265. Message From Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

[Omitted here is information unrelated to oil.]

“The publicly announced results of the OAPEC Conference represent all decisions actually taken.2 Although we did not achieve as much at the conference as we wished, the results came as close as possible to achieving our goals. The main factor inhibiting full achievement of our goals as previously conveyed to you3 was the insistence of other participants at the conference that even stronger and more extreme decisions and resolutions be enacted. I instructed our acting Petroleum Minister Hisham Nazir to insist that the conference formally adopt a “decision” of the conference rather than merely announcing a “recommendation” of the conference which would not have bound the OAPEC member states to implement lifting of the oil embargo and the production restrictions once progress has been achieved as outlined at the conference. The decisions and recommendations of the conference would have been very different had it not been for the position taken by our acting Petroleum Minister.”

[3 lines not declassified]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 139, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Nov–Dec 1973. Secret; Sensitive.
  2. At the December 8 meeting in Kuwait, OAPEC issued a resolution setting forth its decisions: 1) If Israel withdrew from the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, in accordance with a timetable, which the United States would guarantee, the oil embargo on the United States would be withdrawn; 2) when the timetable for withdrawal was agreed, the Arab Oil Ministers would meet to agree on a schedule for return to the production levels of September 1973; and 3) African and “friendly Islamic” countries would be supplied with oil even if it meant an increase in production, provided they did not re-export the oil to embargoed countries. (Telegram 8269 from Kuwait, December 10; ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) In his memoirs, Kissinger described the resolution as a “clear non-starter.” (Years of Upheaval, p. 883)
  3. See Documents 259 and 260.