Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

168. Briefing Memorandum From the Inspector General of the Foreign Service (Sutterlin) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, December 7, 1973.

The Department’s Performance in International Narcotics Control

During the past ten days we have reviewed the Department’s performance in the International Narcotics Control Program (INCP). This review was undertaken as an updating of our November 1972 inspection report on the role of the Department in international narcotics control.² It was performed under the severe handicap of the absence of your Senior Adviser for Narcotics Matters and his deputy—both out of the country for the duration of the study.

Our findings and conclusions are known only by me and the three officers who conducted the review.

I. Principal Finding

S/IG continues to believe that the lead role in international narcotics control is a proper responsibility of the Department, but finds that its performance of that role during the past year has varied from unacceptable to barely sufficient. The significant contributing factors are:

—The Department’s delay in accepting the INCP leadership role offered in the Ash memorandum of February 1 (attached)³ and in filling the position of Senior Adviser for Narcotics Matters;

—Insufficient aggressiveness on the part of the new Senior Adviser, once appointed, to exercise State’s new authority; and

—General belief within the INCP community that the program is now essentially “orphaned” with neither the President nor the Secretary of State viewed as active proponents of the program.

II. Background

The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC), which you chair, is the top interagency forum for setting international narcotics control policy. Subordinate committees in Washington and the field are responsible for developing and coordinating programs to reduce the flow of narcotics and drugs into the United States.

Other agencies playing major roles in the International Narcotics Control Program (INCP) at the present time are OMB’s Federal Drug Management Division, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the CIA, AID, and Treasury. Except for OMB, their activities are operational in nature—improved intelligence collection, strengthened law enforcement capabilities abroad, crop diversification. In most cases they must work closely with host governments.

The success of our operational activities overseas is dependent on the effectiveness of our diplomatic effort. Without internal political decisions to clamp down on narcotics production and trafficking, our overseas activities will produce only limited, and often disappointing, results.

Accordingly, when the interagency structure for the INCP was adjusted early this year, at the recommendation of OMB Director Ash, it was agreed that State should exercise key leadership/management responsibilities previously handled in the White House. The Senior Adviser was given the additional functions of Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee and Chairman of the CCINC Working Group—replacing Egil Krogh.

On May 3, Secretary Rogers sent a letter to the other members of the Cabinet Committee informing them of the appointment of William J. Handley as Senior Adviser and Executive Director of the CCINC.⁴ The letter set forth a list of duties:

1. Overseeing the operation of the Cabinet Committee’s interagency organization;

2. Coordinating the international narcotics control activities and programs of all involved US agencies;

3. Acting as the principal point of contact and adviser on international narcotics control matters for OMB, the NSC, and the Domestic Council;

4. Ensuring implementation of United States policy in international narcotics control matters;

5. Providing drug control direction to American Ambassadors and narcotics control coordinators abroad;

6. Communicating, as appropriate, with foreign governments on drug control matters;

7. Representing the United States on the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs and at other international drug meetings and conferences; and

8. Supervising the expenditure of funds now appropriated in the AID budget for international narcotics control programs.

III. Assessment of Performance

A. Interagency Management

An effective INCP requires that the activities of the numerous participating agencies, in Washington and in the field, are consistent with US interests and are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Strong central leadership and coordination are essential, therefore, and are best provided by someone who can relate the narcotics control interest to other foreign affairs interests of the US.

In outlining State’s expanded INCP role on February 1, 1973, Ash sought to remedy “a lack of clear lines of authority, the absence of independent funding or budget coordination, the need to secure agreement (or at least reluctant acquiescence) from each of the seven organizations involved for even minor program decisions, and the absence of any real management information system or program evaluation capability.” He indicated willingness to provide an executive level position from the White House pool so that S/NM could be headed by a Deputy Under Secretary, and he called for an enlarged and upgraded S/NM staff.

The Department has been slow in exerting the leadership and developing the staff required to do its expanded job. It declined the offer of an executive level position. It failed to capitalize on the personal recommendation of the OMB Director as a way to obtain needed positions quickly. It allowed the top S/NM job to lie idle from January 20 to May 7. It allowed the Department’s INCP efforts to be headed for several months by an officer who does not believe State should have been given its new role. It did not convene meetings of the Cabinet Committee Working Group or Coordinating Subcommittee, and it allowed the job of Coordinating Subcommittee Chairman to go unfilled.

Ambassador Handley, taking the job of Senior Adviser and Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee, carefully reviewed the activities of State personnel, participated in preparation of a PARA paper, and worked on obtaining control of the narcotics budget. He requested new positions to complete his staff but did not seek reprogramming action to avoid the long delay in getting them through the budget process. He did not move aggressively into his interagency manager role.

With the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)⁵ and the end of a period in which old organizations and leaders were being phased out, the lack of strong leadership and coordination became more apparent and the patience of OMB wore thin. OMB provided, on non-reimbursable loan, one of its staff to serve as Coordinating Subcommittee Chairman. That officer moves effectively among the agencies and is regarded as the man who ties the program together. While he operates under a title given him by Handley, he is widely regarded as representing Walter Minnick, OMB’s Federal Drug Management Division Chief. Minnick, who sharply decreased his own activity on the international drug program when he left the White House staff last winter, found it necessary to take the initiative on such matters as the Burma program and the drafting of the delegation of authority transferring funds control from AID to S/NM. Now he does not hesitate to issue orders and bring pressure to bear when he thinks that the State Department is not moving rapidly or forcefully enough.

The delegation of authority has been obtained and there are pending FY 1974 budget and supplemental appropriation requests for additional S/NM positions. The Senior Adviser/Executive Director is still operating with inadequate staff, however, and has not gained other agency acceptance as the interagency manager of the INCP. He is not sought out on important issues. He almost never sees such important INCP officials as John Bartels of DEA and Ed Morgan of Treasury. OMB views him as having abdicated his leadership role. Most INCP participants have concluded that he lacks the high-level backing previously exhibited by Krogh and Gross.

