Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

218. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 19, 1976, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Kissinger
• Deputy Secretary Robinson
• Under Secretary William Rogers
• Under Secretary Philip Habib
• Deputy Under Secretary for Management Eagleburger
• Mr. Winston Lord, Policy/Planning Staff
• General Scowcroft, Director—NSC
• Mr. Bill Hyland, NSC
• Jock Covey, notetaker

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with President-elect Carter

Kissinger: In the first place, none of these papers will do me any real good.² They are all self-serving bureau papers written to tell me how to suck eggs or how to lock Carter into my position.³

Lord: They really were intended only to bring you up to speed on certain specific issues like Panama.

Kissinger: Exactly what is the thrust of this Panama paper?⁴ All it says is that Ellsworth Bunker wants authority to negotiate the treaty before January. It is total insanity! If I were Carter, I would tell me to go to hell! Why should he tell us to go ahead with this unless it’s just to stick us with the negotiations? Even if he asks us to complete the negotiation, I will say it is out of the question.

O.K. Forget the papers—they are not going to help us now anyway. What is it I want to achieve in this meeting?

Hyland: It should probably be a factual analysis of where we are on the Middle East, on South Africa, SALT . . . maybe China or Europe . . .

Kissinger: My idea was to ask what he wants to hear about. Then I will tell him that if he wants to hear what I have to say then he will have to either reappoint me or start paying me. (Laughter) Let’s go through SALT.

Lord: The basic problem is you don’t want to look like a professor, but if he gives you a lead you should give a broad conceptual description.

Kissinger: I think I should probably give something of the broad historical evolution of SALT. Bill, can you do me a one page paper?⁵

Lord: I don’t think you want to lecture, but you should try to give some sense of what you have been doing in the past few years on SALT.

Scowcroft: I do not agree. That may be intellectually satisfying, but you don’t want to tell Carter where this administration was going.

Eagleburger: If he has sense, he is going to ask you to go around the world in 10 minutes. Then you can fit the Middle East, SALT, and everything else right into context.

Kissinger: Let’s start with SALT. What key things are we trying to convey?

Hyland: Well . . . maybe you should start with where we stand with the Russians, then go on to what we were going to do. But I am not sure how far you will want to go with him.

Kissinger: I think I should tell him everything.

Hyland: If you tell him what the alternative was that we would have pursued . . .

Kissinger: There is no need to go into that, but I can tell him what the two big issues are. First, the foreign policy aspect; and second, the domestic vested interests that lie in the Pentagon and how they carefully cultivated support on the Hill . . . and that the campaign reflected less of an ideological position than it did a refusal to let outsiders prescribe force levels . . . the outsiders being the people in State who were doing the negotiating.

Scowcroft: Maybe you should go further and start with SALT I.

Kissinger: Good point. I could lay it all out.

Hyland: I don’t know whether you want to tell him how he can get an agreement.

Kissinger: No, I don’t think I should. He can easily enough get the two options from DOD. And if he asks me what to do, I am not sure I will tell him. After all there is no need to get into a brawl over this. His position is totally opposed to mine.

Hyland: It is a nutty position.

Kissinger: I will tell him for you: “Mr. President-elect, you should know that Bill Hyland, who needs a job in your administration for a couple of months, says that your SALT position is nutty!” (Laughter) O.K. So I start with SALT I and then go on to SALT II—then what?

Hyland: Then you should go into how we tried to solve the problem with the Backfire/Cruise missiles. I will write it out for you.

Scowcroft: Did you see the latest Pentagon leak? It says that the Soviets are building a big-tanker aircraft. That way they can get around the Backfire problem by saying that it doesn’t matter that the Backfire doesn’t have strategic range because they can just refuel it.

Kissinger: There is no way the Backfire can be much better than the Foxbat.

Scowcroft: I can’t argue with you on that.

Kissinger: I bet we will find it has a steel frame, and that it therefore has even less range than we are saying now. And even if it did have the range to get to the U.S., what could it possibly hit.

Scowcroft: Whatever is left after the initial attack. After all, the Backfire carries 40% of the total megatonnage.

Kissinger: But if that is all it is doing it is ridiculous, because even Soviet cargo aircraft and Aeroflot are better equipped to carry that sort of tonnage at low altitudes.

