Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

65. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Moscow¹

Washington, January 22, 1976, 0137Z.

15449/TOSEC 10103. Subject: Highlights of Draft Pike Committee Report. For Secretary from Eagleburger and Saunders.

1. This telegram is to give you an initial sense of the main elements of the current draft of the Pike Committee report. The Committee staff provided CIA with a copy “as a courtesy,” saying that the Committee would be “interested” in the Agency’s comments while maintaining that the Committee’s final report is not subject to the agreement regarding access and disclosure of classified material which Pike reached with the President last September.² We are participating in an effort to assure that, at a minimum, material which remains classified is not published in the report. The report is currently scheduled to go to the printer on January 27, and the Committee is meeting now to make its decision on the handling of classified material.

2. The headings of the table of contents are described at the end of this telegram. The highlights of the report which are of special interest to you are described in the next few paragraphs. We should point out in advance that, while the charges collected in one place as they are below are infuriating, for whatever consolation it is worth they are scattered through a 340-page report with long stretches of unrelated material between.

3. Overall. The tone of the report is set in its opening pages: “If this Committee’s recent experience is any test, spy agencies that are to be controlled by Congressional law-making are, today, beyond the law-maker’s scrutiny. These secret agencies have interests that inherently conflict with the open accountability of a political body, and there are many tools and tactics to block and deceive conventional Congressional checks . . . . In short, the words were always words of cooperation; the reality was delay, refusal, missing information, asserted privileges, and on and on.” The entire first section of the report is devoted to a description of the Committee’s experience and the various devices which the report charges that the administration used to thwart its investigations. In a number of cases throughout the report, the text falls back on the assertion that the administration succeeded in withholding certain information and therefore definitive judgments are not possible in the report. The report goes on to discuss the dilemma of secrecy: “. . . There must be a responsible system of classification, accompanied by an equally responsible and effective system of declassification. We have neither.” Following that setting of the stage, the report goes on to indicate first that the costs of our intelligence operations are 3 to 5 times as large as the Congress has been previously led to believe and examines a series of “intelligence failures” to make the point that the American people are not getting their money’s worth, either in intelligence collection and analysis or in covert action.³ On top of that, the program is subject to a number of abuses such as domestic intelligence investigations and manipulations such as the alleged “political control of intelligence in connection with the SALT ‘hold’ system.”

4. Of particular interest to you are the following which are spread throughout the report. These are presented more or less in the order in which they come up in the report.

A. Davies death.⁴ “There sits before the Committee, for example, unresolved testimony that Dr. Kissinger himself may have received a closely held intelligence report identifying the people who killed the American Ambassador, Rodger Davies . . . and that a public protest has perhaps not been raised because these same murderers are now officials of the Cyprus Government. Questions related to that intelligence report should, and must, be cleared up.”

B. Boyatt testimony.⁵ The charge is repeated that, in connection with the “silencing” of Boyatt, you asserted a “new doctrine that can best be characterized as ‘Secretarial Privilege’.” In this case, a footnote also carries your statement: “I have deliberately not asked the President to exercise Executive privilege, nor am I asserting a Secretarial privilege.”

C. Subpoenas. The draft asserts that the 3 subpoenas directed to the Secretary of State “not surprisingly . . . went unanswered.” This, of course, ignores the fact that a response was sent to the Committee in the form of the assertion of Executive privilege. In a seeming internal contradiction, the draft report later discusses the assertion of Executive privilege. It goes on to discuss the contempt citation, concluding that “access to information, even when it was backed up by subpoena, was not satisfactory.”

D. Secretiveness. Several cracks are taken at “the passion for confidentiality and secrecy at State.” With regard to the SALT material, the assertion is (a) that material was restricted within the US Government while the “Russians and other adversaries were either directly informed by Dr. Kissinger of the same secrets the Committee sought, or that Russians knew of them by other means.” Much later, in the report’s discussion of the intelligence failure before the Middle East war: “There was testimony that Dr. Kissinger’s penchant for secrecy may also have thwarted effective intelligence analysis. Kissinger had been in close contact with both the Soviets and the Arabs throughout the pre-war period. He, presumably, was in a unique position to pick up indications of Arab dissatisfaction with diplomatic talks, and signs of an ever-increasing Soviet belief that war would soon break out. When the Committee was denied its request for high-level reports, it was unable to learn whether Kissinger elicited this information in any usable form. It is clear, however, that the Secretary passed no such warnings to the Intelligence Community . . . . Despite the obvious usefulness of this information, Dr. Kissinger has continued to deny intelligence officials access to notes of his talks with foreign leaders.”

