62. Executive Summary of a Draft Report to President Ford by an Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Group1
I/R–75/S–665
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Executive Summary
The primary objective of the foreign intelligence community is to provide quality intelligence on a timely basis to both policy-makers [Page 197] and operational officials. Any organization and management of the Community—its collectors, processors, and producers—must be shaped to accomplish this objective. To assure public confidence and support, organization and management must be structured to prevent potential abuses and to make maximum use of limited resources.
Demands from Congress for information on intelligence operations and substantive intelligence will force the Intelligence Community to operate in a more public arena. Diffusion of political and economic power, proliferation of nuclear and sophisticated conventional weapons, and growth in terrorism are creating broader demands for timely integrated analysis. Ever-increasing demands for high quality intelligence assessments, especially in crisis situations, will require increased use of advanced technological systems as well as the more traditional human intelligence sources. Any restructuring of the organization and management of the Community must respond to these challenges.
Executive Branch safeguards are necessary to prevent potential abuses. Options include: (1) guidelines defining the scope of permissible intelligence activity and (2) mechanisms to improve Executive Branch oversight.
To improve quality and direction in the Intelligence Community, four major structural options—three requiring legislative action—are examined:
#1: Creation of a new expanded intelligence agency, headed by a Director of Intelligence, with resource and line control over the national programs—the CIA Program (CIAP), Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), and the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). This option is based on the premise that national programs are best managed if centrally funded and controlled, and that gains from centralization outweigh disadvantages resulting from separation of collectors from their primary consumers.
#2: Creation of a Director-General for Intelligence (DGI) with resource control over the CIAP, CCP and NRP, but line control only over his immediate staff. This option is based on the premise that a central leader with resource control and without a vested interest in any one element of the Community is needed. Option #2A differs from Option #2 by giving the DCI line control over present CIA production elements.
#3: Creation of a Director of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) with broad coordination powers but neither resource nor line control over any part of the Intelligence Community. This option is based on the premise that an intelligence leader, independent of any organization within the Community, would be best able to coordinate its activities, and that the Defense Department requires a major voice in resource and line control of intelligence assets. Option #3A differs from Option #3 by decentral [Page 198] izing intelligence production responsibilities through transfer of present CIA production elements to the relevant departments.
#4: Retention of current Community relationships with the addition of a second full Deputy to the DCI with management responsibility for the CIA and perhaps with expanded or restructured Executive Committees and production responsibilities. This option is based on the premise that major organizational changes may be undesirable, and that improved Community leadership structures are possible through administrative action.
The study also discusses moving the covert action capability out of CIA and placing it in a new, separate agency.
Finally the study also discusses certain possible management improvements.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M01044A, Box 5, Bush Files (Eyes Only) Reorganization Report. Secret. Scowcroft directed the preparation of this study by an ad hoc group in his November 14 memorandum, Document 58. Ogilvie chaired the group. Lynn forwarded the complete 56-page draft to Ford under an undated covering memorandum. Lynn also forwarded the study for comment to Kissinger, Simon, Rumsfeld, Levi, Colby, and JCS Chairman Brown under a December 16 covering memorandum. The transmittal memoranda and agency responses are in the Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M01044A, Box 5, Bush Files (Eyes Only) Reorganization Report. A summary version of agency responses prepared by Ober for Hyland, December 19, is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Outside the System Chronological File, Box 3, 12/19/75 (1). The final report, titled “Intelligence Community: Decision Book for the President,” comprising four chapters and three appendices, was sent to Ford on December 22. (Ibid., Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 6, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Intelligence Community Decision Book (1)–(2)) The decision book formed the basis of a January 10 meeting to discuss intelligence reorganization options. See Document 64.↩