Hyland: It is a complete phony, but don’t say that to Carter.

Kissinger: O.K. What was our last position? (Kissinger, Hyland and Scowcroft outline the details of the last SALT proposal for the U.S. and Russian sides. Then conversation is interrupted by a call from Dobrynin.)

There is proof that he has this office bugged! (Laughter) He was just calling to say that they will give agrément for Toon. That will make us some money with the Israelis.

Habib: What do you mean?

Kissinger: The Israelis will not be sorry to see Toon go. Then they can demand that the next Administration appoint an ambassador who does not speak English—only Hebrew. (Laughter)

Scowcroft: There is no reason not to say that the last negotiations broke down because of the difference of opinion within the bureaucracy.

Kissinger: How did it go again? DOD did not want to go below 2400, even though they had no program above 2150. And they wanted all SLCM’s and Backfire’s outside the agreement. They did not want the Cruise missiles to count for two years. Which happened to coincide with their developing the missile when they would not be able to deploy them anyway. Then those pinko commie bastards rejected it! (Laughter) How could they have done otherwise?

Maybe I should warn him that the Chiefs will be waiting for him with a hatchet about the difference between “nuclear armed” and “armed” missiles. You know a conventional warhead weighs more than a nuclear warhead. They will continue developing conventionally “armed” missiles and say that they don’t have to be counted. Then all they have to do is test the conventionally armed missile at the prescribed range. And if a conventionally armed missile will go 600 miles, you can bet your bottom dollar it will go almost twice as far with a nuclear warhead. This I have not dared to explain to the Russians yet. (Laughter)

O.K. I will just give him the evolution of the SALT position. Then on foreign economic policy, I think I basically understand the issues.

Eagleburger: What about OPEC?

Robinson: The question is whether or not Carter will join with Ford in urging the OPEC leaders to be moderate. He has already said that it is a good idea.

Kissinger: Yes, he should do some letter on his own.

Robinson: The question of Carter coming into this will change the picture for the OPEC leaders. A big increase will lose them leverage with Carter, but then they may just do it in June.

Kissinger: If they were rational, which they are not, they would hit us with a 20% increase right now. Ford really can’t do anything about it. Carter will not be nearly as mad now as he would be in June. We would retaliate less about a 20% increase now than we would about a 3% increase in June. But the real concern has to be the world economy. But my basic view remains that I do not think we should urge him to do anything except maybe in Africa.

Scowcroft: Why in Africa? Why is that so much more important?

Kissinger: It is a totally screwed up conference. What do you think I should say about Africa?

Lord: You should tell him that Ian Smith is not the problem.

Rogers: Give him a rundown on Rhodesia, and then the status of Namibia.

Hyland: Maybe you should go back to Angola—give him a rationale for being involved in Southern Africa in the first place.

Kissinger: Yes. That’s a good idea.

Habib: On OPEC, maybe you should give him an idea of how much increase we can take before we have to retaliate.

Kissinger: Can someone do some minimal talking points for the rest of Africa—Southern Africa I know pretty well. But it is the rest of Africa that I need some sort of overview for.

Hyland: Did you know that Slocum⁶ is on the DOD transition team?

Kissinger: That is crazy. He is a mad left-winger. You know I told Holaway⁷ the other day that he would remember these times fondly—that it wouldn’t be too long before he was standing at attention before some Senate committee vigorously defending a SALT agreement for which he would have called me a traitor. (Laughter) He said: “Henry, I think you are going to turn out to be right.” (Laughter)

Robinson: Speaking of your former dropouts—Fred Bergson⁸ came in to ask about economic assistance. He is on the transition team for foreign economic policy.

Kissinger: You know, every guy I fired for emotional instability has ended up in a key position. How long do you think this will last?

Eagleburger: Maybe two hours.

Kissinger: What if he asks about personnel? If he asks what qualities are needed, I can say what qualities he needs.

Eagleburger: But he won’t ask. Brent, do you think he will ask about the defense budget?

Kissinger: No, no, no. I will avoid the defense budget. But I will say he must have a Secretary of Defense who is responsive to him. The Secretary of Defense must not set himself up as an opposition group.

Rogers: You should tell him the problems he might have with the Chiefs.

