 273]
10. The following matters shall always require OAG review and
approval, [less than 1 line not
declassified]:
a. Any programs involving [2½ lines not
declassified] including operations which use [1½ lines not declassified]. For purposes of
this paragraph programs shall include, but are not limited to,
substantial enlargements of routine covert actions. In determining
whether other matters are programs, CIA shall consider the contemplated length of time of
the activity, the financial resources to be utilized, commitments to
other countries, attendant risks, and likely political impact.
b. Any proposal to enter into a cooperative relationship or provide
financial support [2½ lines not
declassified]. This does not include the funding [1½ lines not declassified] where the
intention is to employ such person primarily as an intelligence
source. In these latter circumstances, OAG review and approval are
not required.
c. [5 lines not declassified]
d. Any paramilitary program, [2½ lines not
declassified].
e. Any counterinsurgency program where involvement extends beyond
mere support or improvement of CIA’s intelligence collection capabilities through
cooperative foreign intelligence and security services or the
improvement of the intelligence collection capabilities of these
services. For these purposes such programs include civic action or
any covert use of U.S. Government personnel to promote institutional
or other forms of national development. However, such programs do
not include counterintelligence advice and technical assistance or
counterterrorist training or training in intelligence collection
techniques directed against international narcotics, given to
cooperative foreign intelligence and security services by CIA to counter international terrorism
and narcotics traffic. [1½ lines not
declassified]
f. [4 lines not declassified]
11. Because routine covert actions [1 line not
declassified] do not require the prior review of the OAG
and the approval of the President, they shall be reported to the OAG
as part of the OAG’s periodic reviews of programs previously
considered. Such reports shall include [3 lines
not declassified]. In addition, [less
than 1 line not declassified] shall be reported by
generally indicating the State Department [less
than 1 line not declassified] followed and the general
extent of the [less than 1 line not
declassified].
