Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

37. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 28, 1975, 2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
• Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
• John O. Marsh, Jr., Counsellor to the President
• Phillip W. Buchen, Counsel to the President
• Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

• Congressional Investigation of CIA

President: I know you wanted to discuss intelligence. We have set up a group here under Phil. Brent, Jack and Don are on it. We think this is of the highest importance. We look at each request to determine what should go up to the Hill, what shouldn’t, and why. I wanted you to have this background. I would appreciate your thoughts.

Buchen: The USIB also reviews it.

Schlesinger: I take that with a grain of salt. In these times it is less of a community than usual. There is demoralization and contention as to what should be done. Within the CIA there is bitter dissension.

One of my points is that in this period it is difficult for the DCI to serve as leader of the intelligence community as in the 1971 directive.² We thought that the DCI should have a management job, operations would be left at Langley and the production would be brought closer to the White House. President Nixon didn’t want legislation so we went for a hybrid. The difficulty is that it is difficult for the DCI to be a manager and also to run the covert and other business. You can change it by patching it or by going for new legislation. The Hill will do it eventually, but maybe you should go in in nine months or so with an organization which would put clandestine operations in a less exposed position such as MI6.³

President: Who is under the DCI now?

Schlesinger: The line responsibility is CIA. He is also the chairman of the Executive Committee. If Bill becomes spokesman for other elements of the community, it tends to pollute the whole community.

Buchen: The DCI also has management responsibility throughout the community.

Schlesinger: There has been a DCI staff for years, but it wasn’t effective until I and Colby got there.

[There is a discussion about the Director and two hats.]

These arrangements are very fragile right now. Reducing the prominence of CIA operations is desirable in this climate.

If you look at restructuring the intelligence community you should look at a restructuring of the personnel field—it is now full of tired-out old agents.

President: Wouldn’t any proposal for a new intelligence community be submitted in the worst possible atmosphere? Just as the argument against a new director now.

Buchen: We are looking into the structural business quietly.

Schlesinger: In the interim, we have a job of patchwork.

[There is a discussion of separating the DCI from Director of CIA.]

Colby is inclined to be too damned cooperative with the Congress.

Rumsfeld: Colby is not sending papers up against our instructions, but 90% of the contacts we can’t control.

Schlesinger: [1½ lines not declassified].

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 10, March 28, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, Marsh, Buchen. Confidential. All brackets except that accounting for still-classified material are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 242.
3. MI–6, officially the Secret Intelligence Service, is the British external intelligence agency.