Scowcroft: The Chiefs were not the problem.

Kissinger: Brent, the Chiefs are monsters.

Scowcroft: But it remains that they are not the fundamental problem. The Secretary of Defense is supposed to keep them under control.

Kissinger: What should I tell him about the NSC—that he should keep Scowcroft? (Laughter)

Scowcroft: Say that this process is essential, it is what keeps him in control of the federal bureaucracy.

Kissinger: I will tell him that he can do whatever he wants, but there must be some focal points.

Habib: I can remember when the NSC just wrote papers and reported to nobody.

Kissinger: The NSC was strong so long as Nixon was strong. But it started to weaken as soon as his influence wained. A strong Cabinet makes it difficult for the NSC to get ahold of issues because any Cabinet member has a strong personal interest in presenting their issues to the President personally. It makes them much harder to turn down.

What should I say about Cyprus?

Scowcroft: You should start with the coup.

Eagleburger: And say where we are with the Greeks and the Turks.

Kissinger: What about Latin America?

Rogers: You should tell him he starts with two strikes against him—human rights and Panama.

Eagleburger: There is also the Cuba problem.

Kissinger: Yes. I will have to give him a little idea of the philosophy—the importance of power and equilibrium.

You know it is scary. All the maniacs are ready to hit him on January 1. Take Gates⁹ for instance. A right wing Republican who now wants rapid normalization.

Habib: Maybe you should start with major problems.

Kissinger: No, I should just say I’m here to help, what can I do for you?

Eagleburger: If he is smart, he will then say “Go around the world in 10 minutes.”

Rogers: He may ask about Congress.

Kissinger: I will just say Mondale can tell him better than I can.

I have a lot of meetings until about 7:00. Can you guys come back then?

(Meeting adjourns until 7:15 p.m.)

Kissinger: It is interesting to note that I have here the only three people in the Department who are really affluent enough that they do not need jobs.

Lord: It only appears that there are three. There are in fact only two.

Kissinger: You guys should remember to take care of your friends. Look at Eagleburger, and Scowcroft and Hyland.

O.K. Let’s go over SALT again. People really have forgotten that 210 Soviet missiles were destroyed because of SALT I. All of which would have remained in force.

Hyland: The only option is whether to tell him what you think can be achieved.

Kissinger: No, I will tell him everything about where we are—the two options, what the Russians would have rejected . . . but I will not give my views. I do not want to have them be able to say I came there to sell my views.

Scowcroft: He may ask you what you would do.

Kissinger: No, I will not do that. Especially on the Middle East. I will not get whipsawed between him and the Israelis and the American Jews.

Eagleburger: That would be a good idea to follow for all issues.

Scowcroft: He may raise violations.

Kissinger: I will say every time the Verification Panel met where a Presidential decision was needed, there were leaks to the press. I will also say that the myth of State Department “softness” was not true. And I will tell him what the violations were.

(Kissinger and Hyland go into a technical discussion of what the “violations” were. Listing each in turn and detailing why they never became serious problems.)

Hyland: What if they ask are there any more secret agreements like the G-class submarines?

Kissinger: Then I will blow up. You know that was just a Jackson canard. As I remember it the issue was whether to count them into the total. (Secretary and Hyland go into details of the G-class submarine caper.)

Hyland: Jackson just seized on a loophole.

Kissinger: The real problem was with the moronic military on the Verification Panel.

Scowcroft: I am not sure you should crap on the military to such an extent that press stories leak out about you being bitter and defensive.

Hyland: Anyway there are no secret agreements.

Kissinger: Except that we agreed to drop the Trident submarine in the third year of SALT as a unilateral budgetary decision. (Laughter)

O.K. Rogers, talk for five minutes on Latin America.

Rogers: It is an area of special relations. Most of which is halfway up the development ladder. We have important bilateral and multilateral relations and have made special efforts to improve relations. There are some major issues but the one truly hemispheric issue is Panama.

Kissinger: What about human rights?

Rogers: That is a second common hemispheric threat. It is becoming a real dilemma in our relations and it is becoming increasingly obtrusive. Virtually every country in the hemisphere causes us a human rights problem.

Lord: The problem is to avoid mucking around in human rights. Particularly in this hemisphere.

