Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

171. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Robert C. McFarlane of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, March 9, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Foreign Assistance

Based upon an assessment of Congressional and Executive Branch attitudes and intentions with regard to the foreign assistance program, we believe that the Administration may be facing a serious legislative defeat that will have a major impact on our relations with foreign aid recipients around the world and on the credibility of the Nixon Doctrine.² In our judgment, a successful effort to reverse this defeat will require:

—the personal participation of you and Secretary Schlesinger in defending the foreign assistance program; and,

—changes in the way in which foreign assistance is planned, administered, and promoted.

The purpose of this memorandum is to identify the nature of the problem and to make recommendations for its resolution.

The Problem

This year we are making over 10 individual requests, either regular or supplemental, for foreign assistance of various kinds—nearly twice the normal number (Tab A).³ Indochina Relief, Jordan, ICCS funding and the MASF ceiling increase are only illustrative of the vital character of the requests. The Congressional climate in which they are being received is increasingly hostile. The defeat of the IDA replenishment in the House and the steps taken to end Foreign Aid by both Mr. Fulbright and Mr. Gross⁴ are indicative of the deep antipathy this year on the Hill—deeper than those in any other year. Even in the House, where we have been supported in the past, there is strong sentiment against the programs—a reflection of the effects of our domestic economic dilemmas, the energy crisis, and the unsettling aftermath of the Middle East War. In addition, Jane Fonda and her entourage have made headway on the Hill in spreading disenchantment with our “open-ended” commitment to South East Asia.

The problem this year is complicated by the lack of coordination between the economic and security assistance programs and by the lack of attention devoted to Security Assistance within the State Department.

—The mechanism for coordinating Security Assistance and economic programs, which formerly was managed by Deputy Secretary Irwin is not working—yet such coordination is an absolute must if the two programs are to be presented and defended effectively on the Hill. (OMB and Peter Flanigan are moving to fill this void with the institutional viewpoints of which you are aware—and we are fighting this problem continually.)⁵

—Defense is in our judgment at best lukewarm—e.g., they don’t like SVN MASF; they don’t want to fight for amounts needed for Cambodia; and State’s leadership role is simply not driving Defense nor even coordinating effectively the efforts of the two departments.

The problems on the Hill are so formidable and these programs so important, that they demand a comprehensive, intensive, coordinated, government-wide effort with full support from the highest levels. Up to now the efforts have lacked inspiration, management and coordination.

—The legislative Staffs of Defense, State, AID, and the White House are essentially going their own individual ways without the coordinated hard-hitting drive necessary to get even minimally acceptable results.

—State’s Under Secretary for Security Assistance has no staff immediately responsible to him to drive the program and its defense on the Hill; nor, because of his necessary concentration on energy matters, has he sufficient time to prepare himself either for the development of the programs or for the vital job of defending them. This is doubly bad because the Hill perceives for the second year in a row that the Under Secretary is devoting little or no time to the task for which the position was established by Congress—evidence to those who are either opposed or on the fence that the Administration does not place a high priority on the programs.

This recitation of horrors is not meant to suggest we have only to throw up our hands. It is late but not necessarily too late.

We believe the following action program is the minimum essential.⁶

(1) State

—The Under Secretary for Security Assistance should be (a) tasked, and (b) staffed to do the security assistance job. This means the personnel working on the program who are now in PM, should be made directly responsible to the Under Secretary; a legislative coordinator also should be assigned to his staff.

—The Under Secretary for Security Assistance should be tasked to coordinate for you and State the full range of Foreign Assistance legislative proposals.

—The Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs and the AID Director, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, should be tasked to develop a full game-plan for presentation and defense of the programs.

(2) Defense

—A full game-plan for presentation and defense of the MASF and MAP programs should be developed in coordination with State’s Security Assistance coordinator.

(3) White House

—The LIG mechanism must be called into play immediately and focused on this panoply of assistance legislation to (a) refine, extend, and coordinate the Departmental game-plans and (b) bring full White House support to bear.

(4) Cabinet Participation

—Both you and Secretary Schlesinger will be absolutely essential to any successful effort.

—The Departmental game-plans should be developed around some key appearances by you and Secretary Schlesinger. Your commitment to individual contacts later would be extremely valuable.

In order for this action program to get off the ground it will be necessary for you to direct the revitalization of the critical coordinating role which is vested in the office of the Under Secretary (SA) by law. With that designation, the other steps can fall into place.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1337, NSC Unfiled Material, 1974 [1 of 9]. No classification marking. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: “Dick—Good paper. I agree. Show it to Donaldson.”
2. For the origins of the Nixon Doctrine, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 29–30.
3. Attached but not printed is a list of current and potential requests before Congress.
4. Representative H.R. Gross (R–Iowa).
5. Kissinger wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “What can be done?”
6. Kissinger wrote “Agree” in the margin next to each point of items 1–4 below, with the exception of the second point of item 4.