Handley has been in a difficult position. He took on his current responsibilities after several months of neglect throughout the INCP, as substantial changes were occurring in organization and personnel. He has not had a strong deputy, and the rest of his incomplete staff has consisted of overcomplement and borrowed officers. In addition, his leadership status has suffered from talk, in and out of the Department, about family difficulties, a drinking problem, and his possible retirement. S/IG was not in a position to substantiate the validity of the drinking problem allegations.

There is evidence that Handley is now attempting to become more forceful. His November 21 memorandum to you⁶ and his reaction to being bypassed by Minnick on the change in policy on licit opium demands are cases in point. Our judgment, however, is that it is too late for him to establish himself as an effective interagency manager. Not entirely through his own fault, confidence has dipped too low.

B. Narcotics Diplomacy

The foreign policy priority of narcotics control needs to be maintained. It must compete with other priorities for the time of Ambassadors and for the attention of host country leaders. Frequently those other interests are either more imperative or more easily advanced. A major part of the Senior Adviser’s task is that of diplomatic protagonist for the INCP. His performance of this role is enhanced to the extent he has the active and evident support of you and the President.

Narcotics diplomacy has been pursued with diminished vigor during the past year. The four-month gap between the departures of Gross and Krogh and the appointment of Handley did not help. Handley is now on his third foreign trip and has plans to visit the Far East and Middle East in the coming months. However, we would distinguish between trips to brief and exhort operational level personnel (as at the current regional meeting in Bogota)⁷ and those for the specific purpose of meeting with the Ambassador and top host country officials on priority programs. To date, only Handley’s trip to Mexico⁸ falls clearly within this definition of narcotics diplomacy.

Other agencies engaged in the INCP do not view the Senior Adviser as having ready access to you and other Department principals. By some this is interpreted as a lack of backing. We do not find this a convincing explanation for his having failed to attempt a more vigorous diplomatic role. It may be a contributing factor.

C. Department Catalyst

It is essential that S/NM play a strong guiding and attention-focusing role within the Department. S/NM must be both an advocate and a catalyst—at the 7th and 6th floors, as well as at the operational levels. It should: stimulate programs and initiatives directed at key problems; promote complementarity of efforts both within and across regions; identify emerging priorities at the earliest possible date.

We find that S/NM has performed this role with only moderate effectiveness during the past year. The most important shortcoming is failure to engage the attention of both 7th and 6th floor principals. Without pressure from above, the regional interagency committees have met less frequently, and there has been less participation by high-ranking regional bureau officers.

How to make best use of the UN and its Fund for Drug Abuse Control (to which the US has been the principal contributor) has been a persistent question within the INCP. On this matter we have found little indication of innovative thinking from within State or willingness to support initiatives from elsewhere.

S/NM is devoting more staff effort to the Department catalyst role than was the case a year ago. However, there is some question whether the overall calibre of personnel in S/NM is adequate to the task. The fact that permanent positions have not yet been made available has contributed to recruitment difficulties.

On the positive side, it should be noted that S/NM took the initiative in updating the country Narcotics Control Action Plans early this year, and is organizing a new round of regional conferences for Embassy narcotics and key Washington personnel.

D. Congressional Relations

Congressional relations requirements are to keep the Hill informed on international drug control matters, to consult with it on programs in which there is strong Congressional interest, and to maintain support for funding. Difficulties arise not from lack of Congressional interest, but rather from Congressmen who are impatient with the progress being made and, in their zeal, threaten other important US interests. For example, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, now requires the President to suspend economic and military assistance to a country which “has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs and other controlled substances” from entering the United States unlawfully.

The Senior Adviser has performed the Congressional relations function well. He has devoted substantial time to it. He enjoys both support and confidence on the Hill. It has, however, been largely a one-man performance. The Office of Congressional Relations does not now accord INCP matters high priority. If S/NM gets the additional positions it has requested, it would be desirable to designate a full-time “public relations” officer to work closely with the Office of Congressional Relations and to assist the domestic agencies in their Congressional liaison problems relating to the INCP.

IV. Conclusion

To fulfill the role it has been accorded in the INCP, State must name a new Senior Adviser/Executive Director who is a more active and forceful narcotics diplomat and who possesses a “take charge” managerial style. His appointment must be accompanied by that of a deputy who has the same traits, by making the Coordinating Subcommittee Chairman a regular State employee, and by providing S/NM with its required positions (on a permanent basis) and staff.

The alternative is to force OMB, by State default, to assume management of the program. S/IG believes State should retain leadership—as does OMB and the rest of the INCP community.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5. Sensitive. Drafted by Deputy Inspector General Perkins C. Pedrick (S/IG) on December 7.
2. A copy of the report is attached to a memorandum from Pickering to Scowcroft, September 19. (Ibid., PER KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
3. Ash’s memorandum, attached, is printed as Document 160.
4. A copy of Rogers’s May 3 letter to Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson informing him of Handley’s appointment is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5.
5. The DEA was created on July 1, 1973, by merging the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs with the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement.
6. Not found.
7. The meeting of narcotics officials at ARA posts was held in Bogota December 3–4. An agenda for the conference was transmitted in telegram 231213 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, November 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973)
8. Handley visited Mexico June 26–July 1 to confer with Mexican officials and Embassy personnel on narcotics policy. A description of Handley’s trip is in telegram 123095 to Mexico City, June 22. (Ibid.) Details of Handley’s June 27 meeting with Mexican Foreign Secretary Rabasa are in telegram 4668 from Mexico City, June 22. (Ibid.)