Scowcroft: It is hard to talk about human rights without taking a position. Better not to discuss it at all and just let them screw it up.

Eagleburger: To the degree you can give a simple description of the problem, he can just give three sentences about it and go on.

Kissinger: If he asks?

Rogers: He says he wants to improve relations but also says he will beat them all about human rights. It is a probable contradiction. There is no truth that bilateral lecturing will improve relations.

Kissinger: And I shouldn’t tell him anything about what to do. If he asks, I will tell him about the new dialogue, the apparent opportunity to improve relations, and of the possibility of war between Chile and Peru—maybe Panama . . .

Habib: And something about Cuba.

Kissinger: And the dictatorial regimes that have emerged as a result of radical pressures. I just don’t know what he is going to ask for.

Eagleburger: The important thing is that he asked for this so he will be serious.

Kissinger: So what. I don’t want anything from him. Every guy he has appointed so far gives me the creeps. Even the guy you like Chuck [Robinson], this guy Bergson, he is very bright but very unreliable and immature.

Eagleburger: What about Dick Cooper?¹⁰

Kissinger: He is at least more mature, but he is also very unreliable. But I must say that both are extremely bright.

Habib: You should find some way to make it clear that the Department will be fully cooperative.

Kissinger: There can’t be any question about that.

Robinson: What about the Mexican financial crisis?

Kissinger: O.K. Talk for two minutes on the Mexican financial crisis.

Robinson: Lopez-Portillo is coming into a problem that he does not yet fully understand . . .

Kissinger: Can you explain this, Bill?

Rogers: The problem is a lack of confidence in the peso, and the dollarization of the economy. No one wants to hold pesos. They are all buying dollars. You know there was a run on the bank today.

Scowcroft: Because of the coup rumors.

Rogers: No, there have been coup rumors running around for three months. The crisis is coming to a head.

Robinson: The only way to solve the present problem is to expand oil production.

Kissinger: This I will not tell them. It is much too complex a problem to deal with under this Administration. And if it is dealt with as a government plan we will be back in the same mess with the Mexicans as we were in the ’30’s. They must go directly to the oil companies themselves.

It is also very clear to me that I should not volunteer what he should do, but at the same time I should be prepared to say something, if he asks. But what can I say? There are no solutions.

Rogers: No, that is not strictly true. You, at least, have some options. In the first place, you could do nothing. In the second, you could try to work out swaps. A third option would be to put out more public statements about our confidence in the Mexican economy, but this is basically a bad idea.

Kissinger: Why?

Rogers: The present problem stems from stories that Lopez-Portillo will be assassinated.

Kissinger: Echeverria could legally take over again if that were true. You know he cannot succeed himself, but that way he would not have a problem.

Rogers: They would have to go back to the collegiate process and no one is quite sure how that would work out. Luckily they have never had to test the collegiate process.

Kissinger: No Mexican President has ever failed to survive his term. But you ask a Mexican sometime how the President is elected. They will not tell you. But one thing is clear: they have worked out a way to keep those madmen under control. When they are through with the selection process, the three or four potential candidates have somehow been reduced to one, and the incumbent President has given his blessing.

Rogers: The successful transition depends entirely upon the transfer of the sash. That means everything to them. It is amazing, but it works . . . so far.

Kissinger: The question now is not what we do on December 1.

Rogers: No. You don’t know now what the situation in January will be. The transfer of power may go smoothly and the peso reserves may come flowing back. But then again, it may not go smoothly, and then they will have to consider some pretty stern measures.

Kissinger: O.K. What about Southeast Asia?

Habib: We should start with the fall of Indochina. Tell him how the area has managed to put together a new coalition concerned fundamentally with economic development. You can describe our present communications with Vietnam. I don’t think he will give you any trouble—he was not a problem during the election. The basic point is that we still have a role to play in Southeast Asia.

Kissinger: When I think back to the Kennedy years the problem is not whether we have a role to play in Southeast Asia. The problem will be that these guys will be trying to play a role everywhere.

Habib: It is all developing fairly well. There is nothing wrong with our relations with Southeast Asia.

Kissinger: May I tell him what I really think? That he will pay the price for the fall of Vietnam.

Lord: No. You should say that so far things are going well but the jury is still out on Vietnam. They have the fourth largest army in the world and it remains to be seen where their appetites will lead them.

Kissinger: Right. They have not yet digested South Vietnam, but when they do their potential for mischief will be tremendous.

Habib: The Thai will be the first to come under pressure.

Hyland: A lot of the people around Carter are saying that the first place we should start to withdraw troops is Southeast Asia in order to back-up our commitments to Europe.

Habib: That would be no problem in Southeast Asia. The problem would be troop withdrawals in Northeast Asia.

Scowcroft: You still have a lot of troops in the Philippines.

Habib: Only about 16,000.

Hyland: You know the Brookings [Institution] did a study . . .

Kissinger: This has been a Democratic strain for a long time. You know why Marshall ¹¹ said the Korean conflict was the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place, don’t you? Because it should have been in Europe . . .

Hyland: They think that the only real commitments are to Europe. These guys are committed to pulling troops out of Asia and pulling at least two carriers out of the Pacific.

Kissinger: It takes six carriers to keep two on station. That would mean that we could only keep one carrier on station.

Lord: If you want to drive Peking into Moscow’s arms the quickest way to do it would be to pull out of Asia.

Habib: You should mention Japan, too. The role they play is very supportive of our interests.

Kissinger: Do you think he will just go around the world? That would not be any good. If he asks for a tour d’horizon, I will just say “That is too broad—tell me what your general interests are.”

Hyland: He will want to ask about China.

Kissinger: For me that is no problem. What if he asks about Korean troop withdrawals? I will tell him our strategic position depends upon those troops; otherwise, we would have to increase our assurances, and that would increase a certain area of ambiguity that would have to be tested.

Habib: He doesn’t want to pull all the troops out, according to what he said during the campaign. And he said he would only do so in consultation with Japan and Korea.

Kissinger: What about Europe?

Eagleburger: The Italian Communists will be an issue. Also the UK financial crisis.

Rogers: There are several issues he might raise . . .

Kissinger: I will tell him flatly that I do not want to start an argument with him, but if he comes in with the assumption that relations with Europe are bad, then he is dead wrong. They are having some domestic problems, like those caused by Lockheed, but there are no real foreign policy problems between us and the Europeans.

Rogers: We are entering a period of economic pause. Some consultations will be necessary.

Kissinger: But there is a point beyond which consultations become counter-productive. Like the OPEC letter—that would never have been signed if we had brokered it all over Europe.

Hyland: Carter is the problem in Europe. (Laughter) Some of what he said during the campaign has reverberated very strongly. The Germans are very worried.

Kissinger: I will tell him that Bill Hyland, who will be looking for a job in the new Administration says that Jimmy Carter is the problem in Europe. (Laughter)

Hyland: You should say something about the U.S. propensity to re-examine their commitments.

Scowcroft: Why take him on? You know he wants to re-examine NATO anyway.

Kissinger: I should say I have been preaching for years that if we damage the European psychology we would only contribute to the Finlandization of Europe. And if we set goals that they cannot meet they would be tempted to further drop their defense expenditures.

Any other issues he might raise?

Robinson: CIEC: debt rescheduling, commodities . . .

Rogers: And indexation.

There are really only two tests of manhood in CIEC now: debts and indexation, and I would look for the Democrats to cave on both of those. But I don’t think you want to get into a debate with him.

Kissinger: I will tell him that I am against the meeting. There is nothing we can do and he will be stuck with any positions we make. It should be put off until May.

Rogers: Don’t worry. It won’t happen. Everyone is against it even though no one is willing to get out in front.

Habib: You might want to give him a quick once over on Law of the Sea.

Kissinger: Yes, but I am in good shape on Law of the Sea.

Lord: You might make two points. First, that we should do it as a political issue, not as a legal or technical one, and secondly, that we should make absolutely clear that we are not the only ones who need the treaty, and we don’t need it nearly as badly as a lot of people think we do.

Eagleburger: He may want you to say something about the Third World.

Lord: The first point to understand is, there is no such thing as the Third World.

Kissinger: Right! That will settle it! (Laughter)

Hyland: If you can make that kind of progress, you can get through this whole thing in 15 minutes. (Laughter)

Robinson: We have to begin appealing to the moderates among the LDC’s.

Kissinger: We have to prove that with moderation they will achieve more than through radicalism.

Eagleburger: Cyprus.

Hyland: He is so committed to the Greeks . . .

Kissinger: I should give him a run-down on how we got to where we are now, and ask him what he wants to do about the principles.

Lord: MBFR.

Scowcroft: You should go through the basic problem. What our objectives have been . . .

Hyland: You should say that MBFR was created specifically to deal with the immense pressures for unilateral withdrawals, but the priority is not high. But now that the Germans apparently want to reactivate their Eastern policy and the French too . . .

Kissinger: Yes, the conservatives have driven the Europeans into the Soviet’s arms but in three months they will all be in full cry for détente. And who will be left to put a brake on that? Certainly not Schlesinger, and not Brzezinski.

Lord: You may want to explain CSCE.

Kissinger: Absolutely not, unless I am asked.

Hyland: You could raise Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. (Laughter)

Habib: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan?

Kissinger: What should I say?

Habib: Explain how our relations got to where they are now.

Kissinger: Exactly what is worse now, than before? Under Kennedy they wet themselves every time Nehru¹² opened his mouth and what was different than it is now?

Eagleburger: But that is exactly what he does not understand.

Kissinger: The interesting thing about the Indians is not their spiritual up-lift but their cold-blooded exercise of power. Look at what Mrs. Gandhi is doing now. But if I say that to him he will tell me to go talk to his mother. (Laughter) I will have to explain what we were trying to do. I will say that there is very little that they can do for us and not much we can do for them, but that the more we ask them to support us the more it inflates their ego.

Rogers: There is less romanticism in our relationship now than there has ever been before.

Habib: Not among the Democrats.

Scowcroft: That’s right. A lot of those people out there are still pretty mystical about India.

END OF CONVERSATION

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 346, Department of State, Memoranda of Conversations, Internal, November 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.
2. The Department produced a series of briefing papers for Kissinger in anticipation of his meeting with President-elect Carter on November 20. Topics covered include Africa, economics and foreign policy, non-proliferation, the Panama Canal negotiations, U.S.-European relations, U.S.–USSR relations, SALT, MBFR, security assistance programs, Portugal, Cyprus, and the management of the Department. The papers are ibid., Box CL 329, Department of State, Carter, Jimmy Transition Papers, Meeting, 20 Nov. 1976, Briefing Books, May–Nov. 1976.
3. In a memorandum to Kissinger, November 15, Habib listed subjects “on which it would be useful for the President-elect to make his views known in appropriate circumstances,” including relations with the USSR, relations with the PRC, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Panama Canal, Europe, OPEC, the international economic situation, Japan, Korea, Cyprus, and Vietnam. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Entry 5027, Box 382, Kissinger–Carter Meeting (Mr. Lord) Nov. 1976)
4. A reference to a briefing paper summarizing the status of the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations sent by chief U.S. negotiator Ellsworth Bunker through Habib to Kissinger, November 19. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 329, Department of State, Carter, Jimmy, Transition Papers, Meeting, 20 Nov. 1976, Briefing Book, May–Nov. 1976, n.d.)
5. Not found. On November 17, Hyland provided Kissinger with a copy of a July 10 memorandum from Scowcroft to Ford outlining the course of the SALT negotiations with the Soviets since Kissinger’s January 1976 visit to Moscow, as well as the administration’s position on the development of cruise missiles and limitations on the Soviet Backfire bomber fleet. (Ibid.)
6. Walter B. Slocombe was a member of the National Security Council Staff, 1970–1971. He would serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1977–1979, and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1979–1981.
7. Admiral James L. Holloway, III, was Chief of Naval Operations, 1974–1978.
8. C. Fred Bergsten was a member of the National Security Council Staff, 1969–1971. He would serve as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, 1977–1981.
9. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, 1976–1977. He had previously served as Secretary of Defense, 1959–1961.
10. Richard N. Cooper was a member of the National Security Council Staff, 1969–1970. He would serve as the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1977–1981.
11. George C. Marshall, Jr., Secretary of State, 1947–1949, and Secretary of Defense, 1950–1951.
12. Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister, 1947–1964.