E. SALT. There is also a section on “SALT—Political Control of Intelligence.” The theme is: “The prime factor in this situation is Dr. Kissinger, with his passion for secrecy and his efforts to concentrate power and to consolidate ultimate control of important intelligence functions, through his various bureaucratic roles.” It charges that “In the final stages of the SALT talks, US negotiators did not fully consult or inform intelligence experts who had been key figures in previous treaty sessions.” It notes that “only Russian technical experts were on hand” and that “Dr. Kissinger’s private talks with Soviet leaders in this period were not disseminated.” It asserts that “ambiguities which plague the accord and benefit the Soviets may have been the result of US policy-makers’ self-imposed intelligence blackout at the critical moment.” It then goes on to say that the “record indicates that Dr. Kissinger, US architect of the accord, has attempted to control the dissemination and analysis of data on apparent Soviet violations of the SALT pact.” It describes the “hold” status and concludes that “the sector of important information, suggesting Soviet violation of strategic arms limitation, purposely withheld for extended periods of time from analysts, decision-makers, and members of Congress, has caused great controversy within the Intelligence Community. In addition, it has raised questions as to the President’s own knowledge of and concurrence with, the ‘hold’ procedure.”

F. Backgrounder on Angola. In connection with the Angola operation, the report notes that the President’s letter refusing declassification of material on this subject went to the Committee at a time when “one of the items that allegedly would harm this nation’s security if made public had already been made public—by Dr. Kissinger.” A footnote then refers to a backgrounder on your aircraft en route to Tokyo on December 8, which described a statement attributed to “a senior official” as “the first administration acknowledgment of US involvement in Angola.”

G. Intelligence failures. The report then discusses “intelligence failures” in regard to the Tet Offensive, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1973 Middle East war, and Portugal. In addition to the points made above on the ’73 war, the report charges a US failure to track war developments which “may have contributed to a US-Soviet confrontation and troop alert called by President Nixon on October 24, 1973 . . . . Thus misled, the US clashed with the better-informed Soviets on the latter’s strong reaction to Israeli ceasefire violations . . . . Poor intelligence had brought America to the brink of war.”

H. On Angola: “Past support to Mobutu,⁶ along with his responsiveness to some of Dr. Kissinger’s recent diplomatic needs for Third World support, make it equally likely that the paramount factor in the US involvement is Dr. Kissinger’s desire to reward and protect Mobutu in Zaire. The US expressed opposition to the MPLA is puzzling in view of Director Colby’s statement to the Committee that there are scant ideological differences among the 3 factions, all of whom are nationalists above all else.”

I. With regard to the Kurdish operation: “It appears that, had the US not reinforced our ally’s prodding, the insurgents may have reached an accommodation with the central government, thus gaining at least a measure of autonomy while avoiding further bloodshed. Instead, our clients fought on, sustaining thousands of casualties and 200,000 refugees. . . . It is particularly ironic that, despite President Nixon’s and Dr. Kissinger’s encouragement of hostilities to keep the target country off balance, Dr. Kissinger personally restrained the insurgents from an all-out offensive on one occasion when such an attack might have been successful because other events were occupying the neighboring country. . . . Despite direct pleas from the insurgent leader and the CIA Station Chief in the area to the President and Dr. Kissinger, Dr. Kissinger personally refused to extend humanitarian assistance to the thousands of refugees created by the abrupt termination of military aid.” A footnote describes how measures were taken to insure that the State Department did not gain knowledge of the project and that the Ambassador was “responsive to Kissinger rather than the Department of State.”

J. Wiretaps. There is a rather routine 3-page discussion of “electronic surveillance—the Kissinger wiretaps.” It revolves around a decision to install “a wiretap on the residence of a National Security Council Staff on May 9, 1969.” It states that “significantly approval for this ‘national security’ wiretap was not requested until May 10 . . . and was not approved by Mitchell ⁷ until May 12.” It later uses the phrase “the FBI’s national security wiretap installed for Dr. Kissinger,” but it does not otherwise go into the question of responsibility.

K. On Cyprus, it notes that various factors “give rise to speculation that US officials, knowing that a coup was imminent, may have simply allowed it to happen by not strongly, directly, and unequivocally warning Ioannides⁸ against it. The Committee has been unsuccessful in obtaining closely-held cables to and from the Secretary of State during this period including a message the Secretary sent to Ioannides through the CIA the day after the coup. Accordingly, it is impossible to reach a definitive conclusion.”

5. To give you some sense of the scope of the report, the main headings in the table of contents are described below:

I. The Select Committee’s Oversight Experience.

A. Access to information: Delay; cut-off; silenced witnesses; flank attack—an attack averted; deletions; privileges; more delay; routine problems; the right question.

