32. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- 40 Committee Meeting, Saturday, 1 February 1975, 10:30 AM
Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General George Brown, and Director of Central Intelligence William Colby.
Also Present: Lt. General John W. Pauly, William G. Hyland, William Wells and Lt. General Brent Scowcroft.
Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting by asking Mr. Colby in what order he wanted to discuss the agenda.
Congressional Relations
Mr. Colby replied that he’d better bring the group up to date on his relations with the Congress first. He said he had made arrangements with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to brief Senators Sparkman and Case; they would keep records and they would tell other members that they had been briefed. He said he would brief Holt2 [Page 67] also (the committee’s Chief of Staff). He had yet to solidify arrangements with the House, but Morgan has indicated that he wanted to reactivate a subcommittee of about 11 members.
Dr. Kissinger said this would be impossible. He had talked to the President, and we won’t authorize any covert operations until we get this straightened out. How can you expect other countries to work with us? Maybe I ought to name an Assistant Secretary of State for Covert Operations since I get blamed for them anyway.
Mr. Colby said he told Congress that he would go off the record on any details.
Dr. Kissinger asked how he could do that when House members have access to the committee records?
Mr. Colby said it could be done; they won’t be able to see them all.
Dr. Kissinger said that the President plans to call in the Congressional leadership and explain this problem to them.
Mr. Colby said they are aware of the problem but don’t know how to deal with it. They just don’t know what to do.
Dr. Kissinger said we must discuss this. We will not approve anything until we get this straight. If we approved operations in Portugal and then it leaked, we would be playing right into the hands of the Communists. We can’t do it.
Working Group
Mr. Colby said that one special item in his long report on worldwide covert initiatives3 was the proposal to establish a 40 Committee Working Group.
Dr. Kissinger said he could not see where this would work.
Mr. Colby said it was hard to get this group together.
Dr. Kissinger said, with all deference, you haven’t had anything for us to do.
Mr. Colby cited Portugal [less than 1 line not declassified].
Mr. Clements, Mr. Sisco and Dr. Kissinger all said they disagreed with the [less than 1 line not declassified] proposal.
Mr. Colby said Dr. Kissinger had asked him to come up with ideas on what could be done; he was asked for initiatives.
Secrecy
Dr. Kissinger said that the major problem is . . .
Mr. Colby said “Congress.”
[Page 68]Dr. Kissinger continued . . . and having an intelligence organization that can do something in secret.
Mr. Colby said that he needed a law that said it was a crime to reveal secrets and that he did not have that now.
Dr. Kissinger said we can’t approve any covert operations until we can guarantee secrecy. He talked about a leak from a recent NSC meeting and that the President said later that he thought it was the policy that what went on at NSC meetings was kept secret. Dr. Kissinger said he assured him that was correct. He discussed a case involving the Pentagon where the details should have been kept secret but because they leaked, the policy must now be reversed. We are going to look too dangerous for anyone to do business with us. We must establish the integrity of the intelligence community. We have got to decide who is going to testify before these Congressional committees so that we can organize things. The President is ready to invoke executive privilege. We don’t want NSA to be looked at. They aren’t wiretapping, are they?
Mr. Colby said there were many ex-NSA employees who might want to talk.
Mr. Hyland said John Marks4 might contribute to NSA revelations and there would be others.
Dr. Kissinger declared again that the President would invoke executive privilege.
He wants to know who is going to say what before they begin to spout off. What can NSA be charged with?
Mr. Colby said they could be charged with listening to Americans.
Mr. Clements said that was right and that he had reported this.
Mr. Colby said there were three information levels: First, what could be made public; second, what was classified and you would hope to protect; third, what could not be talked about or leaked at all. You are going to have to discuss some of the second-level items; if you don’t you can’t win at all.
Dr. Kissinger said to let the President decide—if you need a Presidential order to hide behind you can get it. He asked for each intelligence agency to give him a summary of what shouldn’t be given out—decisions to be made on merit, not whether the agency thought it could protect the information or not—and let the President decide what to do.
Mr. Clements warned that what was going to happen was a shotgun approach calling on people right and left to testify. He thought General Allen should not testify.
[Page 69]Dr. Kissinger asked who is to testify? We will have a conflict with the Congress on this. The President will explain to the Congressional leadership, and we will go to the courts if necessary.
Mr. Clements said that if anyone was called to testify he should not go until he has checked.
Dr. Kissinger said we must coordinate policy on testimony. He mentioned Vietnam as an area that would be exploited.
Mr. Colby said he was not worried about Vietnam—he thought all of that was out already—but he was worried about Europe.
Dr. Kissinger said that if we start unraveling intelligence operations we will lose our covert capability altogether. We’ve got to get some rules. The President will accept the responsibility.
Mr. Colby said he intended to establish some ground rules in an opening statement. He would refuse to give out names and details of operations. He would refer to items by continent, not by naming a specific country.
Dr. Kissinger suggested making recommendations to the President first, making clear what must not be revealed and what would be dangerous to reveal.
Mr. Clements said he wanted to see the draft.
Mr. Colby said he would comply.
[Omitted here is unrelated discussion.]
National Interests
Dr. Kissinger said this was not strictly 40 Committee business but that while they were all around the table, he wanted to emphasize that the President must determine what is in the national interest. There will be discussions with the Congressional leadership. His worry and mine is that in order to solve some other problems we may dismantle the intelligence community.
Mr. Colby said that the only way he saw out of the mess now was the Joint Committee idea—a small group.
Dr. Kissinger said that may well be the case; a small group; clear procedures. If we have to tell all, we might as well put covert action in State and assign it to INR. We cannot piddle away our intelligence community. The President will decide on how to deal with the Congress. He will do it for your protection.
Mr. Colby said that he would respond to Dr. Kissinger’s request for a memo re NSA.5
- Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1975. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on February 4. Attached to a February 4 covering memorandum for the record by Ratliff, summarizing the decisions taken in the meeting. Copies were distributed to Clements, Sisco, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown, and Colby.↩
- Pat M. Holt, Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.↩
- Not further identified and not found.↩
- A former INR officer, John Marks co-authored CIA and the Cult of Intelligence with Victor Marchetti.↩
- Not found.↩