B. Congress and the secrecy dilemma: Oaths and agreements; selective briefings; special restrictions; the release of information.

II. The Select Committee’s Investigative Record.

A. Costs: Deceptive budgets; an absence of accountability; spending abuses—covert procurement—local procurement—accommodation procurements—research and development—colleges and universities—US recording co.; budget secrecy.

B. Performance: Tet: Failure to adapt to a new kind of war—the order of battle controversy—the consequences—the aftermath; Czechoslovakia: Failure of tactical warning; the Mid-East war: The system breaks down; Portugal: The US caught napping; India: Priorities lost; Cyprus: Failure of intelligence policy; domestic internal security and counterintelligence—Institute for Policy Studies—Socialist Workers Party; President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; National Security Council Intelligence Committee; the management and production of Defense intelligence.

C. Risks: Covert action—ten year survey—election support—media and propaganda—paramilitary arms transfers—organizational support—trends—three projects; intelligence collection–submarines—interception of international communications—manipulation of the media—CIA presence in the Executive branch—CIA relationships with US and foreign police, domestic intelligence investigations—programs as abuses—law enforcement turned law-breaking; SALT: Political control of intelligence.⁹

III. Recommendations (we have not received this section).¹⁰

Sisco

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders and approved by Saunders and Eagleburger. Kissinger was in Moscow January 21–23 for talks with Brezhnev and Gromyko. In telegram 14881/TOSEC 10112 to Kissinger, January 22, the Department requested decisions on how to handle the Pike Committee’s charges. Kissinger authorized Saunders and Eagleburger to approach members of the Committee whom Eagleburger judged “might be prepared to help us in modifying the report in an effort to try to get them to work to remove the most grievous errors” and to prepare a draft response to “those portions of the Pike Committee report that are the most misleading and unfair.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 411, Congressional Hearings, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee), Chronological File, Jan.–Apr. 1976, n.d.) Fact sheets refuting the Committee’s charges were prepared and cabled to Kissinger in telegram 17297/TOSEC 10182, January 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)
2. See Document 50.
3. On January 20, the New York Times published an article on the estimated costs of CIA involvement in Angola and Intelligence Community failures to predict the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the outbreak of the 1973 Middle East war, the 1974 coup in Portugal, and India’s explosion of a nuclear device, based on portions of the Pike Committee report it had obtained. (John M. Crewdson, “House Committee Report Finds C.I.A. Understated Prices of Angolan Arms,” New York Times, January 20, 1976, p. 1) On January 21, the Washington Post published an article claiming that Kissinger overruled CIA and Department of State objections to covert operations in Angola, Italy, and Iraq, citing excerpts of the “secret” Pike report. (George Lardner, Jr. and Laurence Stern, “Pike Draft Critical of Kissinger,” Washington Post, January 21, 1976, p. A1)
4. Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger Davies was murdered in Nicosia on August 19, 1974.
5. See footnote 3, Document 54.
6. Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaire, 1965–1997.
7. Attorney General John N. Mitchell, 1969–1972.
8. Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannides, Chief of Greek Military Security in 1974.
9. On January 29, the House voted 246–124 to block the release of the Pike Committee report. On February 11, excerpts of the report were published by The Village Voice. On February 13, CBS journalist Daniel Schorr acknowledged that he had passed a copy of the report to The Village Voice, prompting the House Standards of Official Conduct Committee to announce an investigation of the leak on February 19. Public hearings were held July 19–21, with some members of the House Ethics Committee charging that the Pike Committee had failed to take adequate measures to ensure the secrecy of the report’s classified material. A subpoena was issued on August 25 for Schorr to testify on his role in the leak. Although he refused to answer the Committee’s questions in his September 15 appearance, the Ethics Committee on September 22 voted 5–6 against recommending Schorr’s prosecution. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 196) Schorr’s account of his role in the leak, the investigation, and its aftermath is in Clearing the Air, pp. 208–284.
10. On February 10, the Pike Committee adopted 20 recommendations for Intelligence Community reform. In addition to proposing strengthened Congressional control over intelligence budgets, including the creation of a new standing committee, the Committee recommended empowering the General Accounting Office to conduct a management and financial audit of all branches of the Intelligence Community. The Committee also called for the creation of a Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the NSC to advise the President on proposed covert intelligence operations, the membership of which would include the Ambassador of the affected country and the Assistant Secretary of State for the affected country’s region. Moreover, assassinations and paramilitary activities were to be illegalized except in time of war and covert operations could be authorized for no longer than 12 months. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 194–195) Unlike the main body of the Pike Committee’s final report, the report’s recommendations were released to the public on February 11. (United States House of Representatives, Select Committee on Intelligence, Recommendations of the